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INTRODUCTION
N both state and federal politics, the ills associated with urban
sprawl and the political opportunities these problems present are
once again hot topics of discussion.' This focus on sprawl, however, is
1. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Political Machine, New Republic, Jan. 25, 1999, at 18
(discussing why political leaders of major U.S. cities support Vice President Gore's
policies on urban sprawl); Alison Mitchell, 2 Parties Seek to Exploit Nonstop Subur-
ban Boom, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1999, at Al (describing political initiatives designed to
attract the increasingly important suburban vote); Randal O'Toole, Dense Thinkers,
Reason, Jan. 1999, at 44 (declaring "New Urbanism" the latest trend in urban plan-
ning); Jennifer Preston, Battling Sprawl, States Buy Land for Open Space, N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1998, at Al (describing several states' plans to preserve open space); John
Tierney, Room Aplenty for Sprawl in the Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1999, at B1
(comparing urban sprawl to earlier "open space" crusades); Sam Howe Verhovek,
Fighting Sprawl, Oregon County Makes Deal With Intel to Limit Job Growth, N.Y.
Times, June 9, 1999, at Al (discussing Intel's agreement with Washington County,
Oregon to limit the growth of manufacturing jobs); General Accounting Office,
GAO/RCED-99-87, Community Development: Extent of Federal Influence on "Ur-
ban Sprawl" is Unclear (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter GAO Sprawl Report] (discussing fed-
eral policies' and programs' influence on sprawling patterns of development and con-
cluding that extent of influence is uncertain).
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far from a new phenomenon.2 The fact that urban sprawl and its asso-
ciated effects would trigger and sustain political attention for decades
is unsurprising. Urban sprawl causes many direct and indirect societal
and environmental harms. Sprawling metropolitan development re-
quires substantial new infrastructure investments by all levels of gov-
ernment and generally requires more costly infrastructure investments
than more concentrated forms of development Urban sprawl also
threatens biodiversity and contributes to transportation-caused air
pollution and the deterioration of river water quality as development
destroys green areas, displaces agricultural uses, creates impervious
surfaces and adds to river discharges. Decisions to develop in a
sprawling pattern also necessarily involve choices of locations for new
real estate development investment. These development decisions
can contribute to an ongoing avoidance of underutilized or decaying
urban centers and "brownfields" sites.' Abandonment of the urban
core, which is both a cause and effect of sprawl, increases disparities in
wealth, housing, environmental, and business conditions.
The counter to this litany of harmful effects is that urban sprawl
represents a logical choice for millions of citizens, businesses, and
2. Sprawl has been a subject of academic and journalistic focus for decades. See,
e.g., Ian L. McHarg, Design With Nature (1969) (noting the development of ecologi-
cal planning); The Editors of Fortune, The Exploding Metropolis (1958) [hereinafter
The Exploding Metropolis] (stating that with the growth of urbanization there is con-
flict between cities and surrounding metropolitan areas). See generally Peter Gordon
& Henry W. Richardson, Are Compact Cities a Desirable Planning Goal?, 63 J. Am.
Plan. Ass'n 95 (1997) (questioning planners' factual assumptions and frequent prefer-
ence for compact cities over sprawling urban forms); Reid Ewing, Is Los Angeles-
Style Sprawl Desirable?, 63 J. Am. Plan. Ass'n 107 (1997) (disputing assertions of
Gordon and Richardson and arguing that sprawl is undesirable). In the 1970s, Sena-
tor Henry Jackson unsuccessfully proposed several bills to increase federal incentives
to state and local governments to engage in more rational land use planning and
thereby reduce environmental harms and waste of land. See generally Jayne E. Daly,
A Glimpse of the Past-A Vision for the Future: Senator Henry M. Jackson and Na-
tional Land-Use Legislation, 28 Urb. Law. 7 (1996) (discussing the goals and history of
federal land use bills proposed by Senator Jackson and others between 1970 and
1974); see also Land Resource Planning Assistance Act and the Energy Facilities Plan-
ning and Development AcL" Hearings Before the Senate Subcomnittee on the Envi-
ronment and Land Resources of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
94th Cong. (1975) (compiling hearing statements, submitted material, and Senate Bills
619 and 984 from hearings held on Apr. 23,24,29 and May 2,1975).
3. For an excellent discussion of growth management techniques associated with
urban sprawl, coupled with a survey of related urban planning literature, see Arthur
C. Nelson et al., Growth Management Principles and Practices (1995).
4. For a discussion of the nature of brownfields and programs to encourage their
reuse, see William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institu-
tional Determinism, 21 Win. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 1-6 (1997). An exodus
of businesses and residents from urban to suburban areas may contribute to urban
blight and increased municipal government burdens, see infra Part I.A.1., but also
should lead to reduced demand for business and residential space and thereby lead to
reduced central city rents or land prices as landlords seek to earn a return on their
real estate in a buyers' (or renters') market. See Paul Peterson, City Limits 22-24(1981).
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units of government seeking to address market, social and political
demands at reasonable cost. Critics question whether urban sprawl
presents a problem at all. They view anti-sprawl initiatives as reflect-
ing political opportunism and anti-car and anti-suburb animus rather
than actual societal need.5 Even environmental pessimist Bill McKib-
ben notes that in highly populated regions such as the northeastern
United States, increasing tree cover is a more prevalent phenomenon
than sprawling development.6 In newer booming cities of the South,
the Southwest, and the West, however, the existence of urban sprawl
is irrefutable.7 Sprawling developing patterns in these newer cities
represent the norm, not the exception. Disagreement generally cen-
ters not on whether sprawl exists, but on whether sprawl constitutes a
problem or merely reflects rational choice and an appropriate diver-
sity of government policies and priorities.
Even if policy analysts could agree on causes of urban sprawl and
different modes of development that would reduce associated harms
and better meet citizens' political or market preferences, it is not clear
that urban sprawl is a phenomenon that can be addressed through any
one legal strategy. Urban sprawl's causes are part social, part market-
driven, and part the result of current legal structures and divisions of
political authority. Sprawl's causes and effects cut across jurisdic-
tional lines and are in part the result of institutional complexity. As
Professor Been notes in a cogent critique of community-oriented vi-
sions for urban form, aspirations and sound visions are insufficient to
lead to successful legal or political reform if the dynamics that create a
social ill are inadequately understood: "a solution needs to fit the
problem."8
5. For a few recent criticisms of proposed sprawl reforms and the "new urban-
ism" response to sprawl, see Gregg Easterbrook, Suburban Myth, New Republic,
Mar. 15, 1999, at 18; Gordon & Richardson, supra note 2; Steven Hayward, Suburban
Legends, Nat'l Rev., Mar. 22, 1999, at 35; Randall G. Holcombe, In Defense of Urban
Sprawl, PERC Reps., Feb. 1999, at 3 (attributing most types of sprawling develop-
ment to market forces representing rational consumer choice and, where less salutary
"single dimension" development occurs, blaming government intervention in the
form of zoning laws); O'Toole, supra note 1; Tierney, supra note 1.
6. See Bill McKibben, Hope, Human and Wild 12-36 (1995). McKibben also,
however, notes the devastating effects of sprawling development and clear-cut timber
techniques. See id. at 36-52.
7. For an excellent discussion of the increase in sprawling forms of urban growth,
including a discussion of older metropolitan areas such as New York City, see Robert
Fishman, America's New City: Megalopolis Unbound, Wilson Q., Winter 1990, at 24,
24.
8. Vicki Been, Comment on Professor Jerry Frug's The Geography of Commu-
nity, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1109, 1111 (1996) (commenting on Jerry Frug, The Geography
of Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047 (1996)). Professor Been questions if Frug's oth-
erwise rich and provocative work adequately acknowledges the contribution of fiscal
and economic motivations to the destruction of vibrant urban centers and concurrent
sprawling urban forms. See id. at 1109. Despite these concerns, Been views Frug's
work as a key contribution to the literature addressing reasons for current urban form
and why corrective actions should be taken.
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Legal literature oddly contains little examination of urban sprawl in
light of prevailing federalism doctrine and political-economic and com-
parative institutional analysis frameworks used to analyze other social
illsf This Article begins to fill this gap in the literature. It does not
resolve whether efforts to combat sprawl are, in fact, justly viewed as a
political priority requiring immediate reform efforts across the country.
At the national, state, and local level, different social concerns may
legitimately take precedence over political scrutiny of sprawl and its
effects. Legal reform or government intervention to address sprawl
and its associated ills may promise to be effective in some contexts and
be utterly ineffective in others. Furthermore, different stages in a ju-
risdiction's political and economic growth will change both the dy-
namics and incentives of sprawl-related market and political activity.10
This Article therefore does not promote a particular optimal mix of
urban, green space, and sprawling development forms. Given the insti-
tutional complexity that underlies sprawl, this Article concludes that
overly rigid legal prescriptions or prohibitions would be a mistake; dif-
ferent incentives and policies will be appropriate in different contexts.
As part of this analysis of institutional complexity and federalism, this
Article looks at lessons from the history of environmental law to assess
whether transformative political and legal reforms are likely to arise
and remain effective in combating ills associated with urban sprawl.
The Article concludes that the complex institutional terrain affecting
urban form and sprawl requires substantial reliance on outright acqui-
sition of important green spaces as well as reliance on regulatory
strategies that entice participants, rather than prescribe a particular
urban form or seek to punish or coerce regulatory targets."
9. The legal literature that obliquely touches on sprawl's political and economic
dynamics and prospects for effective legal reform is found in an array of articles more
generally looking at problems of urban forms of governance and the usual lack of re-
gional units of government that can address regional needs and still provide for the
benefits associated with local government politics. See generally Richard Briffault,
The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 Stan. L Rev.
1115 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, Local Government] (discussing the conflict be-
tween local political autonomy and effective metropolitan area governance); Richard
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 1843 (1994) (asserting that political geography might promote racial
segregation and discussing implications of the lack of regional government units);
Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 253 (1993) (questioning
the benefits of decentralized metropolitan governance and calling for the creation of
metropolitan regional legislatures); Frug, supra note 8, at 1081-89 (arguing that cur-
rent U.S. urban policy has created social division and alienated certain groups). For
one of the few articles that discusses sprawl's effects and a possible federal role in ad-
dressing the problems associated with sprawl and other land use harms, see Shelby D.
Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities' Sake, 26 Fordham
Urb. LJ. 69 (1998).
10. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at 27-66 (developing hypothesis that state-federal
dynamics and institutional roles and incentives have changed over time and that ap-
propriate state or federal roles therefore will continue to change).
11. The conclusions of this Article share features of recent analyses of global envi-
1999]
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Part I of this Article starts by briefly reviewing the market and gov-
ernment actions contributing to sprawling development patterns, of-
fering empirical observations about the causes, benefits and harms as-
sociated with sprawl. This part then briefly discusses the benefits of
an alternative anti-sprawl or "new urbanism" vision for urban form.
Part II offers a theoretical political-economic framework to under-
stand why sprawl is pervasive and difficult to deter. Part III demon-
strates how urban sprawl, while resulting in predictable harms and of-
ten caused by similar market, social and political forces, lacks any
obvious single legal "hook" or institution that can be the focal point
for reform efforts. While federalism cases and our constitution permit
federal, state and local efforts to address ills associated with sprawl,
they also strongly indicate that no single legal strategy is available as a
remedy. State and local governments, as well as regional authorities,
are likely to remain the focal point for sprawl-related political battles,
but federal policies and incentives can influence those state and local
decisions. Federal policies have already influenced sprawling devel-
opment patterns and, if modified, could reduce incentives for such
sprawling urban forms of development. Part III then examines fed-
eral use of conditional spending incentives to encourage state and lo-
cal consideration of measures to address sprawl's ills. This part con-
cludes by suggesting particular strategies that could reduce sprawling
development and associated ills. Part IV compares the dynamics, suc-
cesses, and failures of environmental law to glean insights into the
substantial hurdles facing initiatives intended to deter sprawl or ad-
dress its associated harms. Urban sprawl is unlikely to give rise to a
political and legal context for transformative, enduring, and effective
legal reform proposals. Instead, diverse initiatives that offer incre-
mental encouragement for changes in development patterns may be
the best available opportunities for legal reform. For any reform
measures and incentives to be effective, however, techniques to en-
hance government accountability and responsiveness are critical.
ronmental regulation and efforts to protract biodiversity. See generally Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context,
108 Yale L.J. 677 (1999) (discussing regulatory tools' efficacy in addressing global en-
vironmental ills and concluding that where there are numerous independent jurisdic-
tions, "participation efficiency" calls for strategies where entities causing harm can be
paid to change their actions and where pollution rights can be traded); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1997) (analyzing limited
and scattered laws protecting biodiversity); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and
the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for
Something Completely Different?, 66 U. Col. L. Rev. 555 (1995) (discussing the limita-
tions of the "Coercion Model" and the need to look into a federal role in shaping
biodiversity conservation); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodi-
versity: What is its Niche?, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555 (1993) (analyzing the role local gov-
ernments play in biodiversity protection).
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I. SPRAWL'S CAUSES AND EFFECTS
Urban sprawl often goes undefined, but essentially assumes an ur-
ban area that through a confluence of housing, transportation, and as-
sociated private and government decisions expands in an outward
sprawling pattern, usually encompassing a multiplicity of local gov-
ernments. In doing so, the growth leaves behind increasingly impov-
erished central urban areas. 2 While obvious discomforts associated
with sprawl are often mentioned-such as air pollution, costly delivery
of government services, increased commuting times and traffic con-
gestion, destruction of previously exurban green and agricultural ar-
eas, and abandonment of urban centers that would benefit from "in-
fill" efforts 3-- sprawl in most respects cannot be analogized to societal
dynamics leading to environmental destruction. Sprawl is not solely
the result of unintended harms or side effects, like the environmental
destruction of a water body or air resource due to industrial pollution.
Sprawling development patterns directly constitute harms while they
also generate benefits.14 The effects of sprawl flow from private and
government decisions that reflect both a desire for the benefits of
sprawling development and responses to government created incen-
tives for sprawling development patterns. 5 Any assessment of legal
reform proposals must start with an accurate evaluation of baseline
market, legal, and social influences on sprawl.
A. Sprawl's Causes, Benefits, and Harms
Urban sprawl arises from a confluence of private and government
decisions. Although government policies are correctly identified as
substantial contributors to sprawl, private market and political choices
12- See GAO Sprawl Report, supra note 1, at 1, 4; Nelson et al., supra note 3, at 2-
3; see also Robert G. Healy & John S. Rosenberg, Land Use and the States 17 (2d ed.
1979) (defining sprawl as having three basic forms-subdivision homes on large lots,
development along transportation lines, and "leapfrog" development). As discussed
infra notes 29-30, 83-84 & 129-32 and accompanying text, increasing congestion will
often lead to some market-caused revitalization of central urban areas.
13. Urban "infill" initiatives are efforts to encourage development of underutil-
ized real estate in central city areas, usually in lieu of or in preference to development
outside the central metropolitan area. Infill strategies are often combined with urban
"containment" strategies utilizing growth boundaries or constraints. See Nelson et al.,
supra note 3, at 85-87.
14. For a survey of the costs and benefits of sprawl, see Robert W. Burchell, Eco-
nomic and Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, 29 Urb. Law. 159 (1997); see also
Been, supra note 8, at 1109-11 (discussing why sprawling forms are often chosen);
Frug, supra note 8, at 1097-98 (discussing reasons why "those who can afford to [move
out] are moving... to areas more and more remote from the central city," but also
identifying many ways local, state, and federal legal frameworks encourage, if not un-
derwrite, this move).
15. See Healy & Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 18 ("[S]prawl reflects the diver-
gence of interests between individuals, who wish to maximize private space and acces-
sibility, and society as a whole, which seeks larger, contiguous blocks of open space.").
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likewise contribute to sprawl. This section starts by discussing empiri-
cal observations about the roots of sprawling development patterns by
examining residential and business location trends. It then analyzes
harms flowing from sprawl and visions for a more concentrated urban
form.
1. Sprawl's Causes and Benefits
Private real estate markets create much of the impetus for sprawl,
but those private choices have also required antecedent government
investments to make exurban or suburban residential and business
moves possible.16 Initial flight from urban centers to suburbs started
decades ago with the development of highways and mass transit sys-
tems.1 7 The exponential increase in the use of cars made previously
inaccessible areas available for residential and business use."8 The
availability of a federal income tax deduction for mortgage payment
interest also marginally increased the economic attractiveness of
home ownership over the lease arrangements that are far more com-
mon in central urban areas. 19 Furthermore, other tax policies regard-
ing deferral of tax liabilities following sales of homes created incen-
tives for homeowners to increase the size and value of each new home
purchased.2 Much of the shift from urban to suburban housing also
resulted from racial tension and so-called "white flight" during and
16. For a thorough discussion of the private motives and government policies con-
tributing to "the suburbanization of the United States," including an emphasis on
Americans' deep-rooted interest in suburban private home ownership, see Kenneth
T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (1985). See
generally Green, supra note 9 (discussing harms associated with sprawl and policies
facilitating sprawl).
17. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 163-71; Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal
Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 Cornell L. Rev.
878, 894-97 (1990) (discussing federal policies subsidizing movement of middle and
moderate-income households from the city to suburbs).
18. See Land Use in America 45-48 (Henry L. Diamond & Patrick F. Noonan eds.,
1996); The Exploding Metropolis, supra note 2, at 144; Lawrence D. Frank, Land Use
Impacts on Household Travel Choice and Vehicle Emissions in the Atlanta Region
21-22, 97-98 (City Planning Program, College of Architecture, Georgia Institute of
Technology Jan. 1999).
19. For a discussion of how the mortgage deduction acts as a subsidy, but may also
lead to reduced rents in central cities with increased vacancies due to a shift in previ-
ous renters to suburban residential and business sites, see Peterson, supra note 4, at
21-22.
20. See David Bollier, How Smart Growth Can Stop Sprawl 12-14 (1998) (quoting
and citing Kunstler's more extensive treatment in James Howard Kunstler, Home
from Nowhere: Remaking Our Everyday World for the Twenty-First Century 197-
206 (1996)); Frug, supra note 8, at 1068 (discussing federal mortgage policies and
other federal programs and appropriations for work in areas like defense contracting
that undercut central city vitality). For an optimistic appraisal of reasons why recent
amendments to federal tax law may reduce incentives for sprawling urban forms, see
Environmental Law Institute, Linking Tax Law and Sustainable Urban Development:
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (1998).
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following the civil rights era, as well as from government policies and
market practices that contributed to racially segregated housing pat-
terns0 1 The flight of residents and businesses from central urban ar-
eas contributes to reduced urban and business vitality that in turn fur-
ther renders central urban areas unattractive. 2
Even where central city neighborhoods are not at a notable market
disadvantage due to the ills of urban deterioration, housing on the pe-
riphery of the urban center often offers larger homes on larger plots
of land for less moneyY Many citizens favor affordable housing and
new residential communities over urban settings where homes are
smaller, closer together, and stores are in greater proximity.24 Many
urban planners and legal scholars, particularly the "new urbanists,"' 5
favor development patterns that concentrate residential areas, retail
areas, and mass transit in close proximity. Many Americans recently
surveyed about sprawl, however, confirmed market trends that indi-
cate many, if not most, citizens favor new residential developments
with cul de sacs set at a substantial distance from retail markets and
21. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988)
(discussing integration efforts and "white flight" phenomena and the legality of race-
conscious decisionmaking for the purpose of maintaining integrated populations in a
New York City housing development); see also Frug, supra note 8, at 1068-69 (dis-
cussing government lending practices and public housing practices and their contribu-
tions to racial housing segregation).
22. See GAO Sprawl Report, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the historical develop-
ment and the factors contributing to urban sprawl).
23. See Been, supra note 8, at 1110 (discussing economic factors that induce
movement beyond the city center); Jackson, supra note 16, at 6 ("[T]he price of land
falls with greater and greater distance from city centers."). Differences in price,
house, and lot size are stark and apparent in any newspaper's real estate section. In
1999, three to four bedroom homes in intown Atlanta neighborhoods (defined as
neighborhoods within a circling highway and proximate to down- and mid-town of-
fices), sold for between $300,000 to $600,000. See, e.g., Atl.-J. Const., June 21, 1999
(Classifieds), at E8 (listing many homes for sale in this price range). Substantially
larger homes in new subdivisions located 20 to 30 miles outside of the Atlanta perime-
ter highway not only sell for less than half of intown prices, but also have more land
and lower property taxes. See American Farmland Trust and The Georgia Conser-
vancy, Summary Report, An Unlevel Playing Field: How Public Policies Favor Sub-
urban Sprawl Over Downtown Development in Metropolitan Atlanta 8-10 (Jan.
1999) [hereinafter An Unlevel Playing Field] (discussing the lower costs of land devel-
opment in suburban areas).
24. See Choices Between Asphalt and Nature: Americans Discuss Sprawl: Analy-
sis of 20 Focus Groups Across the U.S. 6-7 (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Choices] (unpub-
lished report of surveys conducted for The Biodiversity Project, exploring American
opinions on housing choices in partnership with The Nature Conservancy; surveys by
Belden Russonello & Stewart). These surveyors found focus group reactions to be
consistent regardless of race or economic background. Only when questions were
posed in terms of issues of civic responsibility or direct harms of major traffic conges-
tion did respondents waver in their preference for exurban development styles and
patterns. See id. Also, see generally Jackson, supra note 16, for a discussion that em-
phasizes the deep roots of Americans' prevalent desire for suburban home ownership.
25. The "new urbanist" visions for urban form and politics are discussed infra Part
I.A.3.
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mass transit.26 These survey responses indicate a potential lack of
grassroots support for major sprawl reforms, but citizens' preferences
or choices may change if presented with an alternative vision or if dis-
comforts associated with long commutes and congestion increase.
While private preferences are shaped in part by government policies
and laws, the strength of private preferences for suburban living ap-
pears substantial.? Even with shifts in government policies and legal
incentives to discourage sprawl, private preferences for suburban resi-
dential living may remain and sprawling development may continue.
Private preferences for more distant suburban living will predicta-
bly lessen as sprawl's ills make exurban living increasingly unpleasant.
The market is thus likely to respond to a segment of the populations'
reduced enthusiasm for sprawl, with wealthier residents' demand for
real estate located in inner ring suburbs and the central city predicta-
bly increasing as sprawl's ills grow. 9 It is less clear, however, that in-
creasing interest in inner suburban and central city real estate will be
accompanied by a substantial reduction in demands for sprawling de-
velopment, particularly if metropolitan areas continue to grow in
population. 0
The shift of many families in the 1950s and 1960s to suburban
housing seldom involved a shift in the location of workplaces. Most
employment in metropolitan areas remained in central cities.3' Today,
26. See Choices, supra note 24, at 7.
27. Professor Frug notes that the current preferences of citizens are probably at
variance with his vision and that of the "new urbanists," see Frug, supra note 8, at
1094-95, but argues that the costs of sprawl and empty central cities coupled with the
benefits of a vigorous urban culture may suffice to start experimentation with alterna-
tives that will prove their worth and solidify an incipient "central city-inner suburb
coalition." See id. at 1094, 1099. Additional discussion of the benefits of the "new ur-
banism" or anti-sprawl vision are further discussed below in Part I.A.3.
28. See Choices, supra note 24, at 7. See generally Robert Ellickson, Order With-
out Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991) (discussing how California ranchers'
perceptions of legal rights influenced behavioral norms and frequently led to conflict
resolution without recourse to courts, but that perceptions of legal rights were often
contrary to actual law).
29. During the 1990's, Atlanta's inner ring residential suburbs have skyrocketed in
value as many metropolitan area residents have sought to avoid traffic and long com-
mutes. This increased demand and accompanied increase in prices has led to denser
new development close to Atlanta's central business districts, but has once again led
to a significant price differential between central metropolitan living and housing lo-
cated on the urban periphery. See supra note 23 (citing to local Atlanta newspaper
providing cost comparisons); see also Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Fron-
tier 60 (1991) (reporting that as exurban office parks were built near Trenton, New
Jersey, inner city Trenton residential properties escalated in value from approxi-
mately $22,000 in the 1970's to "more than $220,000 [around 1988]").
30. See Garreau, supra note 29, at 59-62 (observing that "edge city" development
has often been accompanied by revitalization of downtown areas).
31. See generally Deindustrialization and Regional Economic Transformation:
The Experience of the United States (Rodwin & Sazanami eds., 1989) (discussing the
effect of emerging international economy and deindustrialization on the types of
available jobs).
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in contrast, the increasing magnitude of sprawling development pat-
terns and associated harms includes not only a shift in residential
housing, but also a shift in workplace locations.32 Business changes
both linked to and unrelated to government policies have further con-
tributed to abandonment of once vital urban centers. In the last
twenty years, with the shift away from reliance on railroad or river
transportation and increasing use of trucks for transportation of
goods, many businesses have abandoned the central city in favor of
new factories, warehouses, and service sector offices on the urban
edge. 3 The increasing prevalence and market and political clout of
huge retail stores such as Wal-Mart, Home Depot and mall-building
and management companies have further led to land-intensive retail
development, usually at a distance from urban centers.Y Further-
more, in a phenomenon influencing urban center woes but not neces-
sarily urban sprawl, many employers have shifted operations to the
South, Southwest, or abroad to locations that offer cheaper labor and
a less rigorous regulatory climate.35
Even in largely suburban cities like Atlanta or Los Angeles, the
population shift away from the metropolitan centers continues.,, In
some areas, abandonment of the central city follows concerns about
deteriorating infrastructure, education services, and crime.Y The de-
cline in central city investments is not just the result of federal tax
32- See id; see also Jackson, supra note 16, at 266-71 (examining the movement of
factories and offices to more suburban sites).
33. See Burchell, supra note 14, at 161-62 (detailing the creation of "edge cities" at
the intersection of interstate highways); Fishman, supra note 7, at 28-36 (same);
Karen P. Lane, Studies Buoy New Hopes for Brooklyn Waterfront, Crain's N.Y. Bus.,
Sept. 2,1996, at 22.
34. For a detailed study of the political clout of a mall developer in New York
State and the developer's extraordinary efforts to install a favorable local zoning
board, see State of New York Commission on Government Integrity, Poughkeepsie
'85: A Case Study of Election Law Abuses (June 1990) [hereinafter Poughkeepsie
'85]. See also William E. Roper & Elizabeth Humstone, Wal-Mart in Vermont-The
Case Against Sprawl, 22 Vt. L. Rev. 755,757 (1998) (recounting and analyzing the bat-
tle over proposed siting of a Wal-Mart store two miles outside city center).
35. See e.g., Roger Schmenner, Geography and Character and Performance of
Factories, in Industry Location and Public Policy 243 (Henry W. Herzog, Jr. & Alan
M. Schlottmann eds., 1991).
36. See generally Garreau, supra note 29 (surveying the population shifts away
from urban centers in a number of large cities); Robert Liberty, Planned Growth: The
Oregon Model, 13 Nat. Resources. & Env't. 315, 317 (1998) (contrasting population
density growth in metropolitan Portland, Oregon with dropping density in Atlanta);
J.B. Ruhl, Taming the Suburban Amoeba in the Ecosystem Age: Some Do's and
Don'ts, 3 Widener Law Symp. J. 61, 63 & n.7 (1998) (discussing growth in suburban
areas and citing to works discussing suburban and perimeter development).
37. See, e.g., Randall W. Eberts, Some Empirical Evidence on the Linkage Be-
tween Public Infrastructure and Local Economic Development, in Industry Location
and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 83, 96 (examining the effect of deteriorating infra-
structure on urban population); Fishman, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing the increase
in sprawling forms of urban growth).
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policies and transportation expenditures. 38 This decline is also sub-
stantially the result of political clout and priorities in intrastate battles
between urban, suburban, and exurban municipalities for state dollars,
as well as in municipal battles over how to use available funds and to
plan for new development.39 Urban mass transit has generally been a
low priority in many sprawling cities.40 The newer sprawling cities of
the South, Southwest, and West tend to lack the commuter rail infra-
structure characteristic of older cities such as Boston, New York, and
Chicago. For these newer sprawling cities, cars are the main, if not
the only, option for transportation. In recent decades, there has been
a dramatic increase in the percentage of dual career families, causing
many households to contribute pollution from at least two cars while
still using transportation infrastructure built when single career, one
car families were the norm.4 '
While residential and business real estate decisions explain why
more cars and traffic are on the road every day, these largely private
decisions have nonetheless been substantially influenced by the legal
terrain and decisions by all levels of government. In particular, the
most significant subsidy of sprawling development patterns is from
federal and state expenditures on highway development pursuant to
federal and state transportation laws.42 Each new or expanded high-
way near an urban center opens up new real estate for development.43
38. See supra Part II.
39. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1134-41 (discussing the
sources of and competing uses for funds); Burchell, supra note 14, at 165-67 (summa-
rizing use of public and private funds); Frug, supra note 8, at 1070-75, 1081-89 (sur-
veying municipalities' decisionmaking and use of funds).
40. Sprawl cities such as Los Angeles have sought to add mass transportation al-
ternatives, but with preexisting dispersed business and residential neighborhoods, an-
ticipated ridership for new rail lines is low. See Todd S. Purdum, A Subway Line Ex-
tends to Hollywood: But in Car-Crazed Los Angeles, Underground Travel Has Its
Critics, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1999, at A9 (reporting on opening of new segments of
the Los Angeles subway, but pointing out that while 3.4 million commuters in New
York City use subways every day, Los Angeles hopes that weekday commuter use
will rise to 125,000 passengers daily).
41. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 403
(117th ed. 1997) (reporting that between 1960 and 1996, percentage of employed mar-
ried women jumped from 31.9% to 61.2%, while percentage of employed married
men dropped slightly from 89.2% to 77.6%). In 1940, only 14.7% of married women
were in the workforce. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 223 (1970). A recent survey by a nonprofit organization, Catalyst,
found that in 1950, 63% of working families had a stay-at-home spouse, while in 1998
only 17% of working families had a stay at home spouse. Dual-worker couples now
make up 43% of the total workforce, up from 20% in 1950. See Nancy Rivera Brooks,
Two-Career Couples Just Want Some Workplace Flexibility Study Shows, L.A. Times,
Feb. 8, 1998, at D5. For a thorough exploration of changing demographics in the
workforce and their implication for transportation policy and efforts to clean the na-
tion's air, see Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went
Wrong?, 17 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 141 (1998).
42. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
43. See F. Gerard Adams et al., Undeveloped Land Prices During Urbanization:
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As discussed in greater detail below, highway development in the
United States has been and often continues to be financed by federal
dollars provided for state and local transportation projects." Other
transportation dollars come from state and local taxes.45 State and lo-
cal land use and zoning practices, particularly the tendency to isolate
types of uses and hence eliminate or deter more vital mixed urban
uses, have further contributed to reliance on the automobile and the
strip malls and shopping centers that dominate the sprawl landscape.46
2. Sprawl's Harmful Effects
Despite substantial private and public contributions to sprawling
development patterns and the many benefits associated with sprawl-
ing development, private and public entities and the environment all
suffer from aggregate harms of urban sprawl. The dispersed and often
periodic or delayed nature of these harms, however, makes it unlikely
that they will be addressed. Where anti-sprawl reforms are proposed,
political and market preferences for current sprawling development
patterns may deter government intervention. Nevertheless, these
harms are real and predictable. This section briefly provides an em-
pirical assessment of the harms associated with sprawling forms of
metropolitan development.
a. Abandonment of the Inner Urban Core
Each decision by residential or commercial real estate developers to
build on the urban periphery rather than invest in central urban areas
contributes to the woes of the central city. Disinvestment, or deci-
sions to invest elsewhere, create a predictable confluence of harms. In
many cities, these harms fall most directly on central city residents
who often are people of color and are most economically vulnerable!'
Loss of a refurbished residential housing supply leads to decreased
property values, harming the most vulnerable residents, particularly
children. Declining property values in turn lead to a decreased tax
base and a need for higher tax rates to make up for lost revenues and
A Micro-Empirical Study Over Time, 50 Rev. of Econ. & Stat. 248,252-53 (1968).
44. See GAO Sprawl Report, supra note 1, at 10, 41-44 (discussing substantial fed-
eral share of transportation spending, but also noting that federal expenditure's con-
tribution to sprawl is difficult to discern because of gaps in the collected data).
45. Georgia, for example, has long had an infamous, constitutionally-based gas tax
that requires that seven and a half cents from each gallon of gasoline purchased go
exclusively to work on roads and bridges. See Ga. Cost. art. If, § 9, par. 6(b); Ga.
Code Ann. § 48-9-3 (1995) (implementing legislation).
46. See Frug, supra note 8, at 1081-89, 1091-94 (discussing the historical trend of
separating commercial and residential land uses and the new urbanist theory).
47. For a collection of articles analyzing environmental inequity and the relation-
ships among transportation, investment decisions, and race and class, see Just Trans-
portation: Dismantling Race and Class Barriers to Mobility (Robert D. Bullard &
Glenn S. Johnson eds., 1997).
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pay for increased social services. Rents in the central city, however,
may drop as the demand for urban real estate decreases.48
Deteriorating housing is often accompanied by the departure of lo-
cal employers and industry.49 Exurban development of new manufac-
turing or service sector facilities results in old industrial sites remain-
ing unused or underutilized. Older industrial sites with actual or
perceived contamination problems are often described as "brown-
field" sites." The ongoing abandonment of such sites is often primar-
ily the result of private choices to invest in facilities on the urban pe-
riphery. Brownfield sites are also often avoided because developers
fear substantial contamination cleanup liability under federal or state
statutory law, or under toxic tort case law." Many states and the fed-
eral government have developed new regulatory programs to encour-
age cleanup and reuse of brownfield sites, but these programs gener-
ally focus upon counteracting fears of contamination liability through
more responsive regulatory regimes rather than constituting a general
redevelopment program.52 Even with brownfields incentive schemes,
such as streamlined and responsive regulatory treatment and brown-
field grants and loans,53 elective investment decisions may still be
made to establish or expand exurban sites. 4
48. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 285; Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9,
at 1137.
49. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 266-71.
50. For a frequently updated and detailed discussion of the brownfields phe-
nomenon and federal, state, and local laws and initiatives, see Brownfields Law and
Practice: The Cleanup and Redevelopment of Contaminated Land (Michael B. Ger-
rard ed., 1997) [hereinafter Brownfields Law and Practice].
51. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at 5-12.
52. See id. at 12-19; see also William W. Buzbee, A Roadmap to the Brownfields
Transaction-Perspectives and Goals of the Parties, in Brownfields Law and Practice,
supra note 50, § 2.03, at 107-10, 118-22; Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?:
Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 883, 886 ("The most prominent approaches [to encourage reuse of brownfields
sites] are those ... that attempt to alleviate developers' fears of liability. .... ").
53. For discussion of federal and state brownfield regulatory reforms and grants,
see Eisen, supra note 52, at 887-88, and William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose:
Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Intermina-
ble Liability, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 35, 82-96 (1995). For a report reviewing how federal
agencies have recently sought to coordinate brownfield rehabilitation efforts and in-
centives, see United States General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-99-86, Report to
the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, Environmental
Protection: Agencies Have Made Progress in Implementing the Federal Brownfield
Partnership Initiative (Apr. 1999).
54. See Buzbee, supra note 52, at 1-10. Nevertheless, the track record of federal
brownfields initiatives and several states' voluntary cleanup approval programs sug-
gests reason for optimism. Only a small amount of governmental encouragement may
be necessary to modify decisions that would otherwise contribute to inner city and
brownfields ills that usually accompany urban sprawl. See id.; Eisen, supra note 52, at
886-87. Brownfield site successes may, however, be difficult to replicate outside of
the context of massive contamination fears that are removed through a responsive
regulatory scheme and redevelopment grants. Without recent brownfields redevel-
opment incentives, owners and potential developers of brownfields sites were unable
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For central urban areas with governmental units providing services
to area residents, the disappearing tax base coincides with a need for
increased expenditures on government services." For states with
counties that wield largely independent taxing authority and fiscal re-
sources, residents and employers who move to exurban sites generally
leave one county for another. Competition between counties for new
residents and employment is a partial explanation for private deci-
sions to change residential or business locations.
b. Traffic and Air Pollution
Two effects of sprawling development-traffic congestion and air
pollution-are inextricably linked. As cities develop in a sprawling
pattern, with new highway links and more distant workplaces and dis-
persed residents, citizens travel increased miles in their cars.- In At-
lanta, a quintessential sprawl city, for example, residents travel the
highest vehicle miles per capita of any city in the country.-, Because
of ever more rigorous federal emissions control regulation under the
Clean Air Act, automobiles now emit far less pollution per mile than
older cars.ss Nevertheless, residents of sprawling cities drive increas-
ing distances each day due to increased commuting distances and the
tendency of residents to drive even to acquire basic home necessities.59
to ascertain with much certainty whether regulators viewed a particular site as posing
a huge or minor liability risk. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 47-60 (discussing the sub-
stantial uncertainty of brownfields cleanup liability in the absence of guidance from a
responsive regulatory scheme). Under the recent wave of brownfields and voluntary
cleanup regimes, preferential regulatory treatment can convert sites viewed as liability
risks into sites of substantial value. The EPA's Brownfields redevelopment case his-
tories indicate that once worst-case liability fears are allayed, sites in commercially
viable locations are attractive for new development. See <http'l/www.epa.govl
swerospfbflpilotlst.html>. In contrast, sites that are part of deteriorated central urban
areas may remain abandoned, despite additional brownfields incentives such as the
substantial but narrowly focused brownfields federal tax breaks intended to encour-
age redevelopment of high poverty central city sites. Few other underutilized central
city sites are likely to offer such sudden enhancement of property values. See id. De-
spite federal dollars being conditioned on site-specific brownfields redevelopment
proposals, rather than being provided a block grant context, federal brownfields
grants and related initiatives appear to have widespread political support. See, eg.,
Cities Ask Congress for Brownfields Relief as Hearing Begins on Chafee-Smith Bill, 30
Env. Rep. 166-67 (May 28, 1999) (discussing bipartisan interest in brownfields legisla-
tion and municipalities' interest in additional brownfields funding and regulatory re-
lief). For discussion of forms of federal conditional spending and enactment and im-
plementation hurdles to effective spending, see infra Part II.B.3.
55. See Bollier, supra note 20, at 2-3,9-12.
56. See Frank, supra note 18, at 18-19; Oren, supra note 41, at 168-69.
57. See Frank, supra note 18, at 21.
58. For a discussion of pollution control efforts and their successes, as well as the
destructive effects of increased usage of larger and higher polluting sports utility vehi-
cles and light trucks, see Keith Bradsher, Light Trucks Increase Profits but Foud Air
More Than Cars, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,1997, at Al.
59. See Oren, supra note 41, at 160-73.
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This increase in vehicle miles traveled per resident has substantially
undercut the benefits of improved automobile pollution control.10 In
addition, the increased number of dual career families usually means
that two family cars are on the road.61
A further obvious harm of increased reliance on the automobile
and increased vehicle miles traveled per capita is increased commuter
times. Even without traffic congestion, increased commuting dis-
tances mean that metropolitan area residents spend more time com-
muting, and less time at work, with family, or enjoying leisure activi-
ties.6z The added delays attributable to increased congestion over
longer commuting distances increase the travel times, inconvenience,
and stress of drivers.63
Automobile pollution contributes primarily to two types of air pol-
lution that raise concerns under the federal Clean Air Act. All states
must create air quality control regions and prepare State Implementa-
tion Plans ("SIPs") that will lead each region to attain or move to-
wards attainment of federally set National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards ("NAAQS"). 4 NAAQS are numerical limits for ambient levels
of particular pervasive "criteria" pollutants. 6 The criteria pollutants
most relevant to urban sprawl and transportation pollution are ozone,
carbon monoxide, and particulate matter. For the many metropolitan
areas classified as nonattainment areas for ozone, federal law requires
stringent measures to move towards attainment status.66 In addition,
should a jurisdiction fail to meet its SIP obligations or fail to prepare
an adequate SIP, federal highway funds can be jeopardized and new
construction can be subjected to a federally-imposed moratorium.67
60. See Frank, supra note 18, at 23 (discussing how sprawling growth will outpace
benefits of technological improvement in automobile pollution); Tirza S. Wahrman,
Breaking the Logjam: The Peak Pricing of Congested Urban Roadways Under the
Clean Air Act to Improve Air Quality and Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled, 8 Duke
Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 181, 184-88 (1998).
61. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
62. See Oren, supra note 41, at 171-72; see also Wahrman, supra note 60, at 186
(noting that motor vehicles accounted for 88.2% of miles traveled in 1990).
63. See Jackson, supra note 16, at 10 (contrasting 1980 census data revealing aver-
age American worker travels 9.2 miles and 22 minutes to work compared to other
countries' common work practice of lunch at home and siestas); Oren, supra note 41,
at 171-72.
64. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (1994) (setting out requirements
for State Implementation Plans and criteria and procedures for setting National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards).
65. See id. § 7409.
66. See id.; id. § 7410 (setting forth State Implementation Plan requirements); id. §
7509 (stating general sanctions and consequences of nonattainment); id. § 7511(a)-(j)
(setting forth more detailed requirements for multistate ozone nonattainment areas).
67. See id. § 7410(m) (establishing basic procedures for applying sanctions); id. §
7509(b)(1) (specifying sanctions that may be imposed on highway projects); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. EPA, 167 F.3d 641, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (striking down EPA
regulation regarding intersection of Federal Clean Air Act and local planning re-
quirement under transit-related federal laws); see also David Goldberg, Deadline is
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Development patterns leading to increased use of automobiles are
problematic because cars are often the most significant contributor to
cities' Clean Air Act ozone nonattainment problems.6 Cars emit
volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides, both of which con-
tribute to the formation of ground level ozone.6 Cars also emit car-
bon monoxide, another criteria pollutant.70 Trucks contribute less to
ozone problems than do cars, but diesel fuel combustion produces
substantial particulate matter pollution7 Federal NAAQS for both
ozone and particulate matter were made more stringent in 1997 by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency.n These lowered
NAAQS require all jurisdictions to derive and implement even more
stringent air pollution control efforts. In addition to monetary and
planning burdens imposed on citizens and governments due to the
Clean Air Act and the linked federal transportation laws, high levels
of ozone and particulate pollution create substantial respiratory
risks.7 These pollutants pose especially severe risks to the young, the
elderly, and others suffering from respiratory illnesses such as
asthma.74
Looming for a Regional Metro Plan, in Managing Sprawl 14, 14 (Tony Bennett &
Cynthia Renfro eds., 1997) (reprint of Atl.-J. Const. article dated Dec. 29, 1996).
Federal sanctions for Clean Air Act noncompliance are vulnerable to legislative over-
ride and federal agency officials encounter political pressure to refrain from imposing
sanctions. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air Some
Difficulties in Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27 Pac. LJ. 1521,
1553-54, 1626 (1996) (describing EPA's reaction to certain instances of political pres-
sure); Alec Zacaroli, Senator Seeks Repeal of Highway Sanctions in Air Act: Groups
Fear Rider in EPA Budget, 29 Env. Rep. 2213 (Mar. 12,1999).
68. See Oren, supra note 41, at 150-61 (discussing contribution of cars to air pollu-
tion and effects of such pollution).
69. See id. at 153-54.
70. See id at 151-52.
71. See Environmental Protection Agency, Agency Regulatory Plan, 63 Fed. Reg.
61,340,61,373 (Nov. 9,1998).
72. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed.
Reg. 38,652 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.RI pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) (to be codified at 40 CF.R1 pt. 50);
Lucinda Minton Langworthy, EPA's New Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter
and Ozone: Boon for Health or Threat to the Clean Air Act?, 28 Envtl. L Rep. 10,502,
10,504 (1998). In a recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit struck down the validity of these regulations on "delegation doc-
trine" grounds, finding that legislative instructions to the EPA were unconstitution-
ally broad if not cured by a narrowing EPA construction of statutory criteria. See
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
("Where (as here) statutory language and an existing agency interpretation involve an
unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation without the constitutional
weakness is or may be available, our response is not to strike down the statute but to
give the agency an opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own."). The
EPA, however, may seek a rehearing en banc or Supreme Court review of this deci-
sion. See Matthew L. Wald, Court Overturns Air Quality Rules, N.Y. Times, May 15,
1999, at Al.
73. See Oren, supra note 41, at 150-60.
74. Id. at 155.
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Low levels of investment in mass transit also can be linked to
sprawling development patterns and traffic ills, although it is both a
cause and an effect of sprawl. The economic viability and attractive-
ness of mass transit systems, particularly rail systems, decrease as de-
velopment spreads over wide areas instead of concentrating near
commuter rail service. 75 Sprawling development renders rail service
inconvenient for residents of distant housing and may result in an un-
derutilization of available mass transit.76 Without mass transit as an
alternative to automobile travel, employers may have difficulty in at-
tracting and retaining employees. Urban residents often have no
choice but to travel by automobile, even in cities suffering from sub-
stantial congestion."
c. Green Space, Biodiversity Loss, and Water Quality Effects
Sprawl also causes several other types of traditional environmental
harms. As agricultural lands and green spaces are cleared for residen-
tial or business use, the aesthetic and environmental benefits of green
spaces are forever lost,78 as are the biodiversity benefits of linked
green spaces.79 In addition, the process of clearing green spaces for
new construction and associated increased areas of impervious surface
contribute to degraded water quality in nearby rivers and streams.
Siltation and associated increases in turbidity contribute to rivers
failing to meet water quality standards under the federal Clean Water
Act.80 The Clean Water Act requires state or federal authorities to
75. See Purdum, supra note 40 (assessing reasons for low usage and questionable
economic viability of subways in Los Angeles).
76. See Fishman, supra note 7, at 33-35; Oren, supra note 41, at 169-70.
77. See Oren, supra note 41, at 169-73. To encourage state and local expenditures
to provide transportation links between low-income employees and employers, the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) federal transportation law
provides special monetary incentives in the form of a "competitive grant selection"
for private and government efforts to provide needed transportation links. See Trans-
portation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 3037, 112
Stat. 107, 387-92 (1998) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5309) (entitled "Job Access and
Reverse Commute Grants"). Section 3037 includes legislative findings that "94 per-
cent of welfare recipients do not own cars" and that with "two-thirds of all new
jobs ... in the suburbs" and "three-quarters of welfare recipients liv[ing] in rural ar-
eas or central cities," mass transit to link low income workers and suburban jobs is
sought by such residents "to gain access to suburban employment opportunities." Id.
§ 3037(a).
78. See Bollier, supra note 20, at 20-24. "Green space" refers to land that still has
substantial plant life and has not yet been developed for residential, transportation, or
business use. Green spaces range from parks to government-owned lands of all types
that are not yet developed, to privately owned property that is either undeveloped or
has retained substantial undeveloped acreage.
79. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
80. Although the water quality portions of the federal Clean Water Act long re-
mained moribund, citizen suit litigation during the late 1990s has activated state and
federal agencies to comply with the law. For a discussion of relevant legislative and
regulatory language, as well as litigation and regulatory activity, see generally three
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ratchet down permitted pollution levels of industrial polluter "point
sources" if a river cannot meet its designated use.81 Point sources of
permitted pollution such as factories and publicly owned sewage
treatment works either must modify their modes of production or find
ways to buy out other sources of pollution. Sprawl thus further adds
to costs of industrial production as industry must pay for methods to
reduce water pollution to a total maximum daily load of pollution that
a river segment can handle without becoming impaired.
3. The Alternative Vision of an Anti-Sprawl World?
When only the benefits, causes, and harms associated with sprawl
are analyzed, a critical piece of the urban sprawl policy equation is
lacking. If current development patterns in sprawling cities are
viewed as problematic, one needs a competing vision for policymak-
ers, citizens, developers, and industry to assess. A major challenge for
anti-sprawl proponents results from the lack of models for an alterna-
tive urban form. The enticements of vital urban centers are easy to
identify, particularly when one looks at flourishing older urban cen-
ters such as New York City, Chicago, San Francisco, and Boston.
Each of these cities experiences and suffers from the complex array of
urban ills associated with older American cities, but they also offer
business vitality, an active street life, abundant restaurants, widely
used mass transit, and a rich cultural and political life.s The long-
existing problem for anti-sprawl proponents, however, is that many
residents of newer, rapidly sprawling cities have had no exposure to
the pleasures of urban life in these more concentrated urban settingspm
At this time, many sprawling cities have experienced decades of decay
in the central urban areas and thus for many years have not offered
citizens the amenities associated with more concentrated forms of de-
linked articles by Oliver A. Houck: Oliver A. Houck, TMD Lx: The Resurrection of
Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10,329 (1997) (describing the enactment of 303(d) and the promotion of this ap-
proach to water pollution control by state governments and industry); Oliver A.
Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based
Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L Rep. 10,391 (1997) (describing
subsequent neglect of 303(d) by the states and the EPA and the resulting litigation);
Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III. A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's Ambient
Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,415 (1998) (describing the new 303(d) pro-
gram as it emerges from the courts).
81. "Point sources" are defined as any "discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance" that discharges or may discharge pollutants. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1362(14) (1994).
82. For a classic scholarly embrace of the charms and benefits of complex, older
city life, especially in areas not yet marred by attempts at comprehensive planning
and modern zoning methods, see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American
Cities (1961).
83. See William H. Whyte, Introduction, in The Exploding Metropolis, supra note
2, at 8-19 (discussing benefits of vital urban centers and the need for citizen involve-
ment to counter likely harms of exurban development).
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velopment. Apart from the possible examples of Portland, Oregon or
Seattle, Washington, it is difficult to point to a new or rapidly boom-
ing city that along with its aggregate increase in population and wealth
has retained or created a vital urban core.4 Some sprawl cities have
begun to experience downtown and inner suburb business and resi-
dential revitalization, or at least substantial increases in real estate
prices, but distant sprawling residential and business development
continues."'
Nevertheless, despite the lack of a paradigmatic new or booming
city that has created or retained such a vital urban center, the "new
urbanists," as well as advocates of the virtues of "civic republicanism,"
advocate more concentrated forms of urban design that include more
mixed types of uses in close proximity, and rely less on automobiles
and more on mass transit." The hope is that with a different urban
form less dominated by single family homes distant from each other
and from commercial amenities and workplaces, greater urban vital-
ity, political involvement, and a vibrant cultural center will arise and
thrive.' These advocates of a changed urban development pattern
are substantially hobbled in their advocacy by most citizens' lack of
exposure to these more urban styles of development and life. For
84. Portland's creative efforts to constrain growth and retain nearby green spaces
are often touted as an example for other jurisdictions to follow. See, e.g., Carl Abbott,
Portland: Planning, Politics and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City 206-28 (1983)
(discussing Portland's efforts to redefine the city through downtown planning); Bol-
lier, supra note 20, at 33-34 (stating that Portland has become one of the most attrac-
tive cities in the nation through its comprehensive planned growth); H. Jeffrey Leon-
ard, Managing Oregon's Growth: The Politics of Development Planning (1983)
(describing Oregon's efforts to address land use and development challenges). Port-
land has thrived economically and offers alternative modes of governance, but its use
of urban growth boundaries to encourage-urban "inf'dl" and deter sprawl has met with
only limited success. See Arthur C. Nelson, Oregon's Urban Growth Boundary Policy
as a Landmark Planning Tool, in Planning the Oregon Way 25-45 (Carl Abbott et al.
eds., 1994); infra notes 302-11 and accompanying text.
85. See Garreau, supra note 29, at 59-62 (observing that the "edge city" develop-
ment appears to be accompanied by revitalization of many metropolitan areas' urban
center).
86. For the normative argument that city life offers political and social benefits
precisely because of its diversity and interactions among strangers, see Iris Marion
Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 236-41 (1990). For legal scholarship ex-
ploring the "civic republican" theory of constitutional democracy, see Mark Seiden-
feld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
1511 (1992); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988).
"Civic Republicans" can be categorized generally as scholars or political activists who
emphasize the importance of pursuing public policies that will foster civic engage-
ment, debate, and deliberative decisionmaking about societal issues and needs.
87. See generally Jacobs, supra note 82; James Howard Kunstler, Home From
Nowhere: Remaking Our Everyday World for the Twenty-First Century (1996) (ar-
guing that urban design trends need to be revisited). For planning and architecturally
oriented works, see Moshe Safdie & Wendy Kohn, The City After the Automobile:
An Architect's Vision (1997); Peter Katz, The New Urbanism: Toward an Architec-
ture of Community (1994). For extensive bibliographies of sprawl-related literature,
see Bollier, supra note 20, at 77-82; Ewing, supra note 2, at 119-26.
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many citizens, benefits of sprawl and a more suburban lifestyle are
readily perceived while benefits of more urban living are largely an
unknown quantity 8 Of course, the choices of urban form are neither
theoretically nor practically all sprawl or all new urbanism. Instead,
reform efforts are likely over time to modify incentives and reduce
current government policies that underwrite sprawl and concomitantly
disadvantage efforts to revitalize central urban areas.
Less sprawling, more concentrated forms of urban development
also provide opportunities for preservation of exurban green spaces
and the economic and aesthetic benefits of agricultural uses. The
preservation of green and open spaces not only provides recreational
and psychic relief for nearby urban and suburban residents, but also
provides at least the possibility that green spaces may remain linked
and hence reduce the rapidity of biodiversity loss. 9 To preserve eco-
system integrity and a sustainable mix of "biota and physical traits,"
many ecologists now believe that society must preserve "many large,
contiguous, undisturbed chunks of land." 9° The political constituen-
cies that might join together to advocate and support political initia-
tives designed to deter sprawl are uncertain, but the widespread and
sustained political support for protection of the environment contin-
ues to confound the predictions of many political and economic theo-
ries of law and regulation.91
II. SPRAWL AND POLITICAL-ECONOMICTHEORY
Urban sprawl thus offers many metropolitan area residents and
businesses benefits, but also causes substantial negative effects borne
by citizens, businesses, governments, and ecosystems. The political
economy of sprawl must be examined if one is to assess the efficacy of
reforms to reduce sprawling urban growth or alleviate the harms asso-
ciated with sprawl. This section provides such a political-economic
analysis.
This theoretical framework has its roots in economic theories of
legislation and regulation, but tempers that literature's sometimes
88. For a classic work that explores the deep roots of American's romanticized
view of independent suburban home ownership, see Jackson, supra note 16.
89. For discussion of the magnitude and implications of biodiversity loss, see Ed-
ward 0. Wilson, In Search of Nature (1996). For discussions of current federal poli-
cies and their effect on biodiversity protection, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiver-
sity and Land, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1997).
90. Ruhl, supra note 36, at 66.
91. See infra Part IV. Professor Ruhl suggests that if the federal government
sought to increase its involvement in biodiversity protection by enacting more lawvs or
regulations utilizing coercive regulatory strategies, it would likely lead to "a full scale
political rumble." Ruhl, supra note 11, at 651. Ruhl instead proposes increased reli-
ance on a largely cooperative regulatory regime that includes monetary incentives and
streamlined regulatory processes as enticements to involve state and local govern-
ments in biodiversity protection efforts. See id. at 661-71 (setting forth Ruhl's sug-
gested components of a Biological Resources Zone Management Act).
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monochromatic concepts of rationality and self-interest. 92 While the
analytical framework offered in this part shares many attributes with
"public choice" and its often close cousins, "positive political theory"
and "social choice" schools of scholarship,93 this discussion's cogency
does not depend on unidimensional assumptions that all persons,
whether they be categorized as voters, politicians, citizens, or market
participants, act only in their self-interest with wealth enhancement as
their major goal.94 Instead, this part builds more upon the insights of
Ronald Coase, Mancur Olson, and many of the shared insights of
public choice and social choice literature to assess political and eco-
nomic dynamics in a world of complex and often disparate tastes and
incentives. All contributors to the urban sprawl phenomenon are
likely to have both self-regarding and public-regarding moments.
Nevertheless, focusing primarily on the self-interests of all sprawl con-
tributors both in their individual and institutional roles in light of pre-
92. The theoretical framework offered shares many attributes with the recent
"political market" equilibrium suggested by Professors Keohane, Revesz and Stavins,
see Nathaniel Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 322-23 (1998), as well as often-similar insights
about the dynamics of environmental politics suggested in Christopher H. Schroeder,
Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment Explanations for Environmental Laws,
1969-73, 9 Duke Envtl. Law & Pol'y F. 29 (1998). Keohane, Schroeder, and this Arti-
cle all draw on an earlier generation of legal, economic, and political science scholar-
ship that bridges disciplines to explore the underpinnings of legislative and regulatory
activity, particularly in environmental law, where rigorous regulatory regimes are
generally unexpected due to disparate economic and political incentives of individuals
and groups deciding whether and how to act to achieve political success. See id. at 33-
41(discussing theories of rational choice, collective action and environmental politics);
infra Part III.B.3.a.
93. "Public Choice" scholarship generally refers to the application of the tools of
economic analysis to the study of behavior in the political arena. See Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 1, 7 (1991) (cit-
ing the definition of public choice scholarship offered in D. Mueller, Public Choice II
1 (1989)). A basic tenet of public choice scholarship is that one cannot assume that
political activity is public regarding or will in fact achieve its stated public regarding
goal. Much as markets can fail, political solutions may from their inception or in their
implementation fail to achieve stated goals. This skeptical perspective on politics
predates the recent wave of public choice scholarship. One of the earliest modem cri-
tiques of politics that closely resembles the public choice perspective was offered by
Ronald Coase in 1960: "[Tjhere is no reason to suppose that government regulation is
called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm.
Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice,
the market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects." Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 18 (1960).
94. To use the terminology recently suggested by Professor Schroeder, this Article
instead adopts something closely resembling what he calls either "broad self-interest"
or "material egoism" views of rationality. See Schroeder, supra note 92, at 40. For
broader critiques of the limitations of narrower, public choice-based concepts of ra-
tionality, see Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in
the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 5-23 (1991). See also Robert
C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23, 35-55 (1989) (discussing the
relevance of psychology and sociology in understanding economic analysis).
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vailing legal frameworks allows one to derive a theoretical framework
that closely matches observable political and economic dynamics that
contribute to sprawl.95 This analytical framework examines private
"demands" in the market and for particular government actions, the
"supply" incentives of politicians themselves, and the relative dispari-
ties in power and strengths of preferences of the various sprawl actors
and institutions to suggest both the dynamics leading to pro-sprawl
policies and why anti-sprawl efforts face an uphill battle 6 Under vir-
tually all major strains of political-economic analysis, sprawl is readily
predictable, but difficult to deter.
A. Politicians' Incentives and Interest Group Clout
Ongoing political commitments to fund highways and rail transit
and retain other policies that encourage sprawling development are
consistent with predictable political and economic incentives under-
lying sprawling development patterns. Such government transporta-
tion expenditures are an essential contributor to sprawling develop-
ment patterns.' At least in their early months of use, new highways
offer residents of outlying areas faster commutes, although those
faster commutes rapidly disappear as commuters adjust their travel
plans.9 Highway construction offers jobs, and once built, highways
allow easy access to land that was previously difficult to reach. Land
95. See Jennifer Arlen, Conmment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1765, 1767-70 (1998) (acknowledging significance of diverse
theories of human and institutional motivation and behavior, but arguing that "ra-
tional choice remains a reasonable description of individual choice" and that even
where other theories of non-rational behavior apply, no alternate "robust, tractable
model" yet exists).
96. For a similar framework built upon much of the same preceding theoretical
literature but applied to address the different question of why particular regulatory
instruments are used in environmental laws, see Keohane et al., supra note 92.
97. See e.g., Jackson, supra note 16, at Chapters 5, 6, 9 & 11 (discussing the con-
tributions to suburbanization of commuter railroads, trolleys, cars, and government
policies); An Unlevel Playing Field, supra note 23, at 11-12 (attributing patterns of ur-
ban impoverishment and suburban wealth in Atlanta to the unintended consequences
of transportation policies); Fishman, supra note 7, at 28-38 (correlating the transfor-
mation of modem cities with the development of the transportation system through
the twentieth century); Frank, supra note 18, at 30 (arguing for linked transportation
modes to reduce harms associated with the excessive use of cars).
98. New highways seldom create lasting lower traffic densities. Commuters and
developers adjust, leading to quick elimination of touted lower density traffic. See Mi-
chelle Garland & Christopher Bender, How Bad Transportation Investment Decisions
Affect the Quality of People's Lives, 9 Progress 4, 6 (May 1999) (Surface Transporta-
tion Policy Project) (reporting that traffic congestion levels in cities undertaking sub-
stantial new highway expansion projects was not significantly different than in cities
undertaking 25% less growth in lane miles); Oren, supra note 41, at 172 (analyzing
short-lived benefits of new highways and describing this phenomenon as the "'Field of
Dreams' rule: if you build it they will come" (quoting a line from the movie, Field of
Dreams (Universal 1989), which in turn was based on W. P. Kinsella's novel, Shoeless
Joe (1982))).
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near new highways is suddenly valuable due to its accessibility to
highways and attractiveness either for new business offices, ware-
houses, factories or residences. 99
Real estate and transportation construction interests have substan-
tial monetary incentives to favor continued government expenditures
on the highways as well as rail lines that are essential to urban
sprawl.100 Contrary to the implications of some recent economics-
oriented skeptics about anti-sprawl reforms, the status quo develop-
ment patterns have not arisen in a free market vacuum uninfluenced
by government policy.1 1 Furthermore, as earlier generations of politi-
cal and economic scholars have observed, particularly Mancur Olson,
both markets and politics will result in skewed results that are often
not public regarding or beneficial to society when citizens, industry,
and politicians have disparate stakes in a government policy choice.101
Such skewing of results is likely in the passage and implementation of
policies influencing development patterns. Transportation construc-
tion agencies and industries, as well as large scale residential, retail,
99. See Adams, supra note 43, at 249; Jackson, supra note 16, at 163-68; supra note
43 and accompanying text. See generally Richard Fogelsong, Married to the Mouse:
Walt Disney World and Orlando (Yale University Press, forthcoming) (recounting
substantial efforts of Orlando business people and officials to build new highway links
and the critical importance of those links to the decision of Disney to build Walt Dis-
ney World in Orlando).
100. Anti-highway politics may similarly be skewed in favor of private interests
such as the rail and alternative transportation industry for the same reasons highway
construction has been such a durable political and economic commodity. Public bene-
fits may accrue from each type of development, especially rail transit's creation of an
alternative to the automobile, but the likelihood of "rent seeking" behavior in which
private citizens or officials seek to extract personal wealth from government decisions
is high in these contexts. See Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians,
Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion 9-10 (1997) (defining "rents" as benefits cre-
ated through government regulation "that were unavailable other than through poli-
tics, or were more cheaply available through politics"); see also Purdum, supra note 40
(reporting that Los Angeles' new subway segments were built with substantial cost
overruns, costs of up to $500 million a mile, with "pork-barrel politicking... deter-
min[ing] [their] proposed route in an effort to spread the spoils of construction jobs").
Commuter rail lines may encourage newer development to cluster near the rail lines,
but as much as highways open up new land to economically attractive development,
new rail lines will similarly trigger new exurban development, albeit in a more con-
centrated context that is also less reliant on automobiles. Less land will be consumed
by development linked to new rail lines and less car pollution may be created, but
such rail lines will trigger new development. For a historical discussion of the link be-
tween rail construction and suburbanization, see Jackson, supra note 16, at 91-102.
101. See, e.g., Holcombe, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that government land-use
planning is "more likely [to] hinder than help the development process"). But see
John W. Frece & Andrea Leahy-Fucheck, Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conser-
vation, 13 Nat. Resources. & Env't. 319, 322 (1998) (explaining Maryland's "smart
growth" policies and showing how past government policies contributed to sprawl).
102. For the classic analysis of why small groups with high stakes in a particular ac-
tion may prevail over more broadly held preferences that in the aggregate exceed the
small groups' interests, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965).
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and mall developers, have powerful incentives to use their political
clout to ensure that government investment in transportation infra-
structure continues and that local land-use ordinances allow continued
development. This clout is asserted through campaign contributions
and political support for politicians or agency officials who endorse
such government expenditures. 10n Of course, corrupt types of influ-
ence are also a substantial possibility, but need not occur to observe
signs of strong political influence of interest groups, especially consid-
ering the substantial link between economic prosperity and politi-
cians' job security."0 '
The political influence of the transportation and real estate indus-
tries is unlikely to be countered effectively by voters, who as commut-
ers, homeowners, or renters may be opposed to sprawl and might em-
brace anti-sprawl policies. Many citizens, of course, seek their own
piece of suburban living, and as such, might oppose anti-sprawl re-
forms."° Nevertheless, at least a portion of a metropolitan regions'
citizens feel the brunt of sprawl every day. Each of these citizens,
however, has a small stake in development patterns compared to poli-
ticians, agency officials, and industries making a living from infrastruc-
ture investment and opportunities made available through govern-
ment investments in transportation and favorable land use policies.
These citizens can be expected to be rationally ignorant or, even if
they are aware of the stakes surrounding sprawling development, be
tempted to despair about the likelihood of influencing the govern-
ment. Many citizens will free ride on the anticipated (or desired) ac-
tions of others.1°6 Basic collective action dynamics lead one to predict
103. See Keohane et al., supra note 92, at 328; Schroeder, supra note 92, at 55-56;
An Unlevel Playing Field, supra note 23, at 11 (reporting on wealth creation in land
adjacent to new highway development); Poughkeepsie '85, supra note 34, at 24-52 (re-
counting the extraordinary efforts of a mall developer to elect candidates to the local
zoning board through secret campaign contributions).
104. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1684-87 (1975) (discussing capture theories of regulation, but
noting how industry "orientation" can result from non-corrupt modes of repeat inter-
actions with regulators). Political science literature often observes the "privileged po-
sition of business" in political arenas. See Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets:
The World's Political-Economic Systems 5, 172-88 (1977); see also Richard E. Fogle-
song, Planning the Capitalist City: The Colonial Era to the 1920s 233-34, 239-40
(1986) (analyzing city planning trends and influence of private forms of land owner-
ship within a capitalist market); Peterson, supra note 4, at 13149 (analyzing city poli-
tics and success of pro-growth policies); Clarence Stone, Regime Politics: Governing
Atlanta, 1946-1988 (1989) (analyzing power of business interests and growth policies
but also considering effect of particular local political environment).
105. See generally Jackson, supra note 16 (exploring the deeply rooted American
preference for suburban living despite the many attendant harms and losses).
106. See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Lessons, 27 Loy. LA. L Rev. 1023, 1025-
26 (1994) (discussing reasons citizens in ordinary times "have too few reasons even to
notice commons problems" that are leading to environmental destruction and hence
lack the "motivational spur" to act to prevent environmental harm). That citizens
have incentives to remain inactive in ordinary times, however, does not mean that
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that politicians (including both legislators and agency officials), will
generally be more concerned with the desires of entities with a con-
centrated interest in an issue than with the interests of those with a
lesser stake in the benefits or costs of development. 10W Those entities
with a substantial economic or political interest in sprawling develop-
ment are thus likely to be successful in demanding or preserving legal
frameworks and political structures that allow continued political and
economic success.
This prediction of successful interest group demands for more
sprawl-related government investment and government policies that
allow further sprawling development also makes sense from a "sup-
ply" perspective that focuses on the interests of government officials.
Politicians and agency officials do not merely calculate interest group
pressure and act, but have their own incentives based on their own in-
ternal cost-benefit analysis. 108 Economic affluence, an enhanced tax
base, increased employment in both the private and public sectors,
and visible successes in securing new private or government invest-
citizen power will never successfully be asserted to override periods of "ordinary poli-
tics" when more concentrated interests are likely to sway government policy. See
Schroeder, supra note 92, at 30. While legal scholars analyzing environmental laws
sometimes describe them as the result of political entrepreneurs, "republican mo-
ments" of heightened and more enlightened politics, or periods where critical masses
of citizens rationally came to the conclusion that their participation and their interest
in an environmental goal mattered, citizens have in numerous instances participated
in political initiatives resulting in laws that are stringent and to the detriment of con-
centrated industry interests. See id. Even then, however, the forms or tools of regula-
tion chosen are often those that are the least unfavorable to regulatory targets of
means to a regulatory end of reduced environmental damage. See Keohane, supra
note 92, at 346-62 (explaining frequent use of command and control strategies and
stringent regulation of new pollution sources as the regulatory tools most palatable to
existing industry, while also offering benefits to politicians).
107. For the classic discussion of "collective action" issues and their effects on po-
litical outcomes, see Olson, supra note 102.
108. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Eco-
nomic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101, 102 (1987) (developing hypothesis
that politicians are not "mere brokers" but are "independent actors making their own
demand[s]"); see also Keohane, supra note 92, at 326, 357-62 (discussing diverse con-
siderations of politicians in assessing policy options and separating interest group and
citizen "demands" and "supply" incentives of legislators). Economics-oriented theo-
ries of government behavior predicts that agency officials will almost invariably seek
new dollars and expansion of agency budgets and programmatic or regulatory turf.
For the classic statement of this hypothesis, see William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureauc-
racy and Representative Government (1971). See also Saul Levmore, Irreversibility
and the Law: The Size of Firms and Other Organizations, 18 J. Corp. L. 333, 334
(1993), cited in Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Gov-
ernments, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1347, 1359 n.31 (1997). For a sampling of criticisms and re-
finements of the budget-maximization hypothesis, see Buzbee, supra note 53, at 82-96
(critiquing the budget maximization hypothesis by examining reasons the EPA and
analogous agencies decline opportunities to expand); Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D.
Libecap, Agency Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat, 27 Econ. Inquiry 431,
448 (1989) (questioning hypothesized link between agency budget, turf growth, and
agency official self-interest).
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ments all provide benefits to government officials.1°9 Paul Peterson's
influential City Limits applies political science frameworks and em-
pirical analysis to conclude that local governments have strong incen-
tives to pursue policies that enhance the economic vitality of the juris-
diction."0 For state and local governments, supply and maintenance
of transportation infrastructure is one of their chief obligations."'
Transportation expenditures offer substantial political benefits to
elected and appointed politicians and also offer substantial opportu-
aity for political patronage."2 Elected politicians can point to new
construction on highways, homes, and offices as tangible signs of po-
litical power and economic vitality. 3 In addition, all of this new con-
struction is often claimed to enhance the tax base for local govern-
ments and either lead to enhanced services or a reduced tax burden
on those previously in the jurisdiction." Politicians' concerns with
real estate and transportation interest groups' preferences may at
times be overridden by priorities of an energized electorate or due to
politicians' own ideological preferences. Such politicians may see ad-
vantage in acting as anti-growth leaders.1 5 Nevertheless, as a matter
109. See Been, supra note 113, at 506-28.
110. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 22-38.
111. See id at 57-58, 60-63.
112. See Purdum, supra note 40 (reporting on patronage-driven subway develop-
ment in Los Angeles); cf Jackson, supra note 1616, at 21 (observing that real estate
exploitation of impending government decisions enhancing value of land was evident
as long ago as the 1795 acquisition of Beacon Street land due to inside knowledge of
imminent plans to locate the State House nearby).
113. See generally Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Re-
thinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L Rev. 473 (1991) (dis-
cussing the tendency of local governments to seek new investment and business activ-
ity rather than to overrregulate).
114. Actually, the urban planning and economics literature often questions the
common perception that growth creates economic value for the jurisdictions experi-
encing new growth. For a summary of this literature, see Nelson et al., supra note 3,
ch. 1.
115. For articles exploring the political and economic dynamics leading to the en-
actment of often stringent and durable federal environmental laws, see Buzbee, supra
note 4, at 27-46; E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L Econ. & Org. 313 (1985); Daniel A. Far-
ber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 59 (1992);
Schroeder, supra note 92. See also Rose, supra note 106, at 1025 (stating that "people
in practice sometimes do manage to cope with collective resources, so that the 'inexo-
rable' logic of commons does not always play out so inexorably after all"). While
most literature on politicians' incentives finds a pro-growth slant, anti-growth or pro-
environment politicians can seize a political advantage and enhance their political
prospects. See Elliot et al., supra, at 338. See generally Mark Schneider & Paul Teske,
The Antigrowth Entrepreneur: Challenging the "Equilibriun" of the Growth Machine,
55 J. of Pol. 720 (1993) (acknowledging frequent strength of the "growth machine"
view of local politics, but also reviewing case studies and theory to explain why anti-
growth entrepreneurs can be politically successful despite excessively "deterministic"
views of politics by other scholars); Mark Schneider & Paul Teske, Toward a Theory
of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government, 86 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
737, 745 (1992) (surveying literature on political entrepreneurs and concluding that
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of general prediction, Olson's and Peterson's observations that con-
centrated interests will more often than not prevail over dispersed in-
terests remains sound.11 6 Even if dispersed anti-sprawl interests begin
to coalesce, it is unlikely that citizens' views toward sprawl-related is-
sues will ever be uniformly anti-sprawl. Substantial citizen interest in
suburban home ownership is likely to remain.117
B. Externalities and Sprawl
If one turns to the cost side of the sprawl equation, few of the costs
of sprawl will be borne by businesses, politicians or agencies that
profit in markets or politics from sprawl-related construction, nor will
they be borne in any substantial way by individual residents or em-
ployers in outlying urban areas. If federal, state or local governments
pay for highway construction and much of the infrastructure invest-
ment that accompanies the conversion of green areas into land for
new residential or business construction, then companies and agencies
profiting from that construction have huge ongoing incentives to pre-
serve that flow of business. These infrastructure businesses and agen-
cies see little or nothing of the "externalized" harms flowing from
their activities. 8
Automobile commuters from new tract developments on the pe-
such studies are "ill served by the wholesale importation of economic theories of the
private sector entrepreneur" and calling for "the definition of an expanded utility
function for the entrepreneur"); see also supra Part IV (discussing environmental les-
sons for urban sprawl and reasons politicians might, at times, take an anti-growth po-
sition).
116. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at 17-38 (noting that groups with common interests
are more likely to prevail politically); Olson, supra note 102 (same); Clarence N.
Stone, Summing Up: Urban Regimes, Development Policy, and Political Arrange-
ments, in The Politics of Urban Development 269-88 (Clarence N. Stone & Heywood
T. Sanders, eds.) (summarizing empirical studies presented in the book as showing
that pursuit of growth remains a powerful force in urban politics, but that the par-
ticulars of local political history and climate influence the strength of that motivation
and battles over what measures should be embraced to further growth). Neverthe-
less, as further explored below in Part IV, environmental laws that are both stringent
and durable have been a prominent part of the legal landscape since the late 1960s. A
combination of active citizens, political entrepreneurs and active and knowledgeable
not-for-profit environmental and citizen groups can at times act together and succeed
despite general predictions about collective action problems and interest group be-
havior. See infra Part IV; see also Rose, supra note 106, at 1025; Schroeder, supra note
92, at 43-56 (discussing the history of early federal environmental laws under a modi-
fied "rational choice" account).
117. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
118. For a discussion of "externalities," defined as costs associated with activities
that are not borne by the person creating those costs, see Peter S. Menell & Richard
B. Stewart, Environmental Law and Policy 54-60 (1994). Many local governments
have begun to use exaction strategies to require entities requiring discretionary per-
mits to pay for some of the costs of their proposed development, see Alan Altshuler et
al., Regulation for Revenue: The Political Economy of Land Use Exactions 114-21
(1993), but it is doubtful such exaction could possibly pay for all governmental costs
associated with new development.
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riphery of new cities play a critical role in the air and water quality
problems plaguing the rapidly expanding urban areas. These costs of
sprawl, however, will only partially be borne by residents of outlying
urban areas in the absence of substantial highway tolls, commuter
taxes or other corrective "Pigouvian taxes."119 County and local gov-
ernments that do not share common fiscal concerns or answer to a
powerful governor have little incentive to discourage new develop-
ment as long as traffic congestion is bearable and local services can
handle increased numbers of residents and employers.'" Perhaps of
equal importance, no single unit of government bears most of the
costs of sprawl or is likely to bear the blame for sprawl's harms and
inconveniences. Moreover, the widely felt harms and discomforts of
sprawl do not fall in a concentrated way on any particular segment of
the public that is likely to be roused to political action.
C. Sprawl and Commons' Dynamics
The basic dynamics of resource overutilization described in Hardin's
and Gordon's classic analyses of "tragedy of the commons" also con-
tribute to sprawling developmentUl Under the "tragedy of the com-
119. For a discussion of the rationale for "commuter taxes" in the context of an
analysis of tax policies and population shifts in the Washington D.C. area, see Robert
P. Strauss, The Income of Central City and Suburban Immigrants: A Case Study of the
Washington D.C. Metropolitan Area, 51 Nat'l Tax J. 493, 516 (Sept. 1, 1998), 1998 WL
25355913, at *1. See generally Wahrman, supra note 60 (advocating the use of "peak
pricing" tolls to modify commuting patterns and harms flowing from traffic conges-
tion). For a discussion of how a "Pigouvian" tax is a tax that seeks to correct an oth-
erwise external cost by forcing the harming actor to in effect pay for the harms he
causes, see Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920). As observed in the
recent critique of choices of regulatory instruments in environmental laws, Pigouvian
taxes are the preferred choice of economists to deal with pollution or other environ-
mental harms. See Keohane et al., supra note 92, at 314 & n.2. Whether Pigou's con-
tribution has been correctly characterized is doubtful, but the concept of a Pigouvian
tax is now well established. See James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part
Two, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 325, 325-26 & n.3 (1992) (observing that Pigou fo-
cused on subsidizing pollution control activities rather than taxing). Setting an ap-
propriate tax, let alone finding political support for such a tax disincentive scheme, is
fraught with difficulty. See Keohane et al., supra note 92, at 349 & n. 108 (exploring
why firms that are already regulated prefer almost any regime of harm regulation
over pollution taxes); Krier, supra, at 325-26 (pointing out overwhelming barriers to
constructing a market-oriented environment protection regime).
120. See generally Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9; Frug, supra note 9.
Analyses of the fiscal effects of sprawl sometimes neglect to acknowledge the signifi-
cance of separate budgetary "ledgers" of local, state and federal governments, as well
as further separate budgetary concerns of departments and agencies acting under lo-
cal, state or federal authority. See, e.g., Burchell, supra note 14, at 165-70 (making a
powerful case for aggregate fiscal waste associated with sprawl, but failing to break
down budgetary and fiscal incentives of various units of government in connection
with sprawl-related policies).
121. For a superb discussion of these classic works, see Rose, supra note 106, at
1024 (discussing commons overuse issues and citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968)); see also Briffault, Local Government, supra note
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mons" scenario, a common resource, such as a grazing or fishing area,
will be overdepleted by individuals who individually gain from each use
of the common resource, so that the aggregate effect of these individual
acts is overdepletion of the resource."2 In the sprawl setting, each con-
tributor to sprawl obtains direct and substantial benefits, but the sub-
stantial harms of sprawl are dispersed and borne by many. Each con-
tributor to sprawl eats up an increment of available land, air and water
resources, and increments of free highway space. As long as each deni-
zen of outlying sprawl areas sees greater benefits than individually felt
harms, other immigrants to outlying sprawl regions will arrive. Each
contributor to sprawl, acting rationally and in his or her self interest,
will continue developing in a sprawling pattern unless the contributor
bears the costs of the harms of sprawl or a government unit prohibits or
creates corrective disincentives for such activities. The end result may
be substantial aggregate harm and inconvenience, but that point will be
reached based on individually rational decisions. Thus, from the view-
point of most private and government actors, the individual decisions
that cumulatively add up to sprawl are rational choices and expressions
of both market and political preference. 123 These market and political
choices are also, however, influenced by the political and legal frame-
work in which they occur. 124 As these economic theories of political
and market dynamics establish, individually rational behavior can lead
to substantial societal harms that justify government intervention.
9, at 1149 (observing that local governments' parochial pursuit of self interest can lead
to a tragedy of the "regional 'commons.'); Wahrman, supra note 60, at 183 (observing
how traffic congestion in part results from "tragedy of the commons" dynamics).
122. See Ruhl, supra note 11, at 658 & nn.314, 315 (discussing the "tragedy of the
commons" in analyzing strategies to protect biodiversity); see also Karkkainen, supra
note 11, at 74-75 (applying the common resource overdepletion theory to conclude
that local governments are unlikely to protect important sources of biodiversity be-
cause they are better off externalizing the costs by leaving the costs of conservation to
others).
123. For a more complete discussion of the benefits of sprawl, see supra Part I.A.
124. Critics of anti-sprawl reforms sometimes describe the current sprawling forms
as though they are the result of some pre-legal set of market choices. See, e.g., Tier-
ney, supra note 1 (discussing the benefits of urban sprawl when it is the result of local
choice and initiative, not official government intervention). While market and social
preferences are undoubtedly part of the sprawl equation and must be considered, see
supra Part I.A., such preferences and development patterns are undoubtedly influ-
enced by past government actions and legal frameworks. For example, whether the
common law, statutes, and regulations recognize or deny a right to compensation for
private activities imposing harms or cost on others is itself the result of legal and po-
litical choice, not some pre-legal allocation of natural rights. Similarly, whether citi-
zens or businesses should pay for benefits conferred through government investments
or acts is the result of existing political and legal frameworks. See, e.g., Altshuler et al.,
supra note 118, at 115-20 (exploring political and economic roots of increased reliance
by local governments on exactions to raise revenue); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights
and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
45 Stan. L. Rev. 1433, 1442-51 (discussing the dynamic nature of what property rights
are recognized by law and give rise to rights to compensation or obligations to pay for
harms).
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D. Institutional Incentives and Interjurisdictional Competition
If one moves the focus from the level of individuals and their incen-
tives to the incentives of government units, sprawl's dynamics are fur-
ther illuminated. Businesses looking to find low cost locations benefit
not only from cheaper land prices on the urban periphery, but also
may be able to elicit tax benefits and other financial packages from
municipalities eager to attract new investment and an increased tax
base."' States and even nations have historically competed to attract
such capital investment. Similarly, municipalities that wield substan-
tial political and fiscal independence compete to attract investment,
often offering up more lenient regulatory treatment or financial pack-
ages to attract investment. 126
For businesses that successfully play municipalities and states off
against each other, the availability of numerous exurban development
sites creates great potential for auction dynamics leading to beneficial
development incentives. Businesses can maintain regional business
links while shifting, or threatening to shift, their locations among
competing local governments.127 Thus, businesses have substantial
125. See Been, supra note 113, at 513-14; Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization
of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, in Perspectives on Ur-
ban Politics 98,113-17 (Jay S. Goodman ed., 1970).
126. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1133-41; Peterson, supra
note 4, at 20-22. For a critique of development dynamics and interjurisdictional com-
petition for business, and laws or judicial opinions addressing such dynamics, compare
Been, supra note 113, at 478 (finding that "the market for development suffers many
functions, but nevertheless may be sufficiently competitive to constrain local govern-
ments' exaction practices"), with Richard L Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Compe-
tition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1233 (1992) (stating there is no support for the
claim that "without federal intervention, there will be a race to the bottom over envi-
ronmental standards") [hereinafter Revesz, Rethinking]. For a sampling of the criti-
cisms of the theoretical, empirical, and normative observations and implications of
Revesz's influential article, see Buzbee, supra note 53, at 110-16 (discussing reasons
why states might underprotect the environment); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environ-
mental Standard-Setting: Is There a Race and is it "To the Bottom"?, 48 Hastings L.J.
271, 315-51 (1997) (challenging Revesz's conclusion with data indicating frequent
state laxity); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L Rev.
570, 652-53 (1996) (concluding that the appropriate level of government intervention
will vary based on the situation); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environ-
mental Law, 14 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 67, 91-94 (Symposium Issue 1996) (analyzing
reasons why states might frequently underprotect the environment). For a response
to some of those criticisms, see Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Fed-
eral Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 Minn. L Rev. 535, 545-63
(1997) [hereinafter Revesz, A Response]. For a discussion of local government taxing
and spending authority, see Perry Sentell, A Profile: The Theory and Practice of Lo-
cal Government Law (1994) and R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The County Spending Power:
An Abbreviated Audit of the Account, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 599 (1982) (describing county
spending power under Georgia Law).
127. See Been, supra note 113, at 512-14 (citing articles discussing interjurisdic-
tional competitions for business).
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reasons to support pro-sprawl government policies as long as the
benefits of sprawl outweigh the costs of sprawl borne by that business.
The financial benefits of sprawl are immediately realized and directed
to a single business, while the costs are dispersed, delayed, and may
not even be borne by that business. Therefore, sprawl is likely to be
favored by businesses that can move their sites of operation.'' Simi-
larly, real estate developers and brokers benefit from sprawl and bear
few of its costs because they make their profit at the time of sale and
may bear no discomforts associated with sprawl. The aggregate ef-
fects of excessive sprawling residential development may not become
fully apparent for decades.
E. Anti-Sprawl Dynamics
Over time, the market is likely to provide a partial cure for some ills
associated with sprawl. In particular, residents and businesses incon-
venienced by congestion and long commutes will, if they have the
economic resources, predictably respond to the inconveniences of
sprawl and in private market transactions locate closer to the urban
center or places of work. More central metropolitan areas thus may
over time experience at least a partial revival, but that revival will
likely be accompanied by ongoing sprawl trends and incentives, par-
ticularly as central metropolitan area real estate prices rise.129
As a metropolitan region matures and businesses and their employ-
ees develop deeper roots in particular locations, increasing numbers
of businesses may come to support anti-sprawl initiatives that they
would have had economic incentives to oppose at the time of initial
location decisions.130 Businesses and residents that have substantial
investments in, or other business ties to, a particular city or region will
have strong reasons to support anti-sprawl policies, and thereby en-
hance their economic position or quality of life.131
Inner city or inner ring suburbanites of sprawling cities might come
to support policies designed to reduce the harms associated with new
exurban development. Even if such a coalition of businesses and resi-
dents forms to support anti-sprawl policies, many reasons exist to
question the effectiveness of anti-sprawl reforms, although some alle-
viation of sprawl's discomforts is possible. 32
128. See Buzbee, supra note 53, at 114-15 (exploring similar government incentives
to attract businesses through lax environmental policies due to delayed nature of any
attendant harms and difficulty of monitoring such laxity); see also Swire, supra note
126, at 87-90 (exploring how, due to "measurement problems" in assessing benefits
and costs of environmental regulation, environmental policy is likely to be "skewed"
to the benefit of regulatory targets).
129. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
130. See infra Part IV.
131. See infra Part IV (discussing reasons why anti-sprawl coalitions may form de-
spite general political-economic dynamics and associated predictions).
132 See infra Part IV.
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F. Information Asymmetries and the Public-Regarding Official
Even if one shifts the assumption that government officials act in a
manner that is primarily self-interested to an assumption of public-
regarding official motivations, sprawl would remain expected for rea-
sons predicted by Olson, and further developed by analysts of regula-
tory capture and "tit for tat" game theory models of government be-
havior. 13 3 Even a public-regarding official relies on political input and
information to discern societal needs and constituency desires. The
disparate stakes of interest groups benefiting from sprawl and the dis-
persed interests harmed by sprawl lead one to predict that in sprawl-
ing metropolitan regions, aggregate political demands and pressure
will be felt most often from concentrated interests rather than dis-
persed interests. Some officials, particularly those representing cen-
tral city businesses, neighborhoods, or inner ring suburbs, will look to
their citizen and business constituencies and hence may oppose pro-
sprawl policies. 135 In the absence of regional forms of government,
however, outlying jurisdiction officials will be unlikely to share that
interest36
The costliness of information, be it political or market information,
means that even a public-regarding official seeking to enhance aggre-
gate social welfare is likely to have skewed perceptions due to repeat
contacts with and information provided by sprawl beneficiaries.'3
133. See Olson, supra note 102, at 2; see also Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation 124-29 (1984) (developing and analyzing implications of "tit for tat"
model of evolution of cooperative behavior and exploring how repeat interactions are
essential for cooperative behavior to emerge). Axelrod demonstrates that repeat re-
lationships can promote beneficial cooperation but also notes, as does this Article,
that in some circumstances the cooperation that will likely flow from repeat interac-
tions may be the opposite of the desired result. See id. at 125.
134. See Krier, supra note 119, at 331 (discussing "comparative organizational or
lobbying advantage" of industry groups in battles over environmental quality); Glen
0. Robinson, The FCC: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 Va. L Rev. 169,216-
19 (1978) (discussing problem of agency's "uncritical reliance" on regulated industries
for information and analysis); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
Yale L. 1196, 1213-14 (1997) (discussing reasons agency officials can adopt policies
favorable to regulated interests due to frequency of contacts).
135. For sources regarding pro-environment and anti-growth political entrepre-
neurs, see supra note 115.
136. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1133-41 for a discussion of
different incentives of central city and more suburban or exurban jurisdictions. For a
discussion of the implications of the common lack of regional forms of governance in
the United States, see infra Parts m.A.2 & .3.
137. See Farber, supra note 115, at 71 (developing a theory to explain the successes
of environmental laws despite concentrated opposition interests, and suggesting that
environmental groups serve an informational role and that due to their "incentives as
•. . 'repeat player[s]' to maintain [their] reputation for reliability" prompts such in-
formation to be "relatively unbiased"). See generally George J. Stigler, The Econom-
ics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961) (exploring how reality of costliness of
information must be considered in economic models).
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When one adds to this analysis the game theory insight that repeat
contacts lead to cooperative and more conciliatory modes of interac-
tion, one sees that a public-regarding official is unlikely to take on and
oppose pro-sprawl interests. 138 In some areas of public policy, par-
ticularly in the environmental law arena, national environmental
groups have gained political clout by offering politicians reliable in-
formation and policy expertise, thus providing a counterweight to in-
dustry views.1 39 These counterweights have been critical to national
legislative and regulatory environmental successes.14 In the state and
local arenas where most sprawl-related decisions occur, however, it is
doubtful if representatives for otherwise underrepresented constitu-
encies will likely emerge and participate in the far more numerous
low-visibility contexts where sprawl-related decisions occur.141
When one adds into the equation the reality that politicians can
only pursue their agenda if they remain in government and gain sen-
iority within political institutions, then one sees that ongoing success
in obtaining campaign contributions and being reelected or reap-
pointed is essential to the pursuit of public-regarding ends. 42 Publicly
oriented officials surely exist and can gain reputations that enhance
their electoral and political clout. Even if such public-regarding offi-
cials succeed in electoral or appointment politics, however, skewed in-
138. See Axelrod, supra note 133, at 125; Farber, supra note 115, at 66.
139. See Farber, supra note 115, at 71.
140. See infra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
141. In their critiques of several environmental "reinvention" and "reform" initia-
tives, Professors Steinzor and Mank explore why decentralized and largely discretion-
ary decisionmaking is likely to lead to less effective or minimal participation by well
funded and expert environmental not-for-profit entities, contrasted with such groups'
effective participation at the national level. See Bradford C. Mank, The Environ-
mental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The
Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 Ecology L.Q. 1, 60-61 (1998); Rena I. Steinzor,
Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to
Self-Control, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103, 144-45 (1998).
142. For a discussion of how the link between legislative seniority and control of
key committees and the legislative agenda is well established, particularly in the fed-
eral legislature, see Barbara Hinckley, The Seniority System in Congress (1971) (de-
tailing the history and continued presence of the seniority system in choosing sub-
committee leaders); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 94-97
(1974) (stating that as seniority increases in Congress so too does a representative's
"turf'); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of
Committee Power, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85, 87 (1987) (stating that committee power
"consisting of gatekeeping, information advantage, and proposal power" establishes
committees as agenda setters); see also Glenn R. Parker, Congress and the Rent-
Seeking Society 143 (1996) (explaining that even with the implementation of new
rules for electing committee chairs, seniority remains the overwhelming factor). Re-
duced reliance on seniority in choosing committee leaders and the proliferation of
subcommittees in the U.S. Congress has reduced the clout once wielded by a handful
of key senior legislators. Seniority, however, remains an important factor in choosing
legislative leadership. See Christopher J. Deering & Steven S. Smith, Committees in
Congress 126-44 (1997); McChesney, supra note 108, at 104-06.
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formation may lead to skewed policy.143
This political-economic analysis reveals that few political or eco-
nomic incentives will be strongly anti-sprawl across an entire metro-
politan region. Furthermore, such analysis shows that sprawl benefi-
ciaries have strong ongoing incentives to maintain their market and
political power by opposing anti-sprawl initiatives. As discussed be-
low in parts III and IV, broad voting blocks of citizens feeling sprawl's
negative effects, coupled with businesses and politicians invested in
central city vitality, may emerge to counter these predictable political-
economic incentives. They, however, face substantial hurdles, espe-
cially in light of the fragmented legal frameworks potentially applica-
ble to address sprawl's ills.
Im. LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS, FEDERALISM, AND SPRAWL REFORMS
This part examines the legal frameworks within which sprawl-
related decisions occur. Well established legal presumptions and tra-
ditional roles of federal, state, and local government make difficult
any significant new attempts to alleviate and prevent harms associated
with urban sprawl's cross-jurisdictional effects and roots. Sprawl and
current legal frameworks are mismatched. Local governments tradi-
tionally make land use choices, yet sprawl arises out of dynamics,
causes, and effects that tend, at a minimum, to be regional. Any shift
away from state and local governments' primacy in regulating land
use, however, would be a major change in allocations of governmental
responsibilities. This part concludes that if anti-sprawl reforms re-
main a source of political activity, an increased federal role is constitu-
tionally permissible, politically likely, and desirable. This Article sug-
gests that if federal reforms are enacted to deter sprawl or address its
ills, monetary incentives in the form of conditional federal spending
are preferable to regulatory coercion or substantial federal interven-
tion in land use decisionmaking.
A. Federalism and Local Primacy Over Sprawl Policy
In this country, layers of law and regulation are the norm."* Even if
citizens, politicians, or policy analysts can come to an agreement on a
social ill deserving government intervention, it must then be deter-
mined what level of government has the authority and capacity to ad-
dress the problem. The third analytical step involves determining
143. See infra Part IV.D.
144. See Peterson, supra note 4, at ch. 4. See generally David L. Shapiro, Federal-
ism: A Dialogue (1995) (exploring divergent approaches to the role of federalism in
the functions of government); Alfred R. Light, He Who Pays the Piper Should Call the
Tune: Dual Sovereignty in U.S. Environmental Law, 4 Envtl. Law. 779 (1998) (dis-
cussing the existence of a dual system of government and the relation between state
and federal governments).
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what regulatory strategies will best correct the ills. 145 This section ex-
amines the political economy of sprawl in light of the divisions of
authority among federal, state, and local governments. This examina-
tion of the federalism framework reveals that the federal role can be
expanded further, but authority over the most significant land use and
transportation decisions affecting sprawl have traditionally been the
domain of state and local governments and for pragmatic reasons will
likely remain principally in those fora.
1. The Traditional Dominant Local Role in Land Use
Decisionmaking
Two hundred years of traditional divisions of government authority
must be considered in evaluating sprawl and relevant legal frame-
works. Local governments have long been in charge of land use and
zoning activity, though state governments occasionally intervene.1 46
Given the polycentric nature of land use decisionmaking, where many
affected people and interests are likely to want a say in how land is
developed, local and county governments are often the only levels of
government that knows of, or has the capacity to discover, the prefer-
ences of local constituencies. 147 State, county, and local governments
145. This tiered analysis of regulatory goals, institutional options, and regulatory
tools must occur in any effort to attack a social ill, be it predominantly a local, state,
federal, or global issue. See Wiener, supra note 11, at 686-701 (applying comparative
institutional frameworks and political-economic literature to suggest regulatory
strategies most likely to succeed in addressing global environmental ills). As Wiener
notes, much of the existing political-economic literature assumes that a single, coer-
cive, and effective government body is available to enforce a regulatory scheme. As
he demonstrates, this assumption of what he calls "Unitary Fiat" is inappropriate at
the level of global ills. Id. at 701-04. This assumption is seldom appropriate even in
analyzing domestic environmental or urban sprawl policies in the context of a feder-
alist scheme of government that grants and retains different spheres of authority for
local, state, and federal governments. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism
Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. of Pol. Econ. 152, 154-57 (1981).
The array of appropriate regulatory designs and tools will necessarily differ in differ-
ent contexts. See id. at 162 (stating that "[e]ven when the central government has the
power to preempt state and local laws, its democratic choices will depend upon the
strategic position of citizens living under alternative state legal regimes"); see also
Buzbee, supra note 4, at 27-58 (examining the dynamics of environmental federalism
to develop hypothesis that most effective allocation of authority among federal, state,
and local governments shifts over time depending on context and cannot be predicted
by an approach that assumes deterministic character traits of government institu-
tions); Wiener, supra note 11, at 681 (stating that the "economics of instrument choice
are embedded in and contingent on the underlying legal system").
146. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law 1-2 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that all
states authorize local governments to use comprehensive planning as a guide for land
use controls); Tarlock, supra note 11, at 557 (explaining that land use has almost ex-
clusively been dealt with by local governments).
147. For arguments that state and local governments will better tailor their policies
to constituent desires and needs than would a federal regulator, see Revesz, A Re-
sponse, supra note 126, at 536-45. See also Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey,
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental
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often appear to favor powerful economic interests or their own agen-
cies over the interests of dispersed citizens, but there have also been
instances of state and local government opposition to developer or in-
dustry proposals.148
Even when the federal government has enacted laws and regula-
tions impinging on local and state land use primacy, local and state
governments retain a substantial role. For example, the effectiveness
of federal environmental legislation such as the Clean Air Act and the
two most recent amendments to federal transportation law depends
upon planning activity that is sensitive to local politics and local priori-
ties.49 Under such federal legislation, state and local governments are
offered the chief planning role, especially regarding land use. This
role is conditioned on either the receipt of federal dollars or state or
local officials displacing federal officials who would otherwise imple-
ment and enforce federal programs.' Analysts of state and federal
roles in protecting the environment point out that the federal gov-
Regulatory Authority, 14 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 23, 25 (Symposium Issue 1996) (argu-
ing that "the size of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should
determine the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution"). Re-
vesz explicitly acknowledges that his critique does not fully address different govern-
ment dysfunctions that might be predicted by public choice scholarship. See Revesz,
Rethinking, supra note 126, at 1223, 1243. The thesis of Butler and Macey is strangely
imbalanced because it expresses concerns about interest group dominance and regula-
tory failure in Washington, but fails to consider different interest group and political-
economic incentives and sources of potential regulatory failure if regulatory policies
were shifted to state and local government venues. See Butler & Macey, supra, at 28,
44-45, 53. Butler and Macey critique federal regulation and its anticipated dysfunc-
tions, but fail to look at state and local fora with a similarly skeptical eye. See Geof-
frey Moulton, The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 Minn.
L. Rev. 849, 918-19 (1999) (observing that advocates of more intrusive judicial review
to protect states fail to examine interest group pressures at state and local levels).
14& See, eg., Leonard, supra note 84, at xi (describing Oregon's commitment to
sprawl control and growth boundaries); Peterson, supra note 4, at 20 (analyzing rea-
sons why local governments tend to pursue pro-growth policies); Revesz, Rethinking,
supra note 126, at 1228-29 (discussing how more stringent state environmental regula-
tions have increased costs for intrastate industries); Steven Hayward, The Scourge of
New Jobs, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1999, at A15 (discussing Portland, Oregon's decision
to allow expansion of Intel Corporation's computer chip facility and the city's re-
quirement that Intel pay a "growth impact fee" if Intel creates too many jobs); Sam
Howe Verhovek, Fighting Sprawl Oregon County Makes Deal With Intel to Limit
Jobs, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1999, at A18 (reporting on Portland's decision concerning
Intel and discussing politicians' and citizens' concerns that too much growth at Intel
would contribute to sprawl and impair the area's quality of life). But see Buzbee, su-
pra note 4, at 29-36, 46-58 (acknowledging some instances of state leadership in envi-
ronmental regulation, but showing how federal legislators or regulators have gener-
ally been "the first mover[s]" and that states have often acted to displace a federal
regulator rather than innovate or exceed federal standards).
149. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994) (State Implementation Plan provi-
sions); TEA-21, Pub L. No. 105-178, § 1203, 112 Stat. 107, 170-79 (1998) (setting forth
requirements for metropolitan transportation planning process); id. § 1204, 112 Stat.
at 180-84 (setting forth requirement for statewide transportation planning).
150. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at 52-54.
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ernment cannot bear the burden of taking over local planning activity,
but is dependent on state and local cooperation and planning due to
the huge administrative responsibilities and local knowledge needed
for local and state land use planning.'51 Land use planning is likely to
remain primarily the domain of state and local governments even if
federal goals and incentives seek to shape those local decisions. The
historical division of authority among federal, state, and local gov-
ernments is not a historical accident, but has largely arisen as a result
of the relative institutional competence of each level of government in
addressing particular social needs.1 52 The optimal mix of federal,
state, and local regulatory roles, however, inevitably changes over
time as technological, environmental, market, and political changes
occur.
2. The Absence of Regional Political Units
One of the most intractable problems for efforts to address sprawl
and its harms is the absence of political units coextensive with the
geographic reach of major metropolitan areas. Local governments are
usually the chief land use policymakers, but sprawling metropolitan
regions typically encompass many local jurisdictions, none of which
has authority to address such regional issues. In some cities, such as
New York, a single mayor and city council wield most governmental
clout and govern a jurisdiction that is smaller than the entire sprawling
metropolitan area, but nevertheless encompasses millions of residents
and several counties making up five boroughs. 53 In many of Amer-
ica's more recently expanding cities, such as Atlanta, in contrast, no
single mayor is the chief executive for more than a tiny segment of the
metropolitan area.154 Many areas in sprawling metropolitan regions
are not even incorporated, and thus can only look to county or state
151. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
Md. L. Rev. 1183, 1217-18, 1223-25 (1995); Stewart, supra note 134, at 1202.
152. For a recent work applying comparative institutional analysis frameworks, see
Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics
and Public Policy (1994). For an essay reviewing Komesar, and further developing a
framework for assessing relative competence of various institutions in different con-
texts, see Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995
Wis. L. Rev. 463.
153. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1117 (referring to New York
City's 1898 consolidation but also stating its goals were "undone" by the further ex-
pansion of the city); Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan
Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local
Self-Determination, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 775, 775-76, 780-82 (1992) (discussing New
York's 1898 consolidation and proposed secession of Staten Island).
154. Instead, approximately ten counties include at least portions of what is com-
monly described as the Atlanta metropolitan area. Furthermore, county governments
wield substantial clout and independent authority. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia
Local Government Law: A Reflection on Thirty Surveys, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 24-25
(1994).
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governments for necessary services or political action. 55
The mismatch between regional development and numerous inde-
pendent municipal or county governments means that no single gov-
ernment unit has an incentive to take the lead and suggest measures
to address sprawl's harms. 6 Similarly, no local government has
authority to impose any region-wide sprawl policies. Outlying mu-
nicipalities and counties will often oppose anti-sprawl policies due to
their interest in securing ongoing residential and business expan-
sion.157 Central urban cities usually have a major stake in reducing
sprawling development trends, but they lack authority over outlying
areas and are often in positions of fiscal weakness due to the move-
ment of capital and increased social welfare expenditures.lss
One partial solution for rapidly sprawling cities seeking to address
broader regional problems is the step New York took approximately
one hundred years ago: combine independent local jurisdictions.
Such an event, however, is unlikely. Metropolitan government cam-
paigns in most cities have been defeated and are viewed as lacking in
political viability.15 9 For an expanded city to be incorporated and a
single mayor or city council to assume chief governing roles would re-
quire numerous county governments and officials to surrender their
power and perhaps their jobs. Both empirical and theoretical litera-
ture on behavior of government officials predicts that officials will in
most instances not surrender authority, but seek an expansion of
authority and budgets unless major political risks would be associated
with that expansion. 6 Greater governmental consolidation and coor-
dination might reduce sprawl and its associated ills, but it is difficult to
see how such consolidation and coordination would come about in the
155. See generally Myron Orfield, Atlanta Metropolitics: A Regional Agenda for
Community and Stability (1998) (analyzing the urban sprawl effect in the Atlanta
metropolitan area).
156. Local governments have incentives to free ride on the anticipated or desired
actions of others. As anticipated in the literature on free riding, the result may be
that no one takes the lead in addressing the sprawl harms that all feel. See supra Part
II (discussing free riding and political dynamics leading to exacerbation of sprawl's
harms).
157. Urban policy critic William Whyte noted this tension between urban govern-
ments and exurban or suburban counties 40 years ago. See William H. Whyte, Jr., In-
troduction to The Exploding Metropolis, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing "anti-city bias
of the rural counties" throughout the United States); see also Briffault, Local Gov-
ernment, supra note 9, at 1133-41 (discussing consequences of locally bounded regula-
tion).
158. See Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29
Urb. Law. 183,195-98 (1997).
159. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1117-18.
160. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmental-
ism 6-7, 11, 16 (1991) (asserting the budgetary and turf expansion hypothesis). For a
critique of this hypothesis and literature, see Buzbee, supra note 53, at 83-90; Whyte,
supra note 157, at 14 ("It is sheer escapism, however, for people to address their ener-
gies to a scheme that calls for counties and suburbs to help vote themselves out of ex-
istence.").
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absence of a period of heightened citizen political involvement suffi-
cient to persuade the state government to modify the authority
granted to local governments.16
1
3. Authorities and Regional Problems
Even if metropolitan areas lack a unitary legal and political identity,
and municipalities or counties often wield the most significant political
clout in sprawling jurisdictions, state departments, special districts,
authorities, and public corporations can be authorized to address re-
gional problems such as sprawl. In many states, state departments,
particularly transportation departments, make many of the decisions
that spur sprawling patterns of development. The mission vision of
these agencies, coupled with powerful entrenched interests supporting
these agencies' roles, can lead largely self-sufficient and insulated
state agencies directly or indirectly to cause substantial harms.162
Three common methods of addressing an intractable problem for
which no single governmental unit can take action is for state or local
governments to create separately chartered authorities, public corpo-
rations, or special districts.'63 These entities are usually created to ad-
dress a particular type of problem or issue.' 64 These newly created en-
tities seldom require explicit weakening of preexisting departments'
161. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1167-69.
162. The Georgia Department of Transportation ("DOT"), for example, is an
agency with a culture and history aimed at new highway construction and little inter-
est in transit alternatives. See Goldberg, supra note 67, at 15. Without a constitutional
amendment, DOT could not use gas tax dollars on projects other than roads and
bridges. See id. Recent legislation bypasses Georgia's DOT to establish a new re-
gional commission, the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, that will wield
substantial oversight authority over any transportation-related project in the Atlanta
metropolitan area. See Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth. Act, ch. 32, 1999 Ga. Laws 38; David
Firestone, Georgia Setting Up Tough Anti-Sprawl Agency, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1999,
at A20.
163. For a general discussion of the uses of authorities, including judicial and schol-
arly assessments of authorities, see Comment, An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional
and Multicounty, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1376, 1377-78, 1418-20, 1422-25 (1973), reprinted in
Clayton P. Gillette, Local Government Law 670-83 (1994).
164. Yet another type of quasi-governmental institution that can influence urban
form and vitality are business improvement districts, often referred to as "BIDs." See
Richard Briffault, A Government For Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and
Urban Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 365, 366 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Business
Improvement Districts]. BIDs share features with special districts, but unlike special
districts, BIDs undertake little infrastructure work and are funded through different
devices. See id. at 417-20. BIDs are not an answer to the need for regional forms of
government due to their generally sublocal focus, but BIDs have the potential to as-
sist with efforts to revitalize urban centers and compete with suburban malls that of-
ten draw shoppers away from urban centers. See id. at 365-71, 425-29. Like other
types of quasi-governmental authorities, BIDs are only indirectly subject to demo-
cratic control. See id. at 430-61. For additional analysis of BIDs and other sublocal
entities that assume traditional government functions, see generally Richard Briffault,
The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 503, (1997)
[hereinafter Briffault, Sublocal].
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or governmental units' power, but can be given authority to sidestep
or trump these other units' areas of authority. 1"
Such authorities, public corporations, and special districts offer a
potential means to address regional problems, but have one substan-
tial drawback for citizens fearful of being ignored by the government.
Such quasi-governmental entities are subject to few democratic con-
straints, tending to be led by appointed officials, and sometimes hav-
ing their own separate budgetary allocations or revenue sources.1"
Much as a state department can act with little heed for citizen priori-
ties, authorities, public corporations, special districts, and commissions
are vulnerable to entrenched bureaucracies, special interest capture,
and insensitivity to citizen needs and desires.'6 These types of re-
gional entities thus create a means to address sprawl's ills, but are
largely insulated from democratic accountability. 168 They may be as
effective as their leaders desire, but legal and political constraints on
their actions are few.
The lack of democratic accountability of these regional entities
causes a further harm. Sprawl and numerous other issues facing
growing metropolitan areas need both regional units of government
and alert citizens participating in governance at the regional level. If
states create special regional entities that are not democratically
elected and are only indirectly, if at all, accountable to citizens, then
little political deliberation focused on regional issues is likely to occur.
In the words of Professor Richard Briffault, one confronts a "chicken
and egg" problem in seeking to create effective regional units or arms
of government.169 Without such regional entities, political activity
165. In Atlanta, for example, the Atlanta Regional Commission ("ARC") has been
authorized for many years to address regional transportation problems, but jurisdic-
tional conflict between DOT and ARC and weak ARC authority have led to ARC
having little impact. A regional transportation authority created by 1999 legislation
will now oversee metropolitan Atlanta transportation decisions. See supra note 162.
166. See Donald Axelrod, Shadow Government: The fHidden World of Public
Authorities-And How They Control Over $1 Trillion of Your Money 15-20, 35-62
(1992); Briffault, Business Improvement Districts, supra note 164, at 389-94, 414-20;
Briffault, Sublocal, supra note 164, at 525. Former New York Governor Mario Cu-
omo characterized authorities as having the "big advantage: free from the control the
people have; the big disadvantage: free from the control the people have." Axelrod,
supra, at viii; see also Robert G. Smith, The Changing Role of Funding in Authority
Policy Implementation, in Public Authorities and Public Policy: The Business of
Government 83-95 (Jerry Mitchell ed., 1992) (describing self-financing strategies for
authorities and particular authority projects and their financing). Georgia's new Re-
gional Transportation Authority consists of members appointed by the governor. See
Ga. Reg'l Transp. Auth. Act, ch. 32, art. 4(a).
167. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1145-48 (discussing option of
special districts and "federally inspired" regional councils as means to address re-
gional metropolitan issues and noting appointed nature of officials within such entities
and lack of accountability and legitimacy).
168. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Pro-
ceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030,1065-66 (1983).
169. Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1169.
1999]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
based on perceptions of a community of interest is unlikely to focus
on regional issues. Without citizen clamor for effective regional gov-
ernance, little incentive exists for local governments, preexisting state
departments, or the state legislature or executive to overcome estab-
lished interests and inertia to support creation of a new form of gov-
ernment. If local governments or states establish appointed and
largely unaccountable regional entities, citizen stakes and involvement
in the policies of these regional entities will predictably be far less
than if these entities had to solicit and maintain public approval.
Democratically unaccountable regional entities hence may offer a
means to overcome the common lack of any effective regional units of
government, but they are at best an imperfect solution.170
B. The Traditionally Limited Federal Role in Land Use Decisions
Despite over thirty years of federal environmental activity and
leadership, land use decisions and processes have remained quintes-
sentially within the province of local governments. Indeed, there has
been limited involvement or funding by states in local land decisions,
though there has been substantial funneling of federal transportation
dollars to state and local agencies. 171 Any strategy to empower the
federal government to take a greater role in addressing urban sprawl
and its associated environmental and social ills would constitute a
change in current divisions of work among federal, state, and local
governments. The limited federal role in encouraging or prohibiting
particular urban forms or types of land use is the result of historical
traditions and constitutionally limited grants of authority to the fed-
eral government. Virtually all scholarly examinations of sprawl and
suburbanization trends point out, however, that federal laws and
regulations have already influenced metropolitan growth patterns.
Thus, an increased federal role seeking to address or to deter sprawl
or its ills would constitute a change in federal policy, but would not
constitute a wholly new entry into fields of law and regulation influ-
encing urban form. Recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court make less likely any substantial expansion of federal authority
to displace state and local land use decisionmaking. These cases,
however, preserve the option of a greater federal role in addressing
170. Professors Frug and Ford hence devote much of their analysis of metropolitan
growth, problems and community to the proposition that a regional legislature is the
best cure for regional problems. See Ford, supra note 9, at 1908-09; Frug, supra notes
8, at 1075-81. Professor Briffault questions the viability of such a regional legislature
coming into existence as a result of local government sacrifice, and concludes that
states will have to act to create effective regional entities, but that such regional enti-
ties must be staffed with elected representatives to avoid problems of unresponsive-
ness and to ensure that their actions are viewed as legitimate. See Briffault, Local
Government, supra note 9, at 1166-68.
171. Senator Jackson's proposals to enact federal land use legislation had substan-
tial support, but in the end were not enacted. See supra note 2.
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ills associated with urban sprawl. This section starts by reviewing con-
stitutional limitations on federal authority, particularly over land use
decisionmaking. It then turns to examine areas in which conditional
federal spending has influenced state and local land use decisionmak-
ing. This section concludes that an expanded federal role is constitu-
tional, likely, and potentially a partial solution to address sprawl's
causes and ills.
1. Constitutional Constraints on a Federal Sprawl Role
Although under our Constitution the federal government is a gov-
ernment of limited authority, most federal expansions of authority
since the New Deal have been justified and upheld under the author-
ity granted by the Constitution's Commerce Clause.17 Despite ap-
proximately fifty years of Supreme Court decisions upholding expan-
sions of federal legislative and regulatory authority under the
Commerce Clause, the Court in 1995 signaled an unwillingness to
rubberstamp such expansions. In United States v. Lopez,'73 the Court
struck down the Gun-Free Zones Act of 1990 as beyond federal
authority.174
Urban sprawl tends to be driven by national real estate markets and
financing institutions that do business in numerous states. Sprawl's
effects are also often regional, especially in sprawling multi-state met-
ropolitan areas such as New York, Philadelphia, Seattle, and Portland.
The federal government could intervene more forcefully to address
sprawl's ills without running afoul of constitutional limitations on its
Commerce Clause authority. Lopez thus may be of limited signifi-
cance in itself, but taken in conjunction with numerous other recent
cases involving issues of federalism and "takings," any expansion of
federal authority that excessively impinges on areas of traditional
state and local activity may be vulnerable to constitutional attack.175
172 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce
Clause, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167 (1996) (advocating for a pre-New Deal interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 Vand. L Rev. 1355
(1994) (examining the development of federalism in the context of the Commerce
Clause); Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 Colum. L Rev. 2213 (1996)
(critiquing the Lopez and Seminole Tribe Commerce Clause decisions of the Supreme
Court).
173. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
174. See id. at 552.
175. See John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 174, 175-76 (1998) (exploring the reach of the
Commerce Clause and the Lopez case in the context of a constitutional challenge to
the reach of the federal endangered species law). A separate development that may
also confound anti-sprawl efforts is an increasingly anti-regulatory body of "takings"jurisprudence. Recent Supreme Court cases involving claims of regulatory takings
have created disincentives for federal or state efforts to modify land uses to reduce
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New York v. United States176 is a case of particular importance to
federal efforts to encourage state actions to deter sprawl or to address
its harms. In New York, the Supreme Court stated that the federal
government could not simply order or "commandeer" state govern-
ments to take desired actions. Instead, due to implicit constraints on
federal authority found in the Tenth Amendment, federal ends can be
encouraged only by offering states the option of displacing direct fed-
eral enforcement of federal laws and regulations (assuming the area of
regulation is justifiable under the Commerce Clause or other inde-
pendent grants of federal authority), or by offering financial incen-
tives to states in the form of conditional grants where the desired end
and the grant subject are related. 177 So long as the conditions attached
to federal dollars are related to the purpose of the funded regulatory
scheme, and there is no federal "coercion," conditional federal
spending will pass constitutional muster.78 More recently, in Printz v.
United States, the Court extended New York by concluding that the
federal government cannot commandeer state bureaucratic processes
to further federal goals or implement federal programs, even where
environmental harms. Compare Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (up-
holding a municipal ordinance substantially restricting harmful land use activities),
with Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding a taking due to an insuffi-
ciently proportional exaction imposed by a local government), and Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (determining a regulation that denies
a property owner all economically viable use of his land invalid unless the owner re-
ceives compensation, unless the harm regulated was prohibited under common law).
These cases indicate that a requirement of compensation under takings claims is a dis-
tinct possibility where governments restrict land uses either in the form of direct pro-
hibitions on all economically productive land uses or bargained-for-permits condi-
tioned on a permittee providing some kind of environmental benefit that is
inadequately linked in type or in proportion to the anticipated harms of the proposed
conduct. A narrow majority of the current Supreme Court views land use regulations
to further environmental ends with particular disfavor. A further complicating vari-
able for anti-sprawl efforts is the passage in several states of takings legislation that
creates a state law legislative right to compensation for landowners whose land loses
substantial value due to use restrictions. See generally Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging
the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 Ecology L.Q. 187 (1997).
Similar bills have been proposed by several federal legislators, but such bills to date
have been defeated. For a discussion of one of the leading federal takings bills, see
Sharon Buccino, Turmoil Over "Takings". How H.R. 1534 Turns Local Land Use
Disputes Into Federal Cases, 28 Env. L. Rep. 10,083 (Feb. 1998). For a discussion of
how a less compensation-oriented takings jurisprudence would create incentives for a
"race to develop," see David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop,
143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655 (1995).
176. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
177. For the Supreme Court's earlier upholding of federal authority to use condi-
tional funding to encourage changed state behavior, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987).
178. See id. at 210. As stated by Richard Epstein, a strong critic of conditional fed-
eral spending, after Dole "any constitutional challenges to the conditions attached to
federal grants are hopeless under the current law." Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining
With the State 157 (1993).
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that burden is only a small administrative obligation.1"
The Court's 1999 trio of divided federalism decisions, particularly
Alden v. Maine, less directly bears on the federal government's
authority to create incentives for states to further federally-defined
ends, but again reveals the Rehnquist Court's active revisiting of the
contours of state and federal authority.110 They also make clear the
limited menu of regulatory strategies that remain on a firm constitu-
tional footing. Based on the Eleventh Amendment and pre-
constitutional conceptions of sovereign immunity, the Court broad-
ened the scope of state immunity from private causes of action based
on federal law, even if brought in state courts.'8' The Court, however,
once again cited South Dakota v. Dole's blessing of conditional federal
spending as a means to enlist states in pursuit of federal ends, indi-
cating that states can voluntarily elect to participate in federal pro-
grams. 1 o The Court in College Savings Bank similarly reaffirmed the
federal government's ability to use its spending power to secure state
"agreement... to actions" that "Congress could not require them to
take."1s3 These cases will change the dynamics of federal-state nego-
179. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927-31 (1997). For a critique of New
York and Printz, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 813, 824 (1998). See also Moulton, supra note 147, at 868-85.
180. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). See generally Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); Col-
lege Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219 (1999).
181. Alden thus closed the door on the option seemingly left open in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), for federal statutory rights to be enforced against
states in state courts, even though Seminole concluded that "Congress lacks power
under Article I to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suits commenced or
prosecuted in the federal courts." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2243 (citing and characterizing
Seminole).
182. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 ("Nor, subject to constitutional limitations, does the
federal government lack the authority or means to seek the State's voluntary consent
to private suits." (citing with a "cf." signal South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987))).
183. College Savings Bank, 119 S. CL at 2231. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court
also includes language that perhaps sets the stage for efforts to undercut South Da-
kota by limiting contexts in which offers of conditional federal dollars will not be
viewed as "coercive" and hence unconstitutional. He states:
In any event, we think that where the constitutionally guaranteed protection
of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is auto-
matically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is
attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise
lawful activity.
Id "Otherwise lawful activity" will perhaps be limited to contexts like that in College
Savings Bank where a state participates in markets and it is therefore asserted (unsuc-
cessfully in College Savings), that the state waived its immunity from suit under fed-
eral law, but one can easily foresee contexts in which this language might be extended
to limit the use of federal dollars to enlist states in furtherance of federal ends. For
example, if instead of a state hiring private contractors to build transportation infra-
structure with partial federal funds, a state decides to do the work itself, could it be
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tiations about the obligations accompanying receipt of federal dollars.
They appear to require explicit state waivers of sovereign immunity if
states or arms of the state are to be vulnerable to damage suits in fed-
eral or state court for failure to abide by federal laws, regulations, or
particular conditions linked to conditional federal dollars.',, It ap-
pears, however, that citizen suits against states for injunctive or de-
claratory relief seeking to compel state officials to take action in com-
pliance with previous state commitments remain available under Ex
Parte Young."s5 States deciding to assume regulatory responsibilities
due to receipt of conditional federal dollars or due to a choice to dis-
place federal regulators can likely still be held to such commitments in
either state or federal courts despite these recent modifications of the
bounds of federal and state authority.18 6
This recent wave of federalism cases affirms that the authority of
the federal government is limited. They signal to sprawl reformers
that major new areas of federal intervention will be scrutinized and
possibly frustrated by federal courts, particularly if they rely heavily
on judicial enforcement by citizens against states as states.187 Al-
though the Supreme Court for a short time embraced Professor Her-
bert Wechsler's much cited theory that allocations of authority be-
tween the federal government and the states would adequately be
"safeguarded" and maintained by the political process without judicial
intervention, the Supreme Court has clearly reentered the arena of
federalism."m Nevertheless, as developed in greater detail below,
subject to a waiver argument if the dollars arrived with an explicit state acceptance of
certain administrative obligations or waivers of sovereign immunity? Such an argu-
ment would substantially undercut the usual understanding of South Dakota. See Ep-
stein, supra note 178, at 155.
184. For discussion of ways states can waive and federal actions that will not suffice
to create a waiver, see Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2267-68 (1999); for a discussion
of reasons states will still be subject to suits for declaratory and injunctive relief, see
id. at 2262-63.
185. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (discussed approvingly, with explanation for why Young
remains sound law, in Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262-63).
186. Much as the 1999 trio of federalism cases reaffirm the validity of state waivers
of sovereign immunity in connection with receipt of conditional federal dollars, states
will be held to waive federalism objections when they choose to displace the federal
regulator. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981), cited approvingly in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992)).
Even if this waiver logic were held to be modified in light of the 1999 federalism deci-
sions discussed supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text, Ex Parte Young still pro-
vides for injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials. See supra note 185 and
accompanying text. Federal enforcement against states also remains an option. See
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262-63.
187. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 ("[Thel second important limit to the principle of
sovereign immunity is that it bars suits against States but not lesser entities. The im-
munity does not extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other
governmental entity which is not an arm of the state." (citations omitted)).
188. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 543, 558-60 (1954). For a critique of Wechsler's theory, see William T. Mayton,
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these cases also reaffirm the federal government's important ability to
offer conditional federal dollars to encourage modified state and local
government behavior.
2. Federalism Norms and Strategic Uses of Multiple Political
Venues
Apart from the constitutional boundaries to overreaching federal
action, federalism norms act as a brake on major new federal initia-
tives that might intrude on areas previously within the domain of state
and local governments. Despite these anti-federal norms, sprawl par-
tisans will likely participate in all political venues, including federal
fora, to further or protect their interests. This section concludes that
greater federal involvement in deterring sprawl or alleviating its ills
could provide benefits, even if, as concluded below, most sprawling
metropolitan areas are likely to continue to sprawl.
Even where the federal government has authority to act, politicians
and scholars frequently voice a normative argument or presumption
against such new federal action.1 9 In the "race to the bottom" debate,
for example, the anti-federal view is that apart from the federal gov-
ernment's constitutional capacity to act in an area, one needs to ex-
amine proposed federal initiatives or intrusions with a presumption
that a federal role must be justified.19 Professor Richard Revesz
"The Fate of Lesser Voices": Calhoun v. Wechsler on Federalism, 32 Wake Forest L
Rev. 1083 (1997). Wechsler's theory was embraced by a majority of the Court in Gar-
cia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit AutIL, 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.11 (1985). While the
cases discussed above do not directly overrule Garcia, they reflect a markedly differ-
ent judicial approach in their active redrawing of the lines of federal and state
authority despite Congress having drawn different lines in statutes at issue. See Moul-
ton, supra note 147, at 850, 886.
189. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L Rev. 317, 319 (1997);
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 907-08 (1994); see also Buzbee, supra note 4, at 21-27 (dis-
cussing normative and instrumental federalism views to explore changing federal and
state roles in environmental law).
190. The "race-to-the-bottom" theory is that states or local governments seeking to
secure or retain potentially mobile business and industry (or low fiscal burden resi-
dents in the social safety net program context) will sacrifice regulatory rigor, particu-
larly safety and health regulation, to offer business and industry potentially higher re-
turns in a more favorable business environment. Other jurisdictions, however, will
compete by offering similarly lax regulation, resulting in competing jurisdictions of-
fering sub-optimal levels of regulatory protections as jurisdictions race to the regula-
tory bottom to retain business, but with no actual ultimate business-attracting advan-
tage due to the equally low levels of protection resulting from this competition. For
one of the early influential explorations of "race-to-the-bottom" theories, see Richard
B. Stewart, supra note 134, at 1210-12 (describing race-to-the-bottom dynamics and
characterizing this regulatory competition as an example of a "Tragedy of the Com-
mons"). See also Revesz, Rethinking, supra note 126, at 1211-12 (agreeing that such
regulatory competition occurs, but arguing that such competition is desirable and
should not be foreclosed by federal standards unless some other independent ration-
ale justifies such federal intervention).
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builds on the classic Tiebout hypothesis and race-to-the-bottom litera-
ture to question whether federal legislation should interfere with a
state's choice to bundle its amenities, including environmental protec-
tion, to meet most closely the array of priorities of its citizens, politi-
cians, or successful interest groups. 9' An opposing view is that the
political and scholarly bias against federal efforts to address social
needs is a "national neurosis" that imprudently hobbles potentially ef-
fective policy in a country where state boundaries may be insignifi-
cant."9 This Article largely adopts an instrumental approach to the
federalism question, focusing on what allocation of responsibility is
most likely to ascertain political preferences and effectively act on
those political priorities. Nevertheless, the anti-federal bias and de-
volutionary impulse is undoubtedly not just a scholarly artifact, but
also a political reality.193
Another examination of political-economic frameworks and incen-
tives sheds light on why, even with a frequent anti-federal norm, a
combination of federal, state, and local intervention is likely. From
both the political-economic theoretical perspective and an empirical
perspective, all entities and individuals confronting benefits, harms
and opportunities associated with sprawl can look to all levels of gov-
ernment to play roles in advancing sprawl or anti-sprawl goals. 94
Each sprawl partisan, including private entities and all affected gov-
ermnent officials, sees an array of harms and benefits in status quo ar-
rangements and also sees an array of opportunities and risks in pro-
posed new initiatives.195 As discussed above in the exploration of the
political-economic roots of sprawl,196 partisans can choose to use all of
their political and monetary resources in support of one candidate or
policy, or they can spread their influence among several candidates or
participate in the political realm individually or through advocacy
191. See Revesz, Rethinking, supra note 126, at 1211-12. See generally Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956) (discussed
in Revesz, Rethinking, supra note 126, along with a survey of further refinements of
Tiebout's theory). For a survey of articles critiquing Revesz's analysis of regulatory
dynamics and federalism, see supra note 126.
192. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 189, at 907. For a critique of debates over the
federal role in light of federalism doctrine, see Shapiro, supra note 144, at 104-06. For
Shapiro's critique of the argument that federalism principles should constrain the fed-
eral role, see id. at 58-106.
193. See Shapiro, supra note 144, at 107-08.
194. As concluded above, Supreme Court cases make clear that in addressing
sprawl, federal, state, and local governments all have authority to act.
195. As observed by Jonathan Macey, officials will sometimes find it politically ad-
vantageous to surrender or delegate authority to subordinate levels of government.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 265, 267 (1990) ("Congress will delegate to local regulators only when the politi-
cal support it obtains from deferring to the states is greater than the political support
it obtains from regulating itself.").
196. See supra Part II.
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groups. The ability of each sprawl partisan to allocate resources
among levels of government is akin to a cumulative voting scheme:
each sprawl partisan can use local, state, or federal voting rights plus a
combination of monetary and advocacy resources to influence the
level of government viewed as most significant.197 Each sprawl parti-
san, including government officials, could seek to enlist federal, state
or local assistance, or more likely, some optimal combination of all
three levels of government. The assistance sought might, of course, be
to obtain political action opposing a new initiative.19
Given the constitutional competence of federal, state, and local
governments to play a role in evaluating and addressing sprawl issues,
one can anticipate sprawl partisans using their political clout and their
monetary resources in a complex series of measures and countermea-
sures in light of anticipated actions by other sprawl partisans in each
jurisdiction. Elegant theories about local expenditures or races-to-
the-bottom inform normative arguments about what levels of gov-
emnment intervention are desirable. Nevertheless, in an area of con-
current authority of three layers of government, and agencies and de-
partments within each layer of government, plus operations of the
market that will often be matters of primarily private choice, plus
metropolitan areas facing their own unique stages of urban form and
development, sprawl partisans are likely to use all venues to assert
their interests.
Anti-sprawl advocates are particularly likely to seek federal inter-
vention due to the perception, confirmed in numerous empirical and
theoretical political science analyses, that local governments generally
will be more focused on growth goals than will federal and possibly
state officials. As concluded by Paul Peterson, policies with the goal
or effect of redistributing wealth, as would many anti-sprawl reforms,
will generally be avoided by local governments, but are more likely to
be enacted by central governments.' 91 As one moves from local, to
197. This comparison to cumulative voting is similar in concept to Professor Frug's
suggestion of the use of cumulative voting to allow voters to influence various local
governments in a region and thereby reduce detrimental interjurisdictional competi-
tion or failures to cooperate. See Frug, supra note 9, at 329-30. Briffault critiques
Frug's proposal by questioning if regional cooperation could ever be achieved ithout
substantial reliance on oversight or coercion from higher levels of government. See
Briffault, Local Governmen supra note 9, at 1156-64.
198. For an exploration of ways government officials may use threatened changes
in policy to extract benefits or "rents" from potentially affected entities, whether
these entities support or oppose the government proposal, see Fred S. McChesney,
supra note 100.
199. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 69-70 (discussing reasons central governments
are more likely to enact redistributional policies than are local governments), 90-91(arguing that larger constituencies influence central governments and will support
policies providing "broader and more diffuse" benefits, while local governments will
be more influenced by dominant economic interests), 116-23 (observing lack of group
politics at local level that might give voice to diffuse citizen concerns), 170-71 (ex-
plaining reasons local governments are unlikely to embrace pollution control meas-
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state, to federal fora, one can anticipate relatively greater interest in
policies with the goal or effect of redistributing wealth .2 0 Hence, ra-
tional anti-sprawl reformers will seek reforms from federal officials,
and to a lesser extent state officials, rather than expend substantial re-
sources in seeking anti-sprawl measures from local officials. Such of-
ficials are least likely to be amenable to enactment of such initiatives
and typically lack authority over the multiplicity of jurisdictions af-
fected by sprawl in each urban area.
This political-economic theory of sprawl politics could concededly
be applied in virtually any context of concurrent federal, state, and lo-
cal authority. Federalism (or anti-federal) norms inform this discus-
sion and assist in understanding sprawl politics and law because the
anti-federal norm plus the tradition of state and local policy domi-
nance in land use decisionmaking mean that obtaining an enhanced
federal role in areas of currently limited federal involvement will
likely cost more votes, activity, or money. On the other hand, in areas
such as transportation funding where federal dollars have long played
a huge role, tweaking the uses or amounts of federal dollars will likely
meet little anti-federal related resistance. Entities with a stake in
status quo uses of federal dollars will, as discussed above, have strong
incentives to oppose policy changes, but that opposition will not nec-
essarily be grounded in federalism doctrine or norms.0 l
Although much economic analysis assesses potential gains and
losses of a similar magnitude as creating equal incentives (or disincen-
tives), actual psychological research reveals that people are generally
risk averse and value what they have against loss more than they value
similar potential gains.2° For this reason, sprawl partisans are likely
ures without preceding central government commands due to fear of disadvantaging
local business). See generally Mark Schneider, The Competitive City: The Political
Economy of Suburbia (1989) (exploring political and economic incentives of subur-
ban governments, with a particular focus on implications of competition among local
governments).
200. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 167-83 (stating that lessening of restrictions on
flow of capital and credit at the national level allows for redistributive policies). Even
Clarence Stone concedes such a local government focus on growth, although Stone's
work concludes that local political coalitions and history will at times embrace policies
contrary to the "growth machine" hypothesis. See supra note 104 (citing Stone's
scholarship). Other scholars examining local politics observe that "anti-growth" po-
litical entrepreneurs also may find success in local governments. See supra note 115
and accompanying text.
201. Professor Stewart, in an early important work on environmental federalism,
posits that federal regulatory turf and stringency are unlikely to be "abandoned or
compromised" in part because the costs of such regulation will be felt remotely at the
state and local level. See Stewart, supra note 134, at 1218-19. For a critique of Stew-
art's view, see Butler & Macey, supra note 147, at 48-51.
202. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 265-66 (1979) (describing several
classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of
expected utility theory where individuals value objects in possession more highly than
they would pay initially to acquire the same object).
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to succeed most when they go with existing trends or suggest changes
that minimally threaten to divest current sprawl beneficiaries of their
past gains or advantaged positions. This loss aversion trend may, in
fact, be one of the reasons sprawl reformers are suddenly finding in-
creased citizen, business, and political receptivity to reform proposals.
As developed more below, perhaps a critical mass of citizens and
businesses already invested in and established on the urban periphery
in many metropolitan areas now find that beneficial location threat-
ened by yet more sprawl and congestion.u If their votes, arguments,
or campaign contribution dollars are significant to policymakers, their
demands for government intervention may be heard. That clout may
far exceed mere numbers of potential voters or contributors. Par-
ticular segments of the electorate, such as the increasingly important
suburban population, can become the critical swing vote and hence
will be courted by politicians.2°4
3. Conditional Federal Dollars as Anti-Sprawl Incentives
An underlying assumption in this Article is that if one looks to the
government and legal reforms to remedy ills associated with sprawl,
one must address the risk that the government will "drift" from its as-
signed task? 5 The history of environmental legislative and regulatory
reforms, discussed in greater depth in part IV, teaches that legal re-
forms must provide means to encourage agents to carry out their pub-
licly defined task. One of the most promising and traditional methods
for the federal government to encourage state or local actions consis-
tent with a federal goal is to provide conditional federal funding for
certain state or local activities. Given the substantial undercutting by
the Supreme Court of other federal strategies to enlist states in fur-
thering federally defined ends, conditional federal spending has be-
come a particularly significant regulatory strategy3z°  New York v.
United States and the 1999 Alden trio of state immunity decisions reaf-
firmed the constitutional validity of such uses of federal dollars.
The basic concept of conditional federal spending is that state or lo-
cal governments receive or seek federal funding for activities consis-
203. See infra Part IV.
204. See Mitchell, supra note 1 (reporting that due to growing numbers of suburban
voters and relative decline in urban voters, coupled with suburban voters' shifting of
political alignments, both parties are tailoring "the language and policy proposals" to
attract such votes).
205. The concept of government "drift" is similar to the concept of "agency cost."
Both terms describe the phenomenon of a government agent or agency with a defined
task straying from, or deviating from, the intent of the entity defining the agency's
task. See e.g., Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Ac-
countability, 57 L. & Contemp. Probs. 91, 91-94, 106-110 (1994) (discussing bureau-
crat's drift from legislative goals and responsive strategies).
206. See supra Part Ill.B.1. (discussing implications of Supreme Court federalism
and Commerce Clause decisions).
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tent with a desired federal end.2' Alternatively, state or local actions
inconsistent with federal goals can lead to the potential loss of other-
wise available federal dollars or other forms of subsidy such as insur-
ance.208 Such dollars seek to entice state or local activity, but do not
force state or local participation or compliance.? When a variety of
targeted grants or subsidies are available or vulnerable to loss, states
and local governments can seek the particular array of programmatic
supports that best meet a jurisdiction's interests.
Conditional federal spending influences federal, state, and local ac-
tivities in several ways. All conditional federal funding or related pre-
clusion of federal subsidy laws require federal officials to review state
or local activities and use of dollars. That routine oversight in itself
creates incentives for state and local officials to consider repercussions
of their actions that might otherwise be neglected. The mere exis-
tence of oversight deters sloppy work and also reduces the risk of cor-
rupt or patronage-driven development projects.210 Furthermore, ma-
nipulating the federal financial spigot directly increases the odds that
particular federal goals will be considered. Such regulatory programs
put federal officials in the position of potentially reviewing state, local,
or private sector activity, and thus impinge on state and local auton-
omy and the market's operations. They, however, do not preclude
state or local governments from deciding to proceed with a project if
they are willing to live with the reaction of the federal government. In
addition, despite the presence of federal financial incentives, state and
local governments remain the primary decisionmakers regarding land
use as they have for many decades. All conditional federal spending
schemes leave state and local governments with greater locally sensi-
tive discretion than would be the case with direct federal interven-
207. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 1911, 1918 (1995); Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitle-
ments and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 297, 299 (Symposium Issue 1996) (discussing block grant and entitlement regula-
tory schemes and stating that such federal grants "each have more varied structures
and more heterogeneous purposes than the current debate suggests").
208. See supra Part III.B.
209. Although such federal spending is an option for potential recipients to con-
sider, some scholars question if state and local governments have much actual choice
to turn down available federal dollars. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 207, at 1935-54 (de-
veloping a normative argument against the appropriateness of conditional federal
spending jurisprudence and characterizing the federal government as having "mo-
nopoly power" over sources of state revenue); Epstein, supra note 178, at 153 (dis-
cussing conditional federal spending cases and characterizing federal use of tax and
spending incentives as "coercive" and unfortunate due to their subversion of the
structural benefits of more independent and competitive governments).
210. See Sidney Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory
Policy, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 3-19,27-36 (1994) (analyzing effects of political oversight
of agency action and suggesting ways intrusive oversight can harm the quality of
agency actions); cf William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemak-
ing, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 59-60 (1975) (observing that oversight of agency action by courts
improves the quality of agency decisionmaking).
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tion.21'
The federal role in influencing sprawling development patterns has
to date been most substantial in its significant underwriting of state
and local transportation projects, although its tax policies, particularly
deductibility of home mortgage interest, have also influenced urban
form. 2 In addition, apart from the political opportunities for credit
and patronage that highway spending offers, many safety, health, and
environmentally-oriented laws use the coercive clout of highway
funding cutoffs, often referred to as "crossover" or "crosscutting"
sanctions, to enlist state and local governments in working to achieve
goals first articulated in the federal legislature.2 13 While such trans-
portation funding is often provided to states or local governments
based on criteria that require no project-specific commitment to fulfill
particular obligations, this funding is nevertheless loosely conditioned
in the sense that recipients must use the dollars for the designated
purpose and often must also follow procedural requirements such as
providing opportunities for public participation. Additional targeted
uses of federal dollars should be considered to alleviate ills associated
with sprawl. Similar conditional uses of federal dollars have been ef-
fective, although certainly imperfect, in encouraging states to further
federal goals that impinge on traditional local and state primacy over
211. For a recent critical assessment of the concept of "cooperative federalism" and
reasons "the federal government should not... conscript the services of nonfederal
governments," see Hills, supra note 179, at 817.
212 See Nelson et al., supra note 3, at 2-3; Peterson, supra note 4, at 144-46 (dis-
cussing federal policies facilitating use of the automobile); id. at ch. 11 (discussing tax
policies acting to promote home ownership and suburban development).
213. See Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations ("ACIR"), Regulatory
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 8-9 (1984) (describing "crosscutting"
sanctions as "across the board" requirements attached to federal dollars, while
"crossover" sanctions "threaten the termination or reduction of aid provided under
one or more specified programs unless the requirements of another program are satis-
fied"); Julie Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93
Nw. U. L. Rev. 351, 375 & n.90 (1999) (discussing use of federal highway funds "as a
recurring tool of persuasion" under other regulatory programs). The conditional fed-
eral spending threat of greatest significance to sprawl is found in the Clean Air Act
and linked provisions of transportation laws. Where a jurisdiction is not meeting its
Clean Air Act obligations, federal transportation dollars are often subject to a project
moratorium. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 167 F.3d 641, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (striking down EPA regulations and discussing restrictions on use of federal
transportation dollars for projects in areas not conforming to Clean Air Act and plan-
ning requirements). TEA-21 largely reauthorizes, but also in substantial part replaces
and amends the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-240,105 Stat. 1914 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.). For a
complete version of the House Conference Report on TEA-21, see H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 105-550, at 1 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 70. As of the time of drafting
and submission of this Article, no fully conformed version of TEA-21 that combines
previous law and amending or new language is yet codified in the United States Code.
Numerous TEA-21 provisions link state and local transportation activities to potential
federal transportation funding. See, e.g., TEA-21, Pub. L No. 105-178, §§ 1110, 1203,
1204,3004,3005 & 3037, 112 Stat. 107 (1998).
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land use decisionmaking.
The following section discusses conditional funding statutory prece-
dents and offers suggestions for how the conditional funding strategy
can be used to combat ills associated with urban sprawl. The section
then steps back from particular conditional spending precedents to
examine the politics and efficacy of conditional federal spending
strategies across the continuum from revenue sharing, to block grants,
to project-specific competitive grant regulatory schemes. This section
closes with a discussion of sprawl-targeted strategies that, if ever en-
acted by local governments or states either acting on their own or due
to federal encouragement, might help to alleviate sprawl's causes and
associated ills.
a. Conditional Federal Spending Regulatory Precedents
Four recent laws that use conditional federal spending to influence
state and local land use patterns provide a model for efforts to struc-
ture an effective federal role to address sprawl's impacts. In addition,
regulatory initiatives directed to brownfield sites offer similar mone-
tary enticements, but in a less substantial program. This section pri-
marily focuses upon the structures and efficacy of the Coastal Zone
Management Act ("CZMA"), 214 the Intermodal Surface Transporta-
tion Efficiency Act ("ISTEA") and its successor, the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century ("TEA-21"), 215 brownfield grants, and
earlier transportation laws requiring avoidance of harms to environ-
mental amenities and historic sites. This section also briefly discusses a
few additional regulatory precedents.
The CZMA seeks to protect coastal areas by offering federal grant
dollars to states that, in a manner consistent with broadly worded fed-
eral statutory and regulatory guidelines, create plans to protect those
areas." 6 Under the CZMA, states have substantial flexibility in the
coastal protection measures they adopt.217 States creating coastal
plans are granted authority to ensure that federal projects in that state
are consistent with the state plan.218 Most coastal and Great Lakes
214. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1994).
215. TEA-21, § 1203, 112 Stat. 107, 170-79.
216. See The Center for Urban and Regional Studies (University of North Carolina
at Chapel Fill), Evaluation of the National Coastal Zone Management Program iii-
vii, 1-31, 53-77 (1991) [hereinafter CZMA Evaluation] (describing CZMA's provisions
and its passage and implementation); see also Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 81-82 (as-
sessing CZMA as a possible model for enhanced federal efforts to protect biodiver-
sity); Ruhl, supra note 11, at 616-20 (same); Martin J. LaLonde, Note, Allocating the
Burden of Proof to Effectuate the Preservation and Federalism Goals of the Coastal
Zone Management Act, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 438, 441-46 (1993) (describing CZMA and
focusing on federal consistency provisions' implementation).
217. See CZMA Evaluation, supra note 216, at 81-166 (reviewing states' varied re-
sponses to CZMA incentives).
218. See id. at 33-41; LaLonde, supra note 216, at 441-46.
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states have prepared plans to comply with the CZMA. A related stat-
ute, the Coastal Barrier Resources Act ("CBRA") similarly seeks to
protect coastal areas through federal financial incentives."1 9 CBRA,
however, does not provide federal dollars for particular state actions,
but prohibits federal subsidies or insurance for new development in
undeveloped coastal barrier islands?20 Both CZMA and CBRA pro-
vide programmatic, predictable incentives to direct development in
ways avoiding environmental harms, yet without requiring any federal
displacement of local choices?21 States using federal CZMA dollars
have varied coastal protection strategies.m Critics assail this inconsis-
tent protection of coastal zones in various states and question if the
law adequately ensures the protection of irreplaceable coastal re-
sources? 23 Others praise the flexibility CZMA provides to states.?4
The ISTEA statute, recently reauthorized and amended in TEA-21,
provides federal funding for transportation projects undertaken at the
state and local level. Only in the last decade has the federal govern-
ment allowed and even required state and local governments to con-
sider using federal transportation dollars for projects other than roads.
ISTEA and TEA-21 no longer are as biased in favor of highway ex-
pansion as was much earlier federal transportation funding, but it is
far from clear that these more flexible laws will result in fewer high-
way expenditures. TEA-21 is only a small break from the traditional
spending focus on new highways. TEA-21 provides the overwhelming
majority of its funding for yet more highway construction, with many
of those dollars guaranteed to states?5 Nevertheless, ISTEA and its
successor TEA-21 encourage consideration of environmentally sensi-
tive choices, dovetailing their provisions with Clean Air Act sections
encouraging transportation development projects that would either
219. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-10.
220. See Elise Jones, The Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A Common Cents Ap-
proach to Coastal Protection, 21 Envtl. L. 1015,1017 (1991).
221. David Salvesen, Sand Castles: On Topsail Island, Homeowners Discover that
Building on Barrier Islands is Risky Business, The Amicus J., Winter 1997, at 28, 31
(reporting that aerial photographs show markedly different development patterns in
CBRA and non-CBRA areas).
222. See CZMA Evaluation, supra note 216, at 81-166 (surveying state coastal pro-
tection programs).
223. See Oliver A. HoucK, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal
Zone, 47 Md. L. Rev. 358,359-60 (1988).
224. See Ruhl, supra note 11, at 616-20. "Swampbuster" provisions in federal farm
bills have similarly provided for losses of federal subsidies should a farmer convert
wetlands to crop production. See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996 § 321(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 3821 (Supp. 1999). The efficacy of such provisions is
in doubt due to recent shifts in strategies to provide farmers with monetary support;
instead of variable price supports, recent legislation relies more on "market transition
payments" that are less targeted to particular activities. See Karkkainen, supra note
11, at 66-68 (citation omitted). Without activity-specific subsidies, "swampbuster"
provisions lose much of their efficacy. See id.
225. See U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pub. No. FHWA-PL-98-038, A Summary: Trans-
portation Equity Act for the 21st Century 3-7, 44-49 (1997).
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improve air quality or at least prevent additional deterioration in air
quality. 6 Apart from gross violations of federal laws like the Clean
Air Act, the planning processes encouraged under these newer federal
transportation laws do not preclude the same conjunction of patron-
age politics and established political and economic interests from se-
curing yet more federal dollars for highway construction.
The main strategy in ISTEA and TEA-21 to avoid patronage-driven
transportation decisions is in their provisions mandating a more open
and participatory planning process as a condition for receipt of federal
dollars.m ISTEA and TEA-21 supporters hope that this combination
of more flexible federal dollars and a more participatory mode of de-
cisionmaking will lead to transportation dollars being used in ways
that will create less environmental destruction and greater public
benefits.229 As with the CZMA, however, federal oversight and possi-
ble financial coercion remain the primary means for encouraging a
more open and at least potentially environmentally sensitive transpor-
tation planning process at the state and local level.2no
Federal transportation laws have for decades prohibited federal ap-
proval or funding of any projects that would destroy park spaces or
historic sites. Like coastal zone and barrier laws, this preclusion of
federal funding for environmentally harmful projects has been in-
strumental in some highly visible battles stopping major highway proj-
226. For a sympathetic review of ISTEA's achievement published by a group fa-
voring alternative transportation methods, see Surface Transportation Policy Project,
Green Streets, The 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act and the
Greening of Transportation Policy in the United States 24. For analysis of the inter-
section of Clean Air Act programs and federal transportation laws, particularly fo-
cusing on transportation planning requirements, see Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Trans-
portation-Related Pollution and the Clean Air Act's Conformity Requirements, 13 Nat.
Resources & Env't 406 (1998).
227. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1152-56 (discussing viability
of a regional legislature and concluding that past federal laws encouraging or requir-
ing regional planning and deliberation did not force planning participants to surren-
der preexisting positions of strength). Briffault critiques Jerry Frug, Decentering De-
centralization, supra note 9, at 294-98, and approvingly quotes Frug's statement that
"it is unlikely that those who profit from current law will undo it themselves." Brif-
fault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1155 n.194 (citing Frug, supra note 9, De-
centering Decentralization, at 285).
228. See 23 C.F.R. § 450.212(c) (1999) (ISTEA's implementing regulations).
229. See, e.g., Surface Transportation Policy Project, A Blueprint for ISTEA
Reauthorization: A Common Sense Guide to Transportation Priorities for the 21st
Century 3 (1997) (making twenty-five recommendations to improve and reauthorize
ISTEA); Cynthia Burbank & S. Lawrence Paulson, Congress Battles Over Successor
to ISTEA, Public Roads, July/Aug. 1997, at 41 (ISTEA "gave states unprecedented
flexibility to use federal funds... [a]nd it attempted to balance the need for improved
transportation with other vital national goals - a cleaner environment....").
230. As discussed infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text, these and most other
conditional federal spending regulatory schemes make little or no use of statutory
citizen suit provisions to enlist citizens in ensuring that programs or projects receiving
federal funds conform to legal requirements.
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ects that would otherwise have destroyed parklands.3
A different type of federal spending incentive exists in the current
federal brownfields initiative. The EPA offers $200,000 grants to de-
velopers, local, or state governments seeking to redevelop brownfields
sites.2 This initiative lacks explicit legislative authorization, but has
widespread political support and appears generally consistent with
federal hazardous substance laws' goals. 3 The combination of fed-
eral seed money and state regulatory schemes offering guidance and
approvals to entities voluntarily cleaning up contamination at brown-
fields sites has led to the rehabilitation and reuse of numerous brown-
fields sites." Reinvestment in brownfields occurs most often in cen-
tral urban areas that offer prime real estate locations for residential or
commercial use. One important lesson from brownfields redevelop-
ment efforts is that where a market opportunity can be seized (or cre-
ated) minor federal monetary incentives, in conjunction with coopera-
tive state or local governments, can be effective in modifying land use
decisions and encouraging urban center reinvestment? 5
Direct subsidy programs that seek to encourage farmers through ac-
tual cash payments to retain and to restore wetlands have similarly
met with political and private sector support and success.5 Federal
historic preservation grants and tax incentives constitute another lim-
ited but effective spending program that already provides some en-
couragement for central urban reinvestment. An expanded program
generally encouraging reuse of central urban properties would further
discourage sprawl? 7
Most anti-sprawl strategies, if implemented with conditional federal
231. For the most famous case under such transportation law provisions, see Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) (stating that §
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and another statute with similar
language prohibited release of federal highway funds for a new road through a Ten-
nessee park unless there was a federal finding that there was "no feasible and prudent
alternative to the use of such land, and ... [the] program include[d] all possible plan-
ning to minimize harm" (citation omitted)). Critics question the effectiveness of this
provision. See Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. Colo. L
Rev. 773, 821-22 (1989).
232. For a discussion of brownfields initiatives and federal-state interactions and
innovations, see Buzbee, supra note 4.
233. See supra note 50-54 and accompanying text.
234. See Eisen, supra note 52, at 887-88.
235. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
236. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 68-70 (discussing Conservation Reserve
Program, 16 U.S.C. § 3831(b) (1994), and Wetlands Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. §
3837(a) & (e), and accompanying regulations, both of which provide for direct mone-
tary payments to farmers retaining or restoring wetlands). Karkkainen notes that, in
contrast to schemes that seek to protect wetlands through regulatory prohibitions,
these subsidy programs are "warmly regard[ed]" by farmers subject to their provi-
sions. Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 70.
237. See Rachel L. Schowalter, Reuse, Restore, Recycle: Historic Preservation as an
Alternative to Sprawl, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,418,10,424 (1999).
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spending encouragement, will ultimately depend on an interested and
active public that supports efforts to address sprawls' ills. Such citizen
support cannot, however, be assumed. Conditional federal dollars can
at least serve to encourage more open state, regional, and local plan-
ning processes. Laws and regulatory schemes that encourage oppor-
tunities for broad participation can, by modifying what might other-
wise be insulated or uninformed decisionmaking, change officials'
assessments of sprawl-related measures. 8 Where such participatory
rights are not only encouraged, but made a condition precedent to re-
ceipt of federal dollars, as under ISTEA and TEA-21, such participa-
tory opportunities are likely to arise. Even under routine state and lo-
cal land use and transportation planning, public efforts to influence
discretionary state and local decisions remain the heart of any anti-
sprawl strategy. An active public can influence and possibly change a
project simply because it is viewed as bad policy?239 Many projects
contributing to sprawls' ills are now and will likely remain legal and
rational to project proponents, but are imprudent and costly when
viewed from a broader societal perspective.2 40
Because most major land use and transportation decisions require
discretionary government approvals that involve some adverse envi-
ronmental impacts, active particpation in environmental impact
statement processes that accompany most of these decisions provides
a key opportunity to gather information and influence government
plans. 41 Environmental analyses frequently reveal previously un-
known impacts, often slow down a projects' approval, and sometimes
reveal environmental effects that may require project modification or
cancellation.242 In particular, wetland or endangered species impacts
revealed through environmental analyses are potential sprawl-
stoppers and biodiversity protectors. 43 In addition, rigorous air pollu-
238. See supra Part II.F. (discussing how government officials depend on informa-
tion and contacts with constituents to assess policy options).
239. Citizens seldom would be expected to prevail in such battles, but dispersed
interests have in the past prevailed despite general political-economic predictions. See
Schroeder, supra note 92, at 31; supra Part IV.
240. See supra Part II for a discussion of political-economic dynamics underlying
sprawl and how individually rational decisions can create substantial harms due to
"tragedy of the commons" attributes of sprawling development patterns.
241. For assessments of the value of the environmental impact analysis process,
particularly in the context of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4370 (1994 & Supp. 1999), see Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental
Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 Envtl. L. 447, 451 (1990); Michael Herz, Parallel
Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1668, 1669-70
(1993); William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in Envi-
ronmental Law, 20 Envtl. L. 485,487 (1990).
242. See William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Inter-
ests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 763,
769-72 (1997) (discussing how citizens' ability to enforce legal requirements in court
influences dynamics of even discretionary regulatory decisions).
243. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, 76-78.
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tion analyses may lead to modification of development and transpor-
tation projects to avoid the harms associated with Clean Air Act sanc-
tions." State environmental impact laws often are weaker than their
federal counterparts, but still provide opportunities to scrutinize and
possibly slow down proposed projects. When sprawl threatens to
make incursions on coastal areas, parks or historic sites, federal and
state laws often provide a substantive legal hook to modify or defeat
such proposals. 45 Creative use of Title VI litigation to deter use of
federal dollars that might exacerbate environmental and racial inequi-
ties may also succeed in slowing or deterring developments that would
lead to more sprawl.24
A weakness in many federal programs that seek to achieve their
goals through conditional federal spending is their minimal usage of
citizen litigation to ensure that these laws are effective and imple-
mented in accordance with their terms at both the state and federal
level?' 7 For example, federal, state, or local government actions in-
consistent with legal requirements in coastal laws can likely be pur-
sued under the federal Administrative Procedure Act24 and analo-
gous state laws. Other persons or entities acting inconsistently with
CZMA's mandates and goals, or local or state plans, however, are
likely vulnerable only to the indirect pressure of federal funding cut-
offs or causes of action possibly available under state law. ISTEA and
TEA-21 similarly lack the crucial "citizen suit" provision found in
most environmental laws? 49 Case law is limited, but courts interpret-
ing ISTEA have allowed suits against federal agencies under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. It appears, however, that the law did not
provide a basis for suits against private entities or state or local agen-
244. See supra notes 64-74 (discussing Clean Air Act and its sanction provisions).
245. See supra notes 216-24,230 & 236-37 and accompanying text.
246. See e.g., Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: The
Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 9 3. Envtl. L & Litig. 309, 311-14 (1994) (describing the use of Title VI in bat-
tling environmental racism); Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L Rand, Is Tie VI a
Magic Bullet? Environmental Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes
and Imperatives, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 1, 5-6 (1996) (discussing the benefits of Title VI
litigation); Bradford C. Manic, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title
VI Regulations? The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 Colum. J.
Envtl. L. 1, 5 (1999) (explaining how a private right of action will serve the purposes
of Title VI).
247. For an analysis of why private enforcement may be necessary to implement
anti-sprawl control laws, see James Poradek, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan
Land-Use Planning: Private Enforcement of Urban Sprawl Control Laws, 81 Minn. L.
Rev. 1343,1366-74 (1997).
248. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994).
249. These provisions empower aggrieved citizens to sue polluters, government of-
ficials, or agencies that are breaking the law. Such citizen suit provisions have been
essential to prod reluctant agencies or correct illegal agency activity. See infra Part IV
for further discussion of the importance of such provisions to federal environmental
laws.
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cies acting in violation of ISTEA.10 TEA-21 even more explicitly
limits options for citizens seeking, through litigation, to force private,
state, or local compliance with TEA-21's provisions.251 As further de-
veloped below, mere federal reliance on monetary incentives without
substantial opportunities for citizen participation leaves these pro-
grams vulnerable to failure and unresponsiveness.2 52
While the discussed regulatory schemes continue to provide bene-
fits and constitute a potential model for other sprawl-targeted use of
federal conditional dollars, other conditional federal spending pro-
grams have met with only limited success in efforts to encourage re-
gional planning and the creation of regional planning organizations. 53
Other federal programs have sought through conditional federal dol-
lars to further particular and more targeted goals such as revitalizing
impoverished neighborhoods. These programs have had, at best, lim-
ited success in attaining their declared goals324 Conditional federal
funding is thus far from a panacea; as with any government program
or regulatory technique, failure or limited success is a distinct possi-
bility. 5 Nevertheless, the use of conditional federal dollars, espe-
cially when linked to requirements of a more open and participatory
planning process, offers several marked advantages over more pre-
scriptive or punitive regulatory strategies to address sprawl's ills.
Use of the federal monetary carrot reduces the need for more rigid
250. See Sierra Club v. Pena, 915 F. Supp. 1381, 1381 (N.D. Ohio 1996), affd sub
nom., Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 624 (6th Cir. 1997); Town of Secaucus v.
United States Dep't of Trans., 889 F. Supp. 779,786-90 (D.N.J. 1995).
251. See TEA-21 §§ 1203(0(2) & 1204(c)(2) (to be codified at 23 U.S.C. §§ 134(0)
& 135(c)). Both provisions, pertaining, respectively, to metropolitan and state trans-
portation planning, state that failures to consider planning factors required by the
statute "shall not be reviewable by any court under this title, subchapter II of chapter
5 of Title 5, or chapter 7 of title 5 in any matter affecting" such plans or planning pro-
cess. Brownfields funding seldom provides opportunities for citizen litigation, al-
though brownfields rehabilitation efforts could implicate provisions in the federal
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), or the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994), both of which do
contain citizen suit provisions and other provisions providing for citizen recourse to
the courts. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (providing for challenges to CERCLA regula-
tions); id § 9659 (providing for CERCLA citizen suits); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (providing
for RCRA citizen suits); id. § 6976 (providing for challenges to RCRA regulations).
252. See infra Part IV.
253. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1148 & nn.162-64 (discussing
"rise and fall of federally inspired regional planning councils" and citing sources re-
garding the same). These programs succeeded during the period of federal funding in
modifying state and local planning processes while regional planning councils did
their work, but as soon as most federal subsidization ended during the Reagan ad-
ministration, these councils ceased to serve an important planning function. See id.
254. See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, The Myth of Community Development, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1994, Magazine, at 27 (questioning efficacy of efforts to revitalize im-
poverished neighborhoods).
255. See generally Komesar, supra note 152, at 274-75 ("The best choices we have
or are likely to have will be imperfect and usually significantly so.").
[Vol. 68
URBAN SPRAWL
forms of regulatory intervention. Such flexibility is especially impor-
tant to address a complex institutional problem such as sprawl. Every
jurisdiction confronts a different state of development and political
and economic climate. As Professor Jonathan Wiener concludes re-
garding international environmental regimes, monetary enticements
to encourage participation in anti-sprawl initiatives are likely the most
effective device to surmount complex institutional frameworks where
no unitary entity with coercive authority exists and where different lo-
cal needs may lead to different levels of interest in such programmatic
goals. 56
b. Conditional Federal Spending Enactment and Implementation
Politics
This Article's call for increased use of conditional federal spending
to encourage state and local governments to consider anti-sprawl in-
centives is incomplete without a brief analysis of the degree to which
conditional federal dollars should constrain recipients' discretion. In
constitutional debates over the appropriate contours of federal and
state authority, the phrase "conditional federal spending" refers to
any regulatory scheme that seeks to enlist state and local governments
in furthering federal goals through the enticement of federal dollars.5
A wide range of funding strategies fall within this general constitu-
tional category of conditional federal spending. Federal dollars can be
offered or provided to state and local governments through general
revenue sharing, which only loosely defines required uses; or through
so-called "block grants," which broadly specify the purposes of the
funds but provide few regulatory requirements for how those ends are
to be met; or through dollars that are distributed to all states (often
through general revenue sharing), but which are vulnerable to loss
should recipients fail to meet federal requirements; or through proj-
ect-specific grants that must be sought through a competitive applica-
tion process.5 s Many funding strategies fall somewhere in between
these general categories or share attributes of each.5 9 A detailed re-
256. See Wiener, supra note 11, at 714-26.
257. See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
258. For analysis of ways "block grants" and other funding approaches actually ex-
hibit "more varied structures and more heterogeneous purposes than" the block grant
debate suggests, see Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 207, at 299. For discussions of
shifts in the politics and substance of federal grants, see Timothy J. Conlan, The Poli-
tics of Federal Block Grants: From Nixon to Reagan, 99 Pol. Si. 0. 247, 247-48
(1984); Hills, supra note 179, at 858-61 (discussing variety of forms of conditional
grants and their implications for the political economy of cooperative federalism);
Richard P. Nathan & Fred C. Doolittle, Federal Grants: Giving and Taking Away,
100 PoL Sci. Q. 53 (1985). See generally Bruce Casino, Federal Grants-in Aid: Evolu-
tion, Crisis, and Future, 20 Urb. Law. 25 (1988) (reviewing types of grants and their
political history).
259. A notable example of a so-called block grant scheme that shares attributes
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view of the political viability and efficacy of the universe of potential
conditional federal spending strategies is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle on urban sprawl. A review of legal and political science scholar-
ship, however, provides insights into which conditional federal
spending strategies in sprawl-oriented reforms are most likely to be
politically palatable in enactment battles and effective in implementa-
tion.
General revenue sharing is the broadest and least constrained form
of federal funding. Such dollars tend to be provided based on some
non-programmatic criteria, such as amount of particular taxes paid by
a jurisdiction or numbers of citizens falling in a particular category,
and provide maximum discretion to the funding recipient, usually only
requiring that funds be spent on broad categories of purposes.2"
Much federal transportation funding is provided to states through
revenue sharing formulas; portions of such funding are targeted to
particular construction projects, while other transportation funds are
provided to grant applicants determined to be worthy of support.26
General revenue sharing is the least useful of conditional federal
funding strategies seeking to achieve particular federal regulatory
goals due to the broad discretion these funds provide.262 Revenue
sharing advocates argue that it returns important discretionary deci-
sions to "local governments [that] are closer to the people than are
federal officials. '2 63  Civic involvement, however, may actually de-
with competition-based grant schemes is the Community Development Block Grant
program first enacted and implemented during the 1970's. This program combined
previously separate categorical grants into so-called block grants, but those block
grants were provided only to jurisdictions whose applications and plans were deter-
mined to be worthy of funding by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD"). See Donald F. Kettl, Can the Cities Be Trusted?: The Community
Development Experience, 94 Pol. Sci. Q. 437, 437-38 (1979). They provided local gov-
ernments with substantial discretion in their minimal provision of federal criteria for
what projects would be eligible for federal support, but cities only received such funds
if they had HUD's support. See id.
260. See Richard P. Nathan, State and Local Governments Under Federal Grants:
Toward a Predictive Theory, 98 Pol. Sci. Q. 47, 54 (1983) (describing revenue sharing
as allowing "the most discretion of any current grant"). For a discussion of revenue
sharing, see generally Richard P. Nathan & Charles F. Adams, Jr., Revenue Sharing:
The Second Round (Brookings Institution, 1977); Carol M. Rose, Citizen Participa-
tion in Revenue Sharing: A Report from the South 9-12 (Southern Regional Council,
1975).
261. For a thorough discussion of TEA-21, with a particularly detailed focus on
TEA-21's funding strategies and the general mechanics of federal transportation
funding, see Surface Transportation Policy Project, TEA-21 User's Guide 4-11 (1998).
262. As discussed supra note 213 and accompanying text, if such dollars, particu-
larly transportation dollars, are subject to loss or freezing due to crossover or cross-
cutting sanctions, then state or local dependency on general revenue sharing can be a
key part of efforts to enlist state and local cooperation in achieving federal goals.
263. Rose, supra note 260, at v, 2 (discussing general revenue sharing's stated goals
and results of empirical study of 60 southern communities indicating that "the influx
of federal funds-added to local budgets without any increase in local taxation-has
actually tended to reduce citizen participation in local government in many jurisdic-
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crease when local governments receive general revenue sharing funds.
Dollars delivered to state and local governments through general
revenue sharing strategies are often untraceable once received 6
On the other hand, block grant programs providing federal dollars
for only loosely defined purposes provide substantial discretion to re-
cipients and once received may be irrevocable.m Block grants often
look much like general revenue sharing, but differ in part due to their
history; they have often been the result of reform efforts combining
previous categorical grants into one larger block grant.z State and
local governments can use these dollars in a wvide variety of ways tai-
lored to the preferences and needs of the recipient jurisdiction. 26 Un-
surprisingly, state and local governments strongly support block grant-
based programs, as do federal politicians advocating states' rights. s
Those dollars may be used in public-regarding ways, but expenditures
to benefit favored constituencies remain a distinct risk!O Although
state and local use of federal dollars arguably separates funding ac-
countability and implementation responsibility, citizens and other par-
ticipants in state and local politics at least know the officials most re-
sponsible for making decisions on how funds are spent and can hold
them accountable for imprudent decisions. 7
tions").
264. See id at 11-12.
265. See Conlan, supra note 258, at 251-56; Nathan & Doolittle, supra note 258, at
58-59.
266. See Robert M. Stein, The Allocation of Federal Aid Monies: The Synthesis of
Demand-Side and Supply-Side Explanations, 75 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 334, 335-36, 341
(1981) (describing shift from categorical grants provided with substantial federal
regulatory restrictions to revenue sharing or block grant strategies); see also Conlan,
supra note 258, at 261 (observing that versions of block grants lacking few eligibility
or reporting requirements advocated by the Reagan administration shared many at-
tributes with 1970s funding schemes labeled as general revenue sharing). Much of the
debate over block grants has arisen in the setting of federal "entitlement" programs
such as welfare and other social safety net programs. See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra
note 207, at 298-301.
267. See Conlan, supra note 258, at 250-51, 252-53 (noting goal of returning free-
dom of choice to state and local governments, and also stating that an additional goal
was to undercut the "influence of Washington-centered interest groups and their con-
gressional and bureaucratic allies"); Stein, supra note 266, at 335-36,341.
268. Professor Stein notes the evolutionary nature of grant use: "[N]ew entrants to
the federal aid system seek more secure and less restrictive block grant and revenue-
sharing monies. Having experienced the dependence of federal aid, new entrants
seek to broaden their use of federal largesse by seeking and receiving monies from
the larger pool of project grants." Stein, supra note 265, at 341.
269. See e.g., Kettl, supra note 259, at 447 (reporting that in New Haven, Connecti-
cut, so-called Community Development Block Grants ("CDBGs") were distributed
by the mayor to each of the city's neighborhood corporations, "whose support he
sought to strengthen, shortly before his party's mayoral primary").
270. See generally Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 207, at 297-300 (providing ac-
countability arguments and counterarguments in discussion of variety of funding
strategies actually used). For an article arguing that unfunded mandates may actually
increase political accountability, contrary to the common argument that unfunded
federal mandates are unaccountable and therefore problematic, see David A. Dana,
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Studies of the realities of state and local politics, however, reveal
that grants provided with few criteria or targeted purposes tend to be
subsumed into a jurisdiction's general budget. 1 Little citizen input
into how best to utilize those funds actually occurs.27 Tracking the ef-
fectiveness of state and local governments' uses of federal dollars un-
der such schemes is also difficult due to minimal record keeping re-
quirements or vaguely stated funding goals?273 Federal officials also
arguably escape accountability due to the general lack of criteria de-
claring how funds should be spent and the difficulty faced by federal
legislators or executive branch officials who may wish to assess the ef-
fectiveness of the federal funding. Federal officials can do little more
than declare their aspirations for uses of such dollars and claim politi-
cal credit for their programmatic goals.274 Block grants or similar
revenue sharing programs thus face perhaps the fewest barriers to en-
actment, generally finding favor with federal, state, and local officials.
The views of interest groups on block grant proposals are less pre-
dictable. Interest group support or opposition will likely depend on
whether previous, often more targeted, funding strategies secured an
advantage for those groups and whether interest groups anticipate
faring well in less visible spending battles at the state and local level? 2 5
Block grants do little, however, to foster broad-based political partici-
pation and hence may in reality create little state and local political
accountability. In addition, the broadly defined nature of block grants
creates little federal political accountability. For a regulatory goal
such as deterring sprawl, block grants do little to overcome the strong
political-economic dynamics that have for many years contributed to
sprawl. 76
The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10-25 (1995).
271. See Rose, supra note 260, at 11-12.
272. See id. at 1-2.
273. For a detailed critique of the difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of uses of
such funding, see generally United States General Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-
99-98, Community Development: Weak Management Controls Compromise Integrity
of Four HUD Grant Programs (Apr. 1999).
274. David Mayhew's influential work on legislators' focus on reelection predicts
that such credit claiming will virtually always occur. See Mayhew, supra note 142, at
16-19, 52-61. Jonathan Macey observes that legislators will sometimes obtain maxi-
mum advantage by publicly devolving responsibility to subordinate units of govern-
ment. See Macey, supra note 195, at 267-68.
275. Interest groups may prefer the certainty of targeted grants. See Conlan, supra
note 258, at 253, 256-57, 263 (discussing contexts in which interest groups opposed
funding shifts that threatened previously secured funding). But see id. at 257-58 (dis-
cussing broad-based interest group support for community-based block grants).
276. Cf. Dana, supra note 270, at 31-35 (arguing that unfunded mandates requiring
state or local activities in compliance with federal requirements, but without federal
funding, actually may reflect rational preferences of industry and business due to a
more favorable enforcement and implementation terrain at the state and local level
and business and industry concern with preventing state and local government advan-
tages in a setting where governments act as market participants).
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In contrast to block grants or similarly broad general revenue shar-
ing, federal dollars provided with a more targeted purpose provoke
greater local political participation, especially where those dollars ar-
rive with attached participation requirementsP n If local political par-
ticipation and actual accountability are among the goals sought in
choosing funding design, it appears that more tailored grants meet
with greater success. State and local officials, however, are less fond
of such tailored grants due to the decreased discretion they provide
and the increased work they require?18 Federal officials face greater
accountability in justifying the wisdom of targeted federal funding,
particularly categorical grants. At least in earlier political eras, fed-
eral legislators saw categorical grants as a key means to claim political
credit and reelection; they advocated such grants as their "'program-
matic mainstay... suppl[ying] goods in small manipulable pack-
ets.' '279 Regulatory schemes relying on more narrowly defined pur-
poses for which dollars can be spent thus enhance federal
accountability and citizen participation. Nonetheless, due to their re-
duced spending discretion, state and local officials are less likely to
support them. Federal officials advocating a states' rights agenda may
oppose these regulatory schemes.
Regulatory schemes relying on broadly provided federal funds that
can be lost due to "cross-cutting" or "crossover" sanctions are perhaps
the funding strategy most disliked by state and local officials and by
federal officials advocating devolution of authority to states3m Such
schemes pose a substantial risk of embarrassment to state and local
officials and can lead to the loss of substantial federal funds. Such
dollars are also frequently subject to detailed regulatory prescriptions,
often in programs that enlist state and local involvement through a
combination of conditional federal spending and "displacement" fed-
eralism, under which state and local governments have the choice of
displacing a federal regulator or facing federal enforcement and pos-
277. See Kettl, supra note 259, at 444-46 (observing substantial local participation
in all aspects of CDBGs, with "far stronger [public interest] than in the local general
fund budget" and numerous citizens seeking government provision of funds for par-
ticular projects). Kettl also observes, however, that such participation did not neces-
sarily translate into influence and over time tapered off. See id. As discussed supra
note 259, the CDBGs discussed by Kettl were sought in applications and provided
only if deemed deserving by HUD. Kettl concludes CDBGs led to "a city manifesta-
tion of Lowi's interest group liberalism." Id. at 446 (citing Theodore J. Lowi, The End
of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (1969)).
278. Dislike of "categorical" grants that limited state and local discretion due to
narrowly defined funding purposes and often detailed regulatory requirements led to
political support for general revenue sharing and block grant funding strategies start-
ing in the 1960s. See Conlan, supra note 258, at 250-55.
279. Conlan, supra note 258, at 253 (quoting David Mayhew, Congress: The Elec-
toral Connection 129 (1974)).
280. See ACIR, supra note 213, at 7-17 (discussing funding sanctions, accountability
issues, and criticisms of narrowly targeted and restrictive federal funding strategies).
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sible preemption of state and local laws.2 1 Proponents of particular
federal goals such as a cleaner environment often advocate such sanc-
tions due to the federal clout they provide in overcoming state and lo-
cal resistance to federal goals.m Such funding strategies that actually
threaten to lead to state or local losses of already provided or desig-
nated federal funds, especially when arriving with detailed regulatory
prescriptions, are perhaps least likely to be enacted. In addition, even
where such sanctions are already part of federal laws, state and local
governments have in several highly visible battles persuaded federal
legislators or administrative agency officials to rescue state and local
governments from previously available, if not mandated, sanctions.2 83
In a paradoxical quirk of funding politics, the one type of funding
strategy that appears consistently to meet with broad-based federal,
state, and local support, regardless of party affiliation, are federal
funds that can only be obtained through a project-specific private,
state, or local government application, often in a competitive grant
setting., 4 Support for such funding strategies is paradoxical because
such application-based funding strategies involve federal officials in
detailed evaluation of a grant applicants' proposal. Project-specific,
application-based funding schemes are in many respects the opposite
of the popular block grant or revenue sharing strategies often advo-
cated by critics of federal micro-management. Such funding strategies
in fact look a good deal like the much-criticized categorical grants,
perhaps distinguishable primarily in their less detailed regulatory and
reporting requirements.u5
Application-based funding schemes offer several benefits in their
implementation. Programs like the federal brownfields initiative,
281. Even after recent Supreme Court decisions reducing federal control of state
and local governments in furthering federal ends, conditional federal spending and
displacement (or cooperative) federalism options remain constitutionally permissible.
See supra notes 172-88 and accompanying text. As concluded by David Dana, the
Court's opinion in New York v. United States implicitly concludes that such strategies
"constitute permissible 'incentives,' rather than impermissible coercion." Dana, supra
note 270, at 9 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
282. See supra notes 64-74,213 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 67, at 1595-1600 (discussing agency foot-
dragging and legislative offers of a statutory rescue to jurisdictions failing to meet
federal automobile inspection requirements); Oren, supra note 41, at 174-201 (dis-
cussing legislative amendment of widely disliked Clean Air Act provisions seeking to
modify commuter behavior).
284. See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 68-70, 92-93 (describing the contrast be-
tween broad opposition to regulatory restrictions protecting wetlands and endangered
species and substantial support for project-specific subsidies provided to farmers re-
taining or restoring wetlands); supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (discussing
popularity and successes of brownfields rehabilitation grants and accompanying
regulatory incentives).
285. The CDBGs, although nominally "block grants," were much like the applica-
tion-based funding strategy suggested here. See supra notes 259-77 and accompanying
text.
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which requires grant applicants to define and propose a particular
project, create a market for creative thinkers interested in working to
combat social ills like abandoned brownfields.28 A state or local gov-
ernment succeeding in obtaining a merit-based grant can claim politi-
cal credit for bringing additional, elective dollars into the jurisdiction.
Federal officials can similarly claim credit for funding for a particular
tangible project. State and local governments having little actual
use for targeted federal funds are unlikely to seek them, especially if
such funds require matching state or local expenditures or the funds'
applications require substantial investments of time and money. Ap-
plicants expending the time and money to secure such funds are likely
to have actual programmatic needs?" Federal officials providing such
funds are also accountable for imprudent goals or ineffective pro-
grams, facing scrutiny and criticism if federal funds do little to achieve
desired ends.
Application-based federal funding thus appears to have broad-
based political support and provide a high degree of accountability at
all levels of government. One accountability risk of such schemes is
the unlikelihood that not-for-profits such as environmental groups or
other citizen groups will be able to scrutinize and participate in local
or state efforts to obtain or decide how to spend project funding. Lo-
cal businesses and industry may have proportionately greater influ-
ence where regulatory schemes rely substantially on state and local
applications for project specific funding rather than on more narrowly
targeted funding criteria secured in fewer but higher stakes federal
legislative or regulatory battles.
This Article therefore tentatively advocates that to the extent po-
litically palatable, conditional federal funds should seek to target de-
sired ends in application-based programs, much as a few sections of
the TEA-21 law seek to encourage innovative means to facilitate re-
verse-commutes and development of alternative modes of transporta-
tion. 90 Eligibility for such dollars should include requirements that
recipient jurisdictions provide substantial opportunities for public par-
ticipation in choosing uses for such funds. Historic preservation laws,
286. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at 59-63; Eisen, supra note 52, at 980-82.
287. See Mayhew, supra note 142, at 52-61 (discussing federal legislators' desire to
claim credit as a means to assist reelection efforts).
288. One arguable shortcoming of such application-based funding is that it will
tend to favor larger jurisdictions with greater resources available to compete for such
funds. See Stein, supra note 266, at 335-36.
289. See Dana, supra note 270, at 32 (noting that "at the state and local level, there
is often an absence of well-organized and well-funded groups to articulate and lobby
for the general public's interest in environmental protection"); Mank, supra note 141,
60-62; Peterson, supra note 4, at 116-30 (exploring reasons for low levels of citizen and
citizen-based interest group activity in local government politics); Steinzor, supra note
141, at 144-45.
290. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing ISTEA and TEA-21's
programs seeking project-specific funding support).
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brownfields initiatives, and wetland protecting subsidies have been
similarly structured and met with political support and greater appar-
ent programmatic success than less targeted grant schemes or man-
date-based regulatory regimes.291  Regulatory schemes relying on
crossover and crosscutting sanctions may also be effective, but their
political unpopularity makes them of questionable utility for anyone
advocating increased federal support for anti-sprawl incentives.
C. Additional Sprawl Strategies and Reforms
The question that remains is how best to convert a general goal,
such as reducing sprawl's ills, into tangible programs with discrete and
achievable goals. What particular regulatory tools should be consid-
ered if a jurisdiction decides to initiate anti-sprawl efforts? The fol-
lowing section offers a brief discussion of several regulatory strategies
to address sprawl and its ills. These strategies could independently be
embraced by state and local governments, or might appropriately be
encouraged by federal legislation providing incentives for such strate-
gies through the conditional federal spending regulatory carrot. None
of these strategies alone will prevent sprawl, nor is any combination of
these strategies likely fully to achieve such an end. These strategies
would, however, act as disincentives to sprawl, might alleviate some of
the ills associated with sprawl, and, at a minimum, would reduce ways
in which current legal regimes encourage sprawling patterns of devel-
opment.
More creative imposition of development fees or taxes could help
deter sprawling development, although such fees would have to be
substantial actually to redirect real estate development projects. Sev-
eral states now impose fees on developers of new real estate.29 Such
fees create a mild disincentive to new development, but appear to be
primarily revenue raising measures, in some instances financing the
purchase of other green spaces.293
To deter mothballing of urban center properties by real estate
speculators, urban centers seeking development might enact a split
rate property tax, taxing land at a higher rate than buildings.294 While
291. See supra notes 214-46 and accompanying text. The Department of Housing
and Urban Development recently has combined a wide range of previously separate
programs into one "Super Notice of Funds Availability," or Super NOFA, that simi-
larly seeks applications for eligible projects. See Super Notice of Funding Availability
for Housing and Community Development Programs, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,490 (Mar. 31,
1998).
292. See Altshuler et al., supra note 118, at 120.
293. See Mandelker, supra note 146, §§ 9.11 to 9.22 (discussing uses of development
fees and exactions and constitutional constraints under federal and state law on uses
of such fees).
294. See Southern Envtl. L. Ctr. & Envtl. L. Inst., Smart Growth in the Southeast
15 (1999) (advocating split rate property tax (also known as land-value or two-tiered
real estate tax) as a means to reduce disincentive to develop and use land more inten-
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such a tax strategy would discourage real estate mothballing or un-
derutilization of property, it could also cause the undesirable wiping
out of small businesses, low income housing, and neighborhoods that
retain a distinctive character.295 To avoid such harms, a split rate tax
strategy might best be targeted to metropolitan center properties that
are unused or being used for low-intensity, low-employment uses such
as surface parking.
A more nuanced federal transportation funding scheme might also
reward states or metropolitan governments, especially multi-
jurisdictional entities, which create land use planning schemes that di-
rect development into the urban center and develop strategies to en-
courage greater reliance on rail and alternative forms of transit. If
federal highway and transportation dollars were adjusted to reward
states or local governments imposing a tax or fee on new development
on the urban periphery, or on development that involved clearing of
green spaces, state and local governments would have increased in-
centives to enact such a fee system. Sprawl could also be discouraged
through imposition of congestion fees on users of highways.9 Al-
though tollbooths are less common today than twenty years ago, scan-
ning equipment would allow use of such user fees without adding to
traffic tie-ups. Such a fee could constitute a regressive tax unless off-
set with some income-linked rebate system, but would create a direct
disincentive to drive alone on highways. Such fees would also mar-
ginally increase the relative attractiveness of areas offering untaxed
transportation alternatives.
A related but differently targeted financial incentive scheme would
reduce federal transportation dollars to high vehicle mile per capita
metropolitan areas, particularly where cars tend to have only one pas-
senger. Under such a scheme, cities that develop mass transit and al-
sively).
295. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin, For Retailers in Some City Centers, Gentrification is a
Four-Letter Word, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1999, at 7 (describing tensions between Bal-
timore urban development advocates seeking to add economic vitality to a poor
neighborhood and residents concerned about displacement of their homes and busi-
nesses).
296. Such a scheme would differ from ISTEA or its successor TEA-21 in giving
preferential funding (or greater funding) for non-highway-related expenditures.
Much of TEA-21 provides a limited version of such preferential funding in its creation
of a "Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program." TEA-21 § 1110
(to be codified at 23 U.S.C. § 149). This section encourages proposals for projects to
reduce congestion and air quality problems. An even more targeted monetary en-
couragement is in TEA-21 § 3037 (to be codified within Title 49). Section 3037, enti-
tled "Job Access and Reverse Commute Grants," offers special additional federal
grants for proposals to fill transportation needs of urban poor seeking access to the
many jobs located not in central cities but on the urban periphery. See Notice, Job
Access and Reverse Commute Competitive Grants, 63 Fed. Reg. 60,168 (Nov. 6,
1998).
297. See generally Winston Harrington, Paying to Drive Freely, 129 Resources 9
(1997); Wahrman, supra note 60.
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ternative transportation options (or improve the status of such op-
tions), and hence reduce average vehicle miles traveled per capita,
would be financially rewarded, while cities dependent on single pas-
senger high mileage trips would be financial losers.29 s Current law
provides similar incentives, but only to the extent that state and local
efforts are inadequate to meet federal Clean Air Act requirements.299
A related strategy could require that transportation and sprawl-
related projects proceed only after an assessment of costs and benefits
associated with those plans.300 Particularly in areas such as major in-
frastructure investment, where political patronage and pork-barrel
politics are a substantial likelihood, an assessment of overall costs and
benefits often reveals the actual lack of societal benefits of major gov-
ernment projects.30 1
State acquisition of green spaces or creation of zoned urban growth
boundaries also can deter sprawl and alleviate negative effects of cur-
rent sprawling development.3°0 Such government acquisitions or
regulatory strategies, however, undoubtedly distort land markets and
may have fewer environmental benefits than expected.303  Oregon's
highly touted urban growth boundaries have contributed to that
state's economic vitality and the City of Portland's economic boom,
but where low density or no-build rings of land are placed at a sub-
stantial distance from the urban center, they appear to lead to accel-
erated growth and building on previously green spaces inside the
growth boundary." 4 Such urban growth (or containment) strategies
also can raise equity concerns due to suddenly enhanced values of
land inside an urban growth boundary, while usually rural or agricul-
298. Professor Larry Frank analyzes in detail the benefits of encouraging less spo-
radic modes of car use and more interconnected street patterns. See Frank, supra note
18.
299. See supra notes 64-74,213 and accompanying text.
300. Such a requirement would work much like environmental impact statements
under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and similar state laws, but
would, if made part of such analyses, expand the scope of currently required analysis.
For a thorough analysis of NEPA, its regulations and cases, see John E. Bonine &
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Law of Environmental Protection 1-212 (2d ed. 1992).
301. For example, a similar type of cost-benefit analysis is undertaken by the En-
dangered Species Committee when evaluating requests to allow a proposal to proceed
despite endangered species harms. In numerous high visibility matters, the Commit-
tee has found that costs associated with major infrastructure projects exceed project
benefits. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered
Species Act-A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Ca-
naries in the Coalmine, 27 Envtl. L. 845, 874 n.111 (1997).
302. For a recent critique of growth management strategies, see generally James H.
Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model for
State Growth Management Statutes, 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 489 (1994).
303. Oregon's experience with its urban growth boundary has been mixed, but the
preserved green spaces have remained. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
304. See generally Arthur C. Nelson, Using Land Markets to Evaluate Urban Con-
tainment Programs, 63 J. Amer. Plan. Ass'n 94 (1997) (analyzing theoretically and
empirically the effects of urban containment programs).
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tural properties outside of the boundary experience an immediate loss
in land value due to reduced potential for real estate development.O
To avoid such inequities, any jurisdiction enacting an urban growth
strategy should include a combination of either compensation or tax
benefits to real estate owners outside of urban growth boundaries
Federal, state, and local governments seeking to deter excessive
growth, or to address sprawl's associated harms, especially destruction
of green spaces, can and should make greater use of outright acquisi-
tions of significant green spaces, thereby preserving agricultural uses,
recreational amenities, or helping to preserve biodiversity." Pro-
tected green spaces and parks create environmental benefits, enhance
surrounding land values, and can reduce the visual blight of unmiti-
gated sprawling business and residential development. The power of
all levels of government to acquire land in consensual transactions is
unquestioned, plus governments have the ability to acquire land for
the public good under the power of eminent domain.m Government
acquisition of land for green space or for alternative transportation
uses is a direct means to combat ills associated with sprawl. Such ac-
quisitions might be of a fee simple interest or of conservation ease-
ments limiting future uses of such land.3 Forcing governments to pay
for the benefits of retained green spaces would likely reduce politi-
cians' enthusiasm for such strategies, and hence reduce their prob-
abilities of enactment or effective implementation. Forcing govern-
ments and taxpayers to confront the costs and benefits of such
strategies, however, would arguably enhance government account-
ability.310 To encourage such acquisitions, federal subsidization for
federal, state, or local acquisitions should be expanded from often mi-
nor support and funding available under the Land Water and Conser-
vation Fund.3
In addition, provided states leave landowners with profitable uses
for their lands, states have substantial latitude to limit types of land
uses, especially where those uses of land can be linked to externalized
305. See id. at 164-66.
306. See id
307. Professor Karkkainen has concluded that outight acquisition of areas that can
protect or enhance biodiversity is both politically feasible and equitable. See Kark-
kainen, supra note 11, at 103-04
308. See id. at 84-97 (asserting that government acquisitions of significant lands to
preserve biodiversity face fewer constitutional and political obstacles than would
regulation to achieve such an end).
309. See id. at 55.
310. See id at 96-97.
311. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460-4 to 460-11 (1994). See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 55 &
n.310 (also noting potential of the Fund, but noting its limited funding sources and
lack of focus on protecting environmentally significant lands); Ruhl, supra note 11, at
656 & n.310 (discussing potential of the Land Water and Conservation Fund to en-
hance efforts to protect biodiversity, but questioning if the political will exists to actu-
ally pay for such efforts).
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harms.312 Direct government intervention in land use patterns by land
acquisition or regulation is a major and intrusive form of government
intervention. Nevertheless, the experience of Portland, Oregon shows
that even if such a strategy leads to fewer environmental benefits than
anticipated, it may reduce harms associated with rapid urban sprawl
and contribute to enhanced metropolitan vitality and higher property
values.313
IV. POLITICAL AND LEGAL WILL: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW'S
DYNAMICS AND SPRAWL COMPARED
How the sprawl issue and its associated ills are politically and le-
gally framed will be key to sprawl reform efforts. Environmental pro-
tection initiatives have often met with success, but usually only when a
confluence of particular factors has been present. Many of sprawl's
harms are environmental, and much as pollution-causing industry
wields both market and political clout, the beneficiaries of sprawl also
wield substantial power in the market and politics. 314 Sprawl's con-
tributors also include millions of citizens choosing to reside on the ur-
ban periphery. A comparison of environmental reforms and successes
and the political and legal dynamics of urban sprawl reveal that urban
sprawl's complex institutional dynamics present a challenge that
threatens to be intractable. Nevertheless, this part reviews these envi-
ronmental lessons to assess sprawl reform efforts, suggesting both pre-
enactment contexts favorable to reform efforts and strategies to im-
prove the likelihood of post-enactment implementation success.
A. The Need for a Perceived Disaster
Few environmental initiatives and resulting laws emerged from pe-
riods of cool, rational discussion.315 Instead, most environmental laws
emerged from periods of widespread perceptions of crisis.316 The first
federal Clean Water Act with legal teeth was enacted following the
Cuyahoga River fire and widespread concern about the environment
following the first Earth Day.317 The Clean Air Act was similarly en-
312. See supra note 175 (discussing recent takings jurisprudence and how regula-
tory burdens in the land use context can lead to successful constitutional takings
claims seeking compensation).
313. See generally Robert Liberty, Planned Growth: The Oregon Model, 13 Nat.
Resources & Env't. 315 (1998).
314. See supra Part II (discussing the political-economic dynamics of sprawl).
315. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 Ecology L. Q.
233, 242-50 (1990); Rose, supra note 106, at 1025-1026.
316. See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science and
Policy 3-6, 68-69 (2d ed. 1996).
317. For history-oriented discussions of the political dynamics surrounding passage
of major environmental laws and significant regulatory battles, see Percival supra
note, 316, at 106-14 (providing chronology of significant federal environmental legis-
lation); Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental
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acted after a period of broad political support and heightened aware-
ness of environmental ills. The federal Superfund law (also known by
its statutory acronym of CERCLA), was enacted following wide-
spread concern and publicity regarding hazardous waste contamina-
tion at Love Canal in upstate New York and in Times Beach, Mis-
souri, where dioxin contamination required emergency action.
In contrast to environmental legislative initiatives, where the statu-
tory goal can be presented in a clean manner--cleaner water, cleaner
air, or no hazardous waste dumping-initiatives addressing land use
issues such as sprawl are difficult to present cleanly. "Unlike pollu-
tion controls, land use controls have no ideal of 'pure' land to which
they refer. '319 Unlike issues of environmental racism, which lend
themselves to effective coalition building and strong absolute opposi-
tion statements, sprawl is the result of many private and governmental
decisions where any overriding motivation is likely impossible to dis-
cern.m Furthermore, there is seldom one overarching adverse impact
of sprawl. Instead, many harms all contribute to substantial societal
costs, but no one sudden disaster or wrongful act or actor can be used
to rouse citizens or politicians.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of a single catalyzing event or harm
to trigger political activity to address sprawl, less cataclysmic diverse
harms may be felt widely enough that some jurisdictions may be re-
ceptive to anti-sprawl political initiatives. In particular, increasing
citizen and business concern with traffic congestion, a decrepit urban
core, and loss of green space may soon be sufficiently widespread that
new legal and political activity will arise in many metropolitan areas as
well as in the federal legislature and in federal agencies. Political ini-
tiatives to encourage brownfields reuse and redress environmental in-
equities could also lead to support for anti-sprawl measures. l
B. The Need for Entrepreneurial Politics
A sudden disaster or perceived crisis is often essential to rouse the
populace and give politicians reasons to take on issues of harms
Movement 111-12, 129-48 (1993); Jerry W. Calvert, Party Politics and Environmental
Policy, in Environmental Politics and Policy. Theories and Evidence 158, 158-78
(James P. Lester ed., 1989) (focusing on legislative initiatives). See generally Marc K.
Landy et al., The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions
(1990) (focusing on regulatory initiatives); Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement at the EPA:
High Stakes and Hard Choices (1995) (focusing on the history and regulatory initia-
tives of the EPA).
31& See Landy et al., supra note 317, at 131-71 (discussing history of CERCLA).
319. Healy & Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 1-2 (quoted in Daniel Mandelker et al.,
Planning and Control of Land Development 862 (4th ed. 1995)).
320. For one of the first books articulating problems associated with environmental
racism and inequity, see generally Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class,
and Environmental Quality (1990).
321. See Richard Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice". The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L Rev. 787, 850-52 (1993).
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caused by industry and the process of real estate development. Dur-
ing periods of "business as usual," politicians are likely to encounter
and receive entreaties from those entities with concentrated interests
in political decisions.32 As discussed above, classic economic theories
of regulation predict what is actually often seen in politics. Laws are
often enacted to address the wishes of constituencies, such as devel-
opers and industry, who have substantial incentives to act politically
and thus have frequent contacts with officials who could affect their
businesses.3 3
A sudden disaster or perceived crisis provides politicians with op-
portunities for "entrepreneurial politics."324 Politicians can seize upon
an incipient issue and use it to make a political name and claim credit
for a public initiative.31 Several early environmental laws were en-
acted due to the leadership of Senators Edmund Muskie and Gaylord
Nelson. Both of these legislators perceived an incipient environ-
mental movement and through use of actual hard data and legislative
advocacy moved environmental issues to the political frontburner.26
Legal scholars analyzing reasons for the stringency of the 1972 Clean
Air Act amendments suggest that Senator Muskie and President
Richard Nixon engaged in an escalating battle to claim the environ-
mentalist mantle for an upcoming presidential election.32 7 Few suc-
cessful environmental initiatives have lacked this combination of a
perceived crisis and entrepreneurial politics.
Sprawl may be ripe for such entrepreneurial politics if politicians
perceive the changing demographics of the United States and the po-
tentially wide support for efforts to combat the ills of sprawl. In
New Jersey, for example, Republican Governor Christine Todd
Whitman has recently made sprawl and green space initiatives a cen-
322. See Schroeder, supra note 92, at 30.
323. For classic economic theories of regulation, see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371, 373-81
(1983); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, in The Citizen and the
State 114-141 (1975). See also Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Ad-
ministrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1684-87 (1975) (discussing "capture" theories
of regulation but also noting "more subtle explanation of industry orientation" in
regulation). For further discussion of the political-economic dynamics leading to
sprawl, see supra Part II. This section focuses upon contexts where legal reforms
have succeeded despite anticipated political-economic hurdles to success.
324. For two essential discussions of entrepreneurial politics in the environmental
area, see generally Elliott et al., supra note 115, and Farber, supra note 115. For dis-
cussion of these theories in connection with law and policies to encourage rehabilita-
tion of brownfields sites, see Buzbee, supra note 4, at 12-19.
325. See Mayhew, supra note 142, at 13-77.
326. See Shabecoff, supra note 317, at 112-15.
327. See Elliott et al., supra note 115, at 316.
328. See supra note 1 (citing recent articles regarding substantial political, citizen,
and press interest in sprawl); see Mitchell, supra note 1 (reporting particular impor-
tance of suburban voters).
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terpiece of her administration. Similarly, several decades ago, Ore-
gon Republican Governor Tom McCall supported and enforced envi-
ronmental laws and supported efforts to contain urban sprawl with
urban growth boundaries.3' In 1998, Georgia Democratic Governor
Roy Barnes seized on sprawl as one of his early initiatives. 33' At the
federal level, in 1998 and 1999, Vice President and presidential hope-
ful Al Gore recently has made sprawl reform a major campaign talk-
ing point.3'
Such a conjunction of constituency support for anti-sprawl meas-
ures and politicians perceiving political advantage in leading anti-
sprawl initiatives is essential both for enactment of sprawl reform
policies and the success of post-enactment implementation efforts.
Sprawling cities in the South, Southwest, and West Coast depend less
on an industrial base for job creation and wealth, and need to attract
and retain corporate headquarters and service sector and high-tech
jobs. The competition among jurisdictions for jobs and employers is
less likely to be about which jurisdiction will be most lax in regulating
industry. Instead, a strong argument can be made that recently ex-
panded cities must focus on policies that will create an improved
quality of life and enhanced urban amenities. Sprawl cities such as
Atlanta are less likely to compete with Birmingham for steel manufac-
turing facilities than they are likely to compete with Durham, North
Carolina or Seattle, Washington for service sector, high-tech, and uni-
versity employers and employees.
Furthermore, past sprawl beneficiaries may eventually become anti-
sprawl advocates as inner ring suburbs and businesses find their ad-
vantages threatened by traffic contributions of yet more distant sprawl
developments.333 Central city businesses and governments continue to
seek measures to enhance central city vitality. Traffic congestion,
polluted rivers, generic malls and shopping centers, and lack of a dy-
namic urban center all pose a risk to a city's vitality in the current
economy. All localities within a metropolitan region have incentives
to shirk and let others provide essential amenities, but they neverthe-
less share an interest in ensuring that the metropolitan region offers
decent housing, jobs, and attractive recreational opportunities.p A
combination of these emerging issues and shared interests of diverse
constituencies in anti-sprawl measures may give rise to contexts suit-
able for successful entrepreneurial politics.
329. See Preston, supra note 1.
330. See generally Brent Walth, Fire at Eden's Gate: Tom McCall and the Oregon
Story (1994); Leonard, supra note 84.
331. See supra note 162.
332- See Milbank, supra note 1, at 18.
333. See supra Part III.B-C.
334. See Briffault, Local Government, supra note 9, at 1133-41 (discussing reasons
localities are unlikely to surrender parochial perspectives despite shared interests in
policies addressing regional issues).
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C. The Need for a Public Interest Constituency
The active and effective participation of environmental groups in-
terested in furthering environmental goals is another earmark of suc-
cessful environmental initiatives, especially in the post-enactment im-
plementation phases of environmental protection schemes. Well-
established environmental not-for-profits provide a counterweight to
pro-development and industry interests and prod resistant or sluggish
agencies to comply with legal mandates.335 They generally cannot
compete with the financial resources available to development and in-
dustrial interests, but their ongoing existence depends on success in
furthering their agenda.336 These groups successfully compete in the
legislative, department, and agency arenas by offering officials policy
information and evidence of citizen support for environmental initia-
tives.337
Environmental concerns have long had high voter salience.3 38
Elected officials warily oppose highly visible environmental initia-
tives. 3 9 The increased interest of environmental groups in issues of
sprawl is a promising development for citizens and politicians inter-
ested in pushing sprawl reforms, although that same increased interest
alarms critics who fear misguided and excessively prescriptive anti-
sprawl efforts. 4 Anti-sprawl groups such as the Surface Transporta-
tion Policy Project and environmental justice groups add an important
voice and source of information for anti-sprawl efforts. A major ques-
tion, however, is whether such groups can be effective in influencing
the many dispersed fora where land use and transportation decisions
that affect sprawl will be made, even if federal or state anti-sprawl in-
centives have been enacted.
D. The Need for Discrete Goals and Empowered Citizens
Sprawl reformers confront their greatest challenge in trying to de-
fine discrete and achievable goals. The institutional complexity un-
derlying sprawl's dynamics and legal structures makes difficult efforts
to define a paramount goal or a main forum for activism, let alone set-
tle upon a dominant regulatory tool to address ills associated with
sprawl. Federal environmental laws have had unexpected success and
teeth because they usually contain both deadlines for particular pri-
vate and government actions and also authorize citizen suits for viola-
335. See Shabecoff, supra note 317, at 103,256-58.
336. See Farber, supra note 115, at 70-73.
337. See id.
338. See Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in Environ-
mental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence 87 (James P. Lester ed., 1989).
339. See Shabecoff, supra note 317, at 255-56.
340. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (citing recent articles critical of anti-
sprawl initiatives).
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tions of those mandates.341 Environmental groups devote substantial
resources to initiating litigation against polluters who violate federal
requirements and against agencies and other governmental entities
that violate discrete statutory mandates and firm statutory dead-
lines.342 Virtually all successful environmental initiatives have de-
pended on this combination of discrete goals, citizen suit provisions,
and litigation to prod noncompliers into action. Where older versions
of federal laws instead had more amorphous environmental quality
goals, little environmental improvement occurred. 3
Environmentalists have also enjoyed repeated legislative successes
because the federal legislative forum has repeatedly been amenable to
new environmental proposals.3 In implementing these laws, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has also
been amenable to the participation and suggestions of environmental
groups. By concentrating key environmental decisionmaking within
the Washington D.C. beltway, environmentalists have been able to fo-
cus their limited resources in federal legislative and regulatory fora
and seek to lock in successes in the form of legislative and regulatory
rules.3 45 By concentrating their efforts on the federal government, en-
vironmentalists have been able to achieve far greater successes than
would be possible if decisions were geographically fragmented and
key policy decisions were made in dispersed tribunals.
Given the decentralized nature of land use and transportation plan-
ning, no federal tribunals are likely to create firm goals and litigatable
mandates to combat sprawl. Any new federal legislative initiatives
encouraging state and local anti-sprawl efforts will require substantial
public participation at the state and local implementation stage. In-
stead of securing anti-sprawl implementation through the assistance of
341. Professor Melnick questions the efficacy of such provisions and asserts that
statutory deadlines are often intentionally unrealistic, but acknowledges their influ-
ence on environmental policy. See R. Shep Melnick, Pollution Deadlines and the Coa-
lition for Failure, in Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 89 (Mi-
chael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992).
342. See id.
343. See Howard Latin, Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L Rev. 1267,
1284-92 (1985).
344. See Buzbee, supra note 4, at 42-46 (discussing federal environmental leader-
ship and exploring "first-mover" hypothesis to explain the longstanding federal lead-
ership role); see also Elliott et al., supra note 115, at 338 (exploring political and eco-
nomic dynamics leading to stringent federal environmental laws); Farber, supra note
115, at 68-69 (discussing reasons why environmental groups have influenced federal
policy); Schroeder, supra note 92, at 29.
345. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of Professors
Steinzor and Mank of decentralizing regulatory reinvention proposals and likely ef-
fects of dispersing fora in which policy is made); see also Revesz, Rethinking, supra
note 126, at 1223-24 & n37 (discussing how environmental groups are "more effective
at the federal level"); Stewart, supra note 134, at 1213-15 (discussing reasons for envi-
ronmental groups' successes in federal legislative and agency politics).
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courts, the far less certain fora of state and local legislative and regula-
tory politics are likely to be the sites of successful or failed efforts ac-
tually to implement sprawl-reducing measures. Citizen participation
and advocacy in these state and local fora may be allowed or even in-
vited, but given the complexity and fragmented nature of decisions in
these tribunals, effective advocacy by dispersed citizen or not-for-
profit groups would be difficult. If democratically unaccountable re-
gional authorities become the main venue for review of regional deci-
sions influencing sprawl, the public's voice is particularly likely to go
unheard. As Professor Arnold Reitze noted in his study of transpor-
tation planning requirements under federal air and transportation
laws, the combination of reliance on computer modeling and sequen-
tial and fragmented decisionmaking mean that "the public will con-
tinue to depend almost entirely on the good faith" of responsible gov-
ernment agencies.6
CONCLUSION
Urban sprawl is thus predictable based on a confluence of market,
legal, and political structures and dynamics. Numerous past and on-
going government activities, particularly the underwriting of transpor-
tation infrastructure, have contributed to sprawling urban forms.
Sprawl is not all harm. From the perspective of many residents of
sprawling metropolitan regions, sprawl offers numerous direct and of-
ten substantial economic benefits. Sprawl nevertheless causes numer-
ous tangible harms for citizens, businesses, and the environment.
Modification of present legal structures and incentives within our
federalist scheme to alleviate ills associated with sprawl could create
substantial societal benefits. The federal government has constitu-
tional authority to provide additional anti-sprawl incentives, but can-
not and should not seek to impose rigid mandates for particular urban
forms. Instead, federal initiatives making greater use of conditional
federal spending offer states and local governments the option of
utilizing federal assistance. Conditional federal dollars offer the addi-
tional benefit of enticing participation in a context where fragmented
decisionmaking and the varied conditions of sprawling metropolitan
areas render mandate-oriented regulation unsuitable. Modified in-
centives and the enticement of project-specific, application-based fed-
eral monetary assistance, especially when coupled with mandates that
planning processes be made open and participatory, are far more
likely to achieve anti-sprawl goals at reasonable cost and with appro-
priate sensitivity to local conditions than are more prescriptive anti-
sprawl measures.
Despite the existence of successful examples of programs using
conditional federal dollars to modify state and local land use practices,
346. See Reitze, supra note 226, at 412.
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the prospects for effective anti-sprawl reforms remain dim. Even if a
jurisdiction chooses to open up the processes of regional and transpor-
tation planning, and even if available federal dollars create disincen-
tives for prevailing land use and transportation patterns in sprawling
jurisdictions, there is little reason to anticipate that dispersed citizen
concerns will be heeded in any ongoing manner. Anti-sprawl voices
are likely to exist, particularly as residents and businesses invested in,
or seeking to invest in, more central metropolitan locations attempt to
avoid or reduce the ills associated with sprawl through market trans-
actions and politics. It is far less clear that such anti-sprawl voices will
succeed in deterring sprawl, even if central city and inner ring suburbs
slowly revitalize due to private reinvestment and locally responsive
politicians.
Even with a more open and participatory process of transportation
and regional land use planning, the same confluence of private de-
mands for policies furthering sprawl, coupled with similar state and
local government incentives to attract new development, threaten to
replicate political and economic dynamics leading to sprawling urban
forms. A level playing field where all can speak makes little differ-
ence when some sprawl partisans have the means and incentives to
participate and lobby on an ongoing basis and hence skew ultimate
policy decisions. Were sprawl decisions able to be reduced to a few
key legislative votes or administrative deliberations, then perhaps dis-
persed citizen interests and similarly aligned not-for-profits could suc-
ceed in locking in solidly enforceable government commitments.
Sprawl decisions, however, will seldom be presented in such a discrete
manner before high visibility tribunals where citizens, central city
governments, businesses, and environmental and environmental jus-
tice not-for-profits can concentrate their efforts and perhaps act as a
counterweight to pro-sprawl interests. Furthermore, many citizens
may oppose anti-sprawl measures that make their lives in suburbia, or
hopes for a suburban life, more costly or inconvenient.
Regional transportation authorities or similar subject-limited re-
gional entities can act to address otherwise intractable regional ills
that often are ignored by state and local governments. Most such enti-
ties, however, are staffed by appointed officials and hence are neither
chosen by citizens who embrace their policy views nor are such offi-
cials under any electoral compulsion to seek public approval for their
choices. Such regional entities are unlikely to operate under prescrip-
tive regulatory schemes. Instead, they are likely to evaluate proposed
projects on a case-by-case basis as has long occurred in state and local
land use decisionmaking. Few procedural requirements, substantive
criteria, or clearly stated regulatory goals are likely to give anti-sprawl
interests a toehold to use litigation to further anti-sprawl goals or just
keep such regional entities acting in accordance with applicable legal
frameworks.
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Even if federal or state laws add citizen suit provisions such as have
been central to environment protection efforts, such suits are unlikely
to be initiated unless prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees.
Little reason exists to anticipate that any new anti-sprawl regulatory
schemes would contain clearly stated mandates, let alone confer a
cause of action on citizens and promise attorneys fees to prevailing
litigants. Without such enticements for citizen groups to monitor state
and local decisionmaking, sprawl-related decisions are likely to occur
with little public scrutiny. Key sprawl decisions are likely to continue
to be made by largely unaccountable local, state, and federal officials.
If a culture of professionalism prevails, and senior state or regional
officials have publicly committed to enact anti-sprawl measures, one
still might see substantive and effective measures to address sprawl's
ills. The institutional complexity and skewed political and economic
incentives that have contributed to existing sprawling urban forms
may occasionally be overcome by political entrepreneurs' embrace of
anti-sprawl policies. Sustained and effective anti-sprawl measures,
however, have been and are likely to remain a rarity.
